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
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Ref: 2569/153/46

Dear Department,

We enclose herein copies of selfexplanatory correspondence between H.M. Ambassador,
Dr. Magnes and Mr. Sulzberger, together with a
booklet entitled "Palestine a Bi-National State".

You will see that we have not committed you to putting these proposals on the agenda if the London talks are resumed because we do not think they are practicable at the present time, but we send them to you in case some turn in the conference may render them useful.

Yours ever,

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Eastern Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

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COP

British Embassy, Washington, D.C.

31st December 1946

Ref: 2569/152/46

Dear Dr. Magnes,

Many thanks for your letter of the 12th December about your proposals for a solution of the Palestine problem.

Just before it arrived I had one from Mr. Sulzberger of the New York Times and asked whether the proposals contained therein could be put on the agenda of the London talks.

The greatest difficulty I see at the present time is that neither the Arabs nor the Zionists are likely to accept them. The Arabs strongly resist the idea of Jewish parity of numbers and on the Zionist side no one is likely to be content with less than an "independent state in a viable area of Palestine". This means that your suggestions could only be sponsored by the British Government. After an exhaustive survey of various possible solutions, including some on similar lines to your own, they consider that their own proposals offer the best hope in existing circumstances for a long term solution. But they are of course still ready to consider fully all suggestions and I am therefore sending your proposals to London, where they will, I am sure, be studied attentively.

With all good wishes for the New Year,

Yours sincerely,

INVERCHAPEL

Dr. J.L. Magnes, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

With the comment of the April 3 rd. 1947

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British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

31st December 1946

Ref: 2569/151/46

Dear Mr. Sulzberger,

I promised to write to you again about your letter of 18th December. I fear that in my interim reply I have misled you in suggesting that Dr. Magnes's proposals for a bi-national state in Palestine were to some extent covered by the "Morrison-Grady plan". A closer examination of them shows that they are not, and I do not think that in London their prospects are likely to be very good. The Arabs are strongly opposed at present to the idea that the Jews might obtain parity in numbers with them and the Zionists are unlikely to be content with anything less than "an independent state in a viable area of Palestine". The proposals would have to be sponsored, if at all, by the British Government. I see no immediate chance of this, since my Government, after an exhaustive study of many possible solutions, including some on the lines of Dr. Magnes's proposals, came to the conclusion that its own suggestions offered the best hope in present circumstances, of reaching a long term settlement.

But my Government are of course still open to all suggestions and I am therefore sending Dr. Magnes's proposals to London, together with your plea and his that they should be considered again.

I have just received a letter from Dr. Magnes in much the same terms as your own and I am sending him a reply on similar lines.

With all good wishes for 1947,

Yours sincerely,

Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Esq.,
The New York Times,
Times Square,
New York, N.Y.

INVERCHAPEL

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C O P Y

THE NEW YORK TIMES Times Square

December 18, 1946

Dear Lord Inverchapel:

I have just had word from my friend, Judah Magnes, who talked with you when he was in this country recently about his goal of a Bi-National State in Palestine. He is fearful that the discussion of this particular effort towards solution of the difficult problem in that section of the world will not be on the agenda of the London meething which I understand is scheduled for some time in January.

Magnes asks if I can't assist in seeing that the Bi-National idea is, at least, placed on the agenda so that it may be thoroughly aired and, quite naturally, I turn to you for help. Do you think it would be possible to arrange this? It doesn't seem to be asking too much.

I should appreciate it if you would let me hear from you, as it would be pleasant to cheer up Dr. Magnes with the assurance that the subject will be considered.

With every good wish and the Season's Greetings, I am,

Faithfully yours,
ARTHUR HAYS SULZBERGER

His Excellency, The Right Honorable Lord Inverchapel British Embassy Washington, D.C.

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THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY, JERUSALEM

December 12, 1946

Lord Inverchapel British Embassy Washington, D.C.

Dear Lord Inverchapel,

When we met in Washington in August it was thought, you may recall, that it might be of advantage to a fair settlement of the Palestine problem, that I keep in touch with you.

I wrote you from New York giving the names of a Committee which had been formed to back "moderate and feasible" proposals. Among them, there was our friend Arthur Sulzberger.

I am now sending you a copy of an article which I have just sent on to the Jewish Chronicle, London. I hope you may agree that the opportunity should be given of having these binational proposals put on the agenda of the London Conference - if it takes place.

I do hope, also, that if the Conference takes place and breaks down, the British Government will take the same course as it did with India before "placing the Mandate at the feet of the United Nations". A Cabinet mission with authority to negotiate and settle on the spot might well succeed where Conferences away from Palestine itself have, thus far, failed.

I read that you had taken sick when on your great discovery of the Northwestern Trail, and I hope you are now in good health.

I am,

Sincerely yours,

J.L. MAGNES

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c/o Hebrew University Jerusalem

11th December, 1946.

Dear Mr. Shaftesley,

Your letter of November 18 reached me on December 6. I am sending you herewith the statement you so kindly asked for.

I would ask you please to put the following introduction at the head of the article:

"In view of Mr. Bevin's statement that all views are to be given a hearing at the forthcoming Palestine Conference, we have asked Dr. J.L. Magnes to give a brief summary of the proposals for a bi-national Palestine. "Without necessarily identifying ourselves with these proposals we think arrangements should be made to have them put forward adequately before the Conference."

Introductory words of the sort seem to my friends and myself to be necessary if the article is to be more than just another article. If the London Conference takes place, it should really have as one of its main objectives the clarification of all plans for a solution of the vexed Palestine problem.

If you do not think you can introduce the article in this way, will you please wire me before proceeding with its publication?

Remember me kindly to Mr. Kessler. I hope he does not miss Palestine farming too much.

I am,

Sincerely yours,

J.L. MAGNES

OF.

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It seems certain that at the British-Arab-Jewish Conference in January, not only the British proposal for Federalization or Provincial Autonomy will be discussed, but also the more recent proposal of the Jewish Agency for partition and the formation of a sovereign Jewish state; and also the proposal for a "democratic Palestinian state" with an Arab majority, as put forward by the Secretary General of the Arab League in the Jewish Chronicle for September 27, 1946.

It is not certain, however, that the proposals for a unitary bi-national Palestine with equal rights for the two nationalities, the Jews and the Arabs, will be put forward. Binationalism is a serious proposal which has many advocates both in Palestine and elsewhere. It has advocates both among the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine and other countries. It is the sole proposal for a compromise within a unitary Palestine. Among the Jews of Palestine, the Hashomer Hatzair and the Ihud (Union) Association, and many in the Alihah Hadasha and other parties, and also individuals who belong to no party, advocate this bi-national compromise.

Detailed bi-national proposals were put forward by Ihud (Union) representatives before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. These have been published in New York in a booklet called "Palestine a Bi-national State". It is generally acknowledged that the Anglo-American Committee was considerably influenced by these proposals.

The formula of the Committee of Inquiry - Recommendation No.3:- (1) That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine. (2) That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State; and that Palestine must ultimately become a state which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike; and accords to the inhabitants the fullest measure of self-government - all of this and more is to be found almost word for word in the Ihud proposals for a binational Palestine.

The Ihud was also insistent before the Committee

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that 100,000 Jewish refugees be admitted, and the Ihud is of the opinion that had this been done without too much delay, the Arabs of Palestine and other countries would doubtless have protested, but would have acquiesced in this policy.

The Ihud advocated further, that Jewish immigration be facilitated throughout the years up to parity with the Arabs, by enlarging the economic absorptive capacity of the country through the employment of scientific methods and large capital sums.

The Ihud also protested against the present discriminatory land laws, and emphasized the need of a large Development Plan to be worked out and implemented by Jews, Arabs and British together, for the benefit of all inhabitants without regard to religion or race. This would be of particular benefit to the Jewish settlers and the Arab fellahin.

The Ihud proposed a number of concrete suggestions to the Anglo-American Committee for a large measure of immediate self-government at the Centre, and in the various districts of the country. Why should there be no Jews or Arabs in the Executive Council of Government, or in responsible positions in the Secretariat, no Jews or Arabs as heads of central Government Departments, or as Presidents of Courts, no Jews or Arabs as District Commissioners?

Suggestions were also advanced concerning a Constitution, with a Legislative Assembly elected upon the basis of two equal nationalities.

The Ihud declared further that the objective of self-government in a bi-national Palestine was an independent bi-national Palestine state in the shortest possible time, which might, when it became independent, be an autonomous member of a larger Union of neighbouring

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countries.

We submit that these and the other proposals for a bi-national Palestine are reasonable and feasible.

These proposals maintain a unitary Palestine, and thus do not require the drawing of new boundaries for new States or Provinces - a most difficult, dangerous and very long-drawn-out process. These proposals place upon the Jews and Arabs together the imperative necessity of trying to work out a common life together in their common country, Palestine.

Partition is in large measure the offspring of despair, of the weariness and defeatism of those who say, the Jews and the Arabs can not live together.

We contest this assumption, we deny its truth. Jews and Arabs do live and work together today, and we know that large numbers of Jews and Arabs regret that owing to present policies they arekept from the cooperation in all walks of life to which they naturally aspire. We submit that the opportunity should be given to present this view to the Conference and that it should not be permitted to go by default. It has all the elements of a reasonable and practicable compromise.

A great advantage of these proposals is that of time. They can be bagun immediately. They do not require the drawing of boundaries within the country, or the elaborate preparations necessary for setting up States or Provinces. They do not commit the mistake of the Federalization Plan which would keep Jews out of one part of the country and Arahs out of another, without, on the other hand, giving either people genuiné self-government. Bi-national proposals, if generously and vigoursly announced as policy, and as vigorously put into practice, would bring a deep sigh of relief to hundreds of thousands of Jews and Arabs in Palestine and neighbouring countries, and perhaps to millions of Jews, Christians and Moslems throughout the world, for whom Palestine is the Holy Land of three monotheistic religions. These proposals are the best approach to peace in Palestine. They can form the bridge across the gap between all the other proposals. They "seek the peace of Jerusalem".

412/46/31

PALESTINE A BI-NATIONAL STATE

 \mathbf{BY}

MARTIN BUBER JUDAH L. MAGNES MOSES SMILANSKY

IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE
NEW YORK
AUGUST, 1946

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference:
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The Times

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jungle. He was called to discuss and coordinate their affairs.

Lette

A Bi-National Palestine

Present Federalization Plan

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES: The Federalization Plan, now before the British and American Governments, is not Partition. The confusion | f. in terminology may lead to confused

Partition, as proposed by the Peel Royal Commission in 1937, means the establishment of a Jewish independent sovereign state and of an Arab independent sovereign state. The boundary line between these two sovereign states would be similar to the boundary dividing any contiguous sovereign states. One of the great objections to Partition is that this frontier separates Jews and Arabs, instead of bringing them together; and that this creates two irredentas, which, like all irredentas, are bound to lead to war.

Federalization; on the other hand, maintains the whole of Palestine as a come as something unit, and, therefore, does not separate shock to younger Jews and Arabs. They can pass freely that an officer who into all parts of Palestine. The bounduse in New York is aries between the Jewish province and the Arab province are administrative virz, the department's boundaries only, and therefore do not expert, is retiring at create Jewish and Arab irredentas. Federalization, therefore, is much to be

> But there are at least two cardinal objections to the present Federalization Plan. The one is that the details of the plan are not satisfactory. The second is that a unified, bi-national Palestine is a much better proposal than either Partition or Federalization.

Weaknesses Listed

Although the actual text of the present Federalization Plan has been kept secret, enough is known to justify the statement that it has, at least, the following three basic weaknesses:

1. The area allotted for Jewish immigration is too small. Room must be found for thousands of Jewish immigrants in addition to the 100,000 refagees proposed by President Truman. In this connection, it is not clear if the Negev is to be shut off forever from irrigation and settlement.

2. The amount of self-government offered to the Jews and the Arabs is woefully small. The proposed provincial government in subject to move kinds of checks and controls which t might strangle all initiative. But what | P is even worse, there is no hint that Jews or Arabs are to be in the Central Federal Government. This remains entirely in the hands of the British, even r down to the Department of Antiquities. | c

This is a perpetuation of an impossible situation: No Jews or Arabs in p the Executive of Government, nor as li the head of any Central Department | 5 of Government, nor as high administrative officers in the Secretariat of Government, nor as Presidents of Courts, nor as District Commissioners. It is s treating the Jews and Arabs as children, instead of as mature communi- the ties. The self-government which is to be granted is spoon-fed.

It is high time that these communi- to ties were brought together, and this ov Edward Henry of the can best be done by having them par- pl Civil Service had ticipate together in the Central Govhile been working ernment of Palestine. There does not is system of classifica- even seem to be provision for a coun- tit and the solution of cil containing representatives of the aid to have come to Jews, the Arabs, and the British, so hile he was taking a that they could at least meet, in order is

he head of the C. I. D. 3. There seems to be no provision for and at the start of a Development Plan, which would be tea Hed the system that worked out and carried out by Jews, to all the civilized Arabs, and British, all together for the pl benefit of all the inhabitants of Pales- go

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It seems almost an act God that the ends of n's fingers should eve a mark so distince that the chance of er person in the world an identical trace is be negligible. Add to the excretory glands, ke the papillary ridges deposit an oily sube at least a latent atever they touch and nplete.

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Equal Nationalities

Federalization is a kind of bi-nationalism, and is therefore not to be rejected out of hand. But basic modifications are required in the plan as submitted. A genuine bi-national Palestine, consisting of two equal nationalities, the Jews and the Arabs, is much more practical than either Partition or Federalization. There are many Jews, and many Arabs, and many Britishers, and I find now, many Americans also, who are heartily in favor of a true binational Palestine.

May I call their attention and the attention of the public generally to the pamphlet which has just appeared, called, "Palestine, a Bi-National State." It contains eighty pages, most of which are taken up by detailed practical proposals for a bi-national Palestine. This was submitted by the Ihud (Union) Association of Palestine to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in Jerusalem, last March. The pamphlet contains also the oral testimony before the Inquiry Committee by Prof. Martin Buber, Mr. Moses Smilansky and myself. This pamphlet may be secured at 1776 Broadway, Room 2306, JUDAH L. MAGNES. New York. New York, Aug. 15, 1946.

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ORVILLE PRESCOTT

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cation in brought Lien promotion so that he became a city of Keith magistrate himself, of the city of Kow Loong.

He took Hibiscus with him as his lawfully wedded wife and loved her as well as he was able. But the trouble with the selfish and self-centered Lien was that he also loved several other women within the first year of his marriage. There was Jasmin, the 16-year-old concubine, emotional and stupid, but bewitching nonetheless. And there was Peony, who seems to be the same resolute woman of the earlier novel. Lien was smart and he was eloquent, always composing extemporaneous verses to suit any occasion. But why two such strong-minded women as Hibiscus and Peony should have loved him to such distraction Mr. West never makes clear. Perhaps Lien just was blessed with that irresistible charm which women delight in and which men so often fail to

"The Three Blossoms of Chang-an" reflects the ritualized courtesy, the worldly cynicism and hedonistic philosophy of its hero and his circle. With sensual and decadent appreciation of every refinement of pleasure, flowers and scenery, art and poetry, food, drink and women, Lien enjoyed life, while all around him were poison, murder, intrigue, famine and plague. Although he could observe that "life is more full of bitterness than is justified by the stupidity of men," Lien was indifferent to most suffering not his own. And when he could not solve his own amatory problems he sought escape in a ridiculously unnecessary suicide.

Disillusioned Wisdom

But before that undignified exit Mr. West has decorated Lien's story with many poems in the Chinese manner, with subtle stories and bits of folklore which hide in semi-obscurity their morsels of disillusioned, traditional wisdom, and with many indelicate innuendos and a rather tiresome eroticism. Lien, who is as talkative a character as Mr. Cabell's Jurgen, shares that profligate pawnbroker's preoccupation with procreation. In fact, there is more than a coincidental kinship between the English Sinologue, Keith West, and the American romantic satirist, James Branch Cabell. And Mr. West is at his best when he is least like Mr. Cabell, when he concentrates on his ironic presentation of Chinese culture rather than when he intrudes on Lien's private pleasures.

Here are a few observations from "The Three Blossoms of Chang-an" which can serve to suggest its general atmosphere: "A wise woman woos her husband's ears with words which he wants to hear" (elementary, perhaps, but sound); 's young "theory has more in its favor than practice" (alas, how true!); "the gloating desire of those he went whose crimes have not been discovered to witness the expiation of discovered crimes by some unluckier ones" (not necessarily an exclusively ered in a Chinese aspect of human nature), and "happiness, like a woman, is bound to be unfaithful" (an unhappy truth marred by a faulty comparison which implies a ridiculous generalization).

REVIEW IN EEN



'Holiday in Mexico,' in Which Metro's Array of Musical Prodigies Outdo Themselves, New Bill at Capitol Theatre

steps are more than offset by the delicate blonde beauty of Ilona Massey and the wonderfully rich voice of Jane Powell, a young soprano who is making her third appearance on the screen. Her two previous pictures, "Song of the Open Road" and "Delightfully Dangerous," are best forgotten in light of the way she shines in this new one. Miss P-well doesn't have as yet the easy charm Deanna Durbin exhibited, but given a little more time under the expert tutelage of Mr. Pasternak there is no reason why she, too, shouldn't become the moviegoer's singing sweetheart.

While most of the story centers on the efforts of the precocious 'teen-age daughter of the American Ambassador to Mexico to run their motherless home, all of the music is not left entirely to Miss Power For Miss Massey sings, too, and even Walter Pidgeon, Mr. Am-

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IN REVIEW



aid Bergman in "Notorious"

American roles.

At the Capitol

'Holiday in Mexico,' in Which Metro's Array of Musical Prodigies Outdo Themselves, New Bill at Capitol Theatre

steps are more than offset by the delicate blonde beauty of Ilona Massey and the wonderfully rich voice of Jane Powell, a young soprano who is making her third appearance on the screen. Her two previous pictures, "Song of the Open Road" and "Delightfully Dangerous," are best forgotten in light of the way she shines in this new one. Miss P-well doesn't have as yet the easy charm Deanna Durbin exhibited, but given a little more time under the expert tutelage of Mr. Pasternak there is no reason why she, too, shouldn't become the moviegoer's singing sweetheart.

While most of the story centers on the efforts of the precocious 'teen-age daughter of the American Ambassador to Mexico to run their motherless home, all of the music is not left entirely to Miss Powell. For Miss Massey sings, too, and even Walter Pidgeon, Mr. Ambassador himself, warbles a few lines of "Goodnight Sweetheart." ys it is the prop that holds And since José Iturbi and Xavier Cugat are on hand and just happen Grant, who is exceptionally to be more proficient at making s matched for acting honors music than acting, they also are heard from at considerable and cast by Claude Rains as the ig-wig, to whom Miss Berg-pleasing length. Mr. Iturbi, who is scomes attached. Mr. Rains' still trying desperately hard to beand tense performance of come a genial comedian, again at-vidious character is respon-tr much of the anguish that cuation creates. Reinhold the camera going behind the keylel and Ivan Triesault are
oo, as Nazi worms, and a
felt hammers on the strings, he touch of chilling arro-makes the instrument sing excit-s a German mother is added ingly, whether playing an abridged ame Konstantin. Louis Caldo Rachmaninoff Concerto, the "Rado Moroni Olsen are fine in Interpolation of boogie woogie.

ck up another smash hit situations which find Miss Powell and Roddy McDowell experiencing and Roddy McDowell experiencing all the heartaches and thrills of puppy love. And there are two vastly amusing sequences toward the end when the Messrs. Pidgeon and Iturbi are the victims of a romantic contretemps resulting from a misinterpretation of intentions kettes. on the part of two overly zealous young ladies. Mr. Pidgeon's heart really belongs to Miss Massey, IN MEXICO, screen play by Isobel pased on a story by William Kozpected by George Sidney; produced isternak for Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, as Walter Pidgeon Himself Roddy McDowall this film; the oldsters are permitted to act reasonably sensible. however, and it must be said that

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CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE EDUCATIONAL WORK

OF THE

IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

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PALESTINE A BI-NATIONAL STATE

 \mathbf{BY}

MARTIN BUBER
JUDAH L. MAGNES
MOSES SMILANSKY

IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE
1776 BROADWAY, ROOM 2306
NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

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PREFACE

The Testimony of the Ihud (Union) Association before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in Jerusalem was, in the opinion of many, of great importance.

The Report of the Anglo-American Committee presented a general point of view similar to that of Ihud, which holds, that Palestine should be a bi-national country with Jews and Arabs as equal nationalities, and that Palestine would be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State.

The pamphlet herewith published contains Ihud's reasoned and detailed arguments for this.

At the moment of writing this preface, the movement of the 100,000 Jewish displaced persons to the Home in Palestine has, unfortunately, not yet begun. But their coming to Palestine is inevitable.

It is necessary also that the United States and the British Commonwealth and other countries open their gates to thousands of displaced persons. They cannot remain much longer in Central and Eastern Europe.


We regret that the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry did not recommend an immediate increase in the measure of self-government for Palestine. That is, in its way, as important as the recommendation to admit the 100,000 refugees. The present pamphlet contains our argument for self-government.

I have not seen the exact text of the newest proposals for a Federated Palestine. The idea itself has points to commend it. But it seems woefully lacking in the two essentials of the problem: the opportunity for Jewish immigration up to parity in numbers with the Arab population, and the opportunity for real self-government. No plan has any chance of success unless immigration and self-government are adequately dealt with.

There must be a policy whose main objective is Jewish-Arab cooperation. Jews and Arabs will not be gotten to cooperate by keeping them apart. Nor can the situation wait till the Jews and Arabs "agree" to cooperate. Conditions—economic, social, political—must be created which will require them to cooperate, and there is no part of life more important for this than full participation together in government. Jews and Arabs should not be treated as children, but as mature communities, and imagination and courage and faith are required of those in America and Britain, in whose hands fateful decisions rest.

New York, August 15, 1946.

J. L. MAGNES.



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WRITTEN STATEMENT

to the

ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY'

JERUSALEM

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THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

JERUSALEM, MARCH 5, 1946

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THE IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION

The Ihud (Union) Association was formed in September, 1942. It is not a political party. It is a group of individuals belonging to different parties and of independents belonging to no party. Though members of Ihud may have varying views on details, they are united in the firm conviction that there is but one way of meeting the Palestine problem—that of Jewish-Arab cooperation. We are appending the declaration made when the Ihud (Union) Association was formed (page 29).

The Ihud (Union) Association stands for the union of Jews and Arabs in a bi-national Palestine based on the parity of the two peoples; and for the union of the bi-national Palestine with neighboring countries. This Union is to be a Regional Union under the auspices of the UNO.

JEWISH-ARAB COOPERATION

Jewish-Arab cooperation in Palestine has never been made the chief objective of major policy. Sporadic and, at times, serious attempts have been made in this direction. A history of these attempts would be most illuminating. But whenever such attempts encountered difficulties, as they were bound to, they were all too lightly abandoned. The result is that, after 24 years of the Mandate, there is more political tension in the 7


country than ever before. Far from securing "the development of self-governing institutions" as required by Article 2 of the Mandate, and far from "fostering the establishment of a full measure of self-governing institutions", as promised in the Churchill-Samuel Statement of Policy in 1922, Palestine is governed bureaucratically by a colonial administration, without a legislature and without the participation of Jews or Arabs in the more responsible positions of Government. The fault lies with all concerned—Jews, Arabs and British.

The establishment of Jewish-Arab cooperation is not an easy matter, and it is particularly difficult in the political sphere to which we shall address ourselves. It is here where the crux of the situation lies. Personal relations between Arabs and Jews are, on the whole, still fair. There is no deep racial animosity between these two related Semitic peoples. There is no present religious animosity. In the cities there is a certain amount of economic cooperation, but less than there used to be, and there would be much more under settled political conditions. There is a large measure of cooperation between villages in the farming districts. It is worthy of note, that even with the present political tension, where the leaders on both sides hardly ever meet, and with the boycott propaganda going on, country Jews and country Arabs meet in a friendly way and cooperate with one another. They do not want to be at war with one another. But in all these fields cooperation is impeded because of political, "national" animosity.

POLITICAL COOPERATION

Some of our members are old residents here. We know that Jews and Arabs have cooperated and can cooperate in all spheres of life, including the political. But political cooperation will not come of itself. There is one condition for its achievement—that Jewish-Arab cooperation be made the chief objective of major policy, and that this policy be carried through authoritatively, day by day, year by year.

We shall endeavour to give an outline of how we picture this to ourselves. We are well aware of the imperfections in our practical suggestions. On one thing we are absolutely clear: The way out of the impasse is Jewish-Arab cooperation.



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PALESTINE NOT A JEWISH STATE AND NOT AN ARAB STATE; BUT A BI-NATIONAL COUNTRY

We do not favour Palestine as a Jewish country or Palestine as an Arab country, but a bi-national Palestine as the common country of two peoples.

One of the leaders of the Jewish labour movement in Palestine gave a definition in 1931 of a bi-national country which we think pertinent:

"In a bi-national country the two nations have equal freedom and independence, equal participation in government and equality of representation, and one people shall not be stronger than the other . . . They must make the country into a country of nationalities. This is altogether different from a nationalist country."

For proof that a multi-national country is not just an artificial concoction, but "a tried and tested method of government", we would refer you to three recent books, the one by Professor Janowsky, "Nationalism and Nationalities", published in 1945 by Macmillan; the second by Professor H. Seton-Watson, "Eastern Europe between the wars 1918-41", published in 1945 by the Cambridge University Press; and the third, "National Self-Determination" by A. Cobban, Oxford University Press, 1945.

PALESTINE NOT JUST AN ARAB LAND OR JUST A JEWISH LAND

Palestine is not just an Arab land like any other Arab land, or just a Jewish land.

For one thing, it is a Holy Land for three monotheistic religions, of which two—Judaism and Christianity—had their origin here, whilst the third, Islam, regards Jerusalem as next in holiness to Mecca and Medinah.

Lord Milner, who declared himself "a strong supporter of pro-Arab policy" and a believer "in the independence of the Arab countries . . . I look forward to an Arab Federation", is quoted by the Peel Royal Commission (page 41) as stating in 1923 that:

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"Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You can not ignore all history and tradition in the matter . . . The future of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the country of the present day."

We agree with the further comment of the Royal Commission (page 42), that "the case stated by Lord Milner against Arab control applies equally to a Jewish control".

ARAB LEAGUE: REGIONAL UNION

With Lord Milner, we, too, believe in the independence of the Arab countries, and we would want them to achieve this as soon as possible, and we consider the formation of the League of Arab States a step forward. We look forward to a Federation or a Regional Union of some of the Middle Eastern countries. The Pact of the Arab League foresees this (Article 9). We would want the bi-national Palestine to be a member of this Regional Union. We are hopeful that the League of Arab States will take a broad view of the Palestine problem and recognize the necessity of a bi-national Palestine, if not today then tomorrow, as being the one possible form of independence for Palestine and as being in the interests of the Arab states themselves. Palestine must be lifted out of the parochialism to which its tiny size might condemm it. Palestine represents an inter-national, inter-religious idea of deep concern to millions of Jews, Christians and Moslems throughout the world.

HISTORICAL RIGHTS OF JEWS IN PALESTINE

Another reason why Palestine cannot be regarded as just an Arab land like any other, is because of the indissoluble historical association of the Jewish people and of Judaism with this land. This connection has never ceased, ever since the days of the Hebrew Bible, its prophets, legislators and psalmists. The Jewish religion is universalist in its tendencies; but it is inextricably bound up with the Jewish People and with the Land of Israel for its actual fulfillment. The very idea of Palestine as a modern entity is the result of Jewish activity. Moreover,

52 nations of the world recognized this in the Mandate for Palestine, in endorsing the idea of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Churchill-Samuel Statement of Policy in 1922 declared that it is essential that the Jewish people "should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance."

One of our members, Professor M. Buber, who was one of the founders of the Zionist Organization, is ready to testify before you as to the profound significance of Palestine for Judaism and the Jewish people.

By their labour and skill here in the past generation, the Jews have shown how truly they love this sacred soil. It is now the home of 600,000 Jews. They have their schools, their farms, their synagogues here. They have introduced science into agriculture and industry, and have thus raised the standard of living for all the population. They have found new sources of water and power. They have brought with them progressive social ideas. They did their full share in the war effort in every way.

It is upon this basis that one may say, that the Jews have certain historical rights in Palestine, and have proved themselves worthy of these rights.

NATURAL RIGHTS OF ARABS IN PALESTINE

On the other hand, the Arabs have certain natural rights in Palestine. They are the large majority of the country's inhabitants. They have lived here for centuries and tilled its soil. On every side we see the remains of Arab culture. The holy places and the tombs of their fathers through many generations are here, and they have developed a deep feeling for what they call the Arabism of the country.

HONOURABLE COMPROMISE

We regard the historical rights of the Jews and the natural rights of the Arabs as, under all the circumstances, of equal validity, and it is the task of statesmanship to find ways of adjustment between these contending claims. Neither people can get in Palestine all its wants, and both peoples will have to make concessions. The way of honourable and reasonable compromise must be sought.

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IMMIGRATION VERSUS SELF-GOVERNMENT

In the Report of the Royal Commission it is stated (page 136) that "what the Arabs most desire is independence. What they most fear is Jewish domination". What most Jews desire is immigration. What they most fear is Arab domination. A chief objective of policy must be to remove this fear of domination on either side. We propose methods of achieving this. As to the Jews, in place of the desired unrestricted immigration, we propose a substantial immigration, but with limitations. As to the Arabs, we propose, in place of the desired independent sovereign Arab state, the maximum amount of self-government in a bi-national country.

THE POLITICAL PROBLEM

The three main elements in the political problem are: Immigration, Land, Self-Government. We shall deal first with immigration and land, and then with self-government.

We envisage three distinct periods:

First, the present period and as long as the Mandate lasts. Second, the period of Trusteeship under the UNO.

Third, the period when a bi-national Palestine is no longer a Trust Territory but a self-governing unit within a larger Regional Union.

\mathbf{II}

IMMIGRATION: FIRST PERIOD

100,000 immigrants now

Everyone is deeply concerned with the fate of the many thousands of Jewish displaced persons who are at present languishing without a home, or unable or unwilling to go back "home", and eager to come to their true Home, where brothers and sisters are ready to welcome them with open arms. We regard it as imperative that an interim ad hoc compassionate immigration of the 100,000 refugees recommended by President Truman be made possible without delay. As far as practicable, these refugees might be divided into 25,000 children,

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25,000 parents, relatives and older persons, and 50,000 young people. This would bring creative forces into the country, and also be an historical act of great mercy.

The financing of this immigration and its accommodation in Palestine might be shared by the Jewish Agency, the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Hadassah Women's Organization of America and other Jewish bodies, together with UNRRA and/or the Social and Economic Council of UNO.

The number of Jewish displaced persons exceeds 100,000, and we assume that other countries besides Palestine will open their gates.

Arab opposition

The immigration of 100,000 persons will doubless be opposed by Arab spokesmen. We do not think, however, that this opposition need take on an extreme form. We base our opinion on the following:

- 1. 100,000 additional Jews are not a threat to Arab numbers. In 1936 the Arab population was increasing at the rate of 24,000 per annum (Royal Commission page 282). It is conjectured that the present rate of Arab increase is about 30.000 per annum. It has been established that, during the five years 1939-44, the total Arab increase amounted to about 150,000, and the total Jewish increase to about 83,000. Thus in these five years the net Arab increment exceeds the Jewish by about 67,000. If, therefore, 100,000 Jews were now to come in, the actual proportionate growth of the Jewish population would be no more than about 33,000. This is not a particularly frightening number.
- 2. If 100,000 Jews come in, the total Jewish population would then be about 700,000. This is less than a figure agreed upon just about 10 years ago, in 1936, in talks between some leading Arabs and some leading Jews. These talks took place after the outbreak of the Arab revolt and in an endeavour to find a compromise. The provisional agreement was, that after 10 years the Jewish population, which was about 400,000 at the time, might become 800,000. Had this agreement come into effect, there might be 800,000 Jews here now, instead of 600,000. The agreement was, most unfortunately, not accepta-

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ble in some quarters. But if in 1936 the idea of 800,000 Jews by 1946 did not frighten leading Arabs then, it is difficult to believe that 700,000 should frighten them now.


- 3. Whereas it was possible for Arab leaders to get the Arabs to revolt in 1936, it would be not so easy now. The plain Arabs have had their fill of fighting. It would not be so easy in 1929 to trump up the religious issue. The fellah and the Arab worker have learned a great deal since then, and they are not quite so naive politically. Moreover an Arab youth is growing up, which if nationalistic, is at the same time open to progressive ideas. A mere exercise in arithmetic will suffice to dampen insurrectionary ardour: 1,200,000 Arabs minus 700,000 Jews = a majority of half a million Arabs. That is a large enough figure to keep even the most unlettered from getting excited, much less ready to risk their lives.
- 4. The argument of some Arabs, that they oppose the entry of a single extra Jew, because that is one step nearer to the Jewish State, may seem attractive theoretically. But it is, in fact, only a figure of speech, symbolizing their very deep opposition to the Jewish State. For a Jewish State there would have to be a majority of Jews. An additional 100,000 is not equivalent to setting up a majority.

IMMIGRATION: SECOND PERIOD

It should be borne in mind, that the Churchill-Samuel Statement of Policy in 1922 declared, that for the fulfillment of the policy of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, "it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration".

Parity in numbers

As a long-term immigration policy we propose that, in the bi-national Palestine, the Jewish population should have the chance through immigration of becoming one half of the population. That means, that the Jews would, upon the basis of present population figures, have the opportunity of doubling their numbers, there being about 600,000 Jews here now and and about 1,200,000 Arabs. It would really mean more than that, since the Arab natural increase is higher than the Jewish



(2.7:1.3), thus leaving room, even after parity had been achieved, for additional numbers of Jews to catch up each year with the greater Arab natural increase.

Rate of Immigration

How long it would take, approximately, under favourable circumstances, for Jews through immigration and natural increase to reach parity, can be estimated upon the basis of the population trends on pages 281-282 of the Royal Commission's Report. Although these calculations were made in 1936, it would appear that the ratio of Arab increase and Jewish increase has remained stable. We can therefore take the figures of the Royal Commission as roughly correct for 1946. Upon that basis it would take eleven years from now, i.e. up to 1957, for the Jews to reach parity at the rate of 60,000 immigrants a year; 14 years, i.e. up to 1960, at the rate of 50,000 a year; 18 years, i.e. up to 1964, at the rate of 40,000 a year, and 24 years, i.e. up to 1970, to reach parity at the rate of 30,000 Jewish immigrants a year. Any annual Jewish immigration below 30,000 would never let the Jews catch up with the Arabs.

ECONOMIC ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

We continue to support the principle laid down in the Statement of Policy of 1922, that immigration is not "to exceed whatever may be the economic absorptive capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals".


In view, however, of the basic importance of this principle, we hold that a change should be made in the method of determining this absorptive capacity. In effecting this change there seem to us to be three main elements.

Immigration Board

First, a special body, an Immigration Board, is to be set up to determine economic absorptive capacity. This body would consist of representatives of the Mandatory (or of the Administering Authority under the Trusteeship System) and of the Jewish Agency and of the Arab League.

Jewish achievements

Second, account must be taken not only of the views of economic, financial, agricultural and other experts, but also of




those imponderables which have enabled the Jews to extend the economic absorptive capacity of the country beyond anything the experts had considered possible. When Sir Herbert Samuel was High Commissioner in 1920-25, it was the accepted view, that Palestine, with agriculture as its chief industry, could not hold more than 3,000,000. There were 805,000 inhabitants at mid-1924, of whom 628,000 were Moslems. But now, Lord Samuel in his recent speech in the House of Lords, with the general tendency of which we are in accord, mentions the possibility of a population of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million within a generation. The conviction that Palestine can absorb economically a much larger population than had at one time been considered possible, is due primarily to what the Jews through their zeal and science and capacity for sacrifice have already shown to be the possibilities. These achievements would hardly have been possible by any other people, simply because we know of no other people with the same enthusiasm and love, and the same determination for developing the capacity of Palestine to absorb their brothers and sisters, their own homeless People. Moreover, we think that the Jews could not have achieved this anywhere else. These are factors that must be reckoned with in determining economic absorptive capacity.

Development Plan

Third, a systematic effort must be made, and not by the Jews alone, to develop the economic potentialities of the country. There has been much talk of a Plan of Development for the benefit of the whole country and all its inhabitants. In order that this may be a reality, we favour the appointment of a Development Board, consisting, as before, of representatives of the Mandatory (or of the Trusteeship Council) and of the Jewish Agency and of the Arab League.

The Development Plan might be financed by a loan at a low rate of interest. Provided there was political peace here, this loan might be attractive to the vast amount of accumulated capital lying idle in lending countries, more especially the United States.

The appointment of these two special Boards—immigration and development—with Jewish and Arab representatives to deal with fundamental problems, illustrates what we mean



when we say that Jewish-Arab cooperation should be the objective of major policy.

IF PARITY IS REACHED

We propose further, that when and if parity is reached, the two peoples are to review the immigration situation in the Legislature of the time, and that further Jewish immigration (beyond the difference in natural increase) is to be encouraged, if agreement can be reached between the Jews and Arabs. This would mean that Jewish immigration beyond parity would be dependent upon whether the two peoples had found the way of peace and understanding together.

IMMIGRATION: THIRD PERIOD

We propose further that if and when there be a Union of the bi-national Palestine with neighbouring countries, the question of an enlarged Jewish immigration is to be taken up again in the Palestine Legislature, as well as in the Federal Council of this Union. With the widening of the Arab background through Union with other countries, the Arabs of Palestine would no longer need to fear being "swamped" by the Jews. The present acute importance of majority—minority in Palestine would have lost its main point, and the Arabs of Palestine could then afford to look at Jewish immigration with greater liberality. Indeed, by that time a normal admission of Jewish settlers to the other countries of the Union, without of course extending the boundaries of the Jewish National Home, might well become a question of practical politics. Arab statesmen have expressed a similar view on more than one occasion. The Jews could certainly be of great service in helping the development of backward parts of the Union.

LAND

This is basic for both Jews and Arabs. For the Jews, a return to the soil is essential in order that this city people may be restored to normal health. Land is also of immediate importance in order that new settlements may be established for the absorption of new immigrants. For the Arabs it is important

in order that their basic industry—agriculture—may be safeguarded. From every point of view we think that land reform of a progressive nature is essential. We see every reason why Jews and Arabs should cooperate in this.

We assume that if an answer be found to the question of immigration, a settlement of the land question will inevitably follow. This is bound up in large measure with the Development Plan which we have mentioned.

One of our members, Mr. M. Smilansky, who has lived in this country for over 50 years, and who was for a long time head of the Farmers' Association, is ready to testify before you on the land problem.

Having discussed the question of immigration which is nearest the heart of the Jews, we now come to the question of self-government which is nearest the heart of the Arabs. These are the two main factors to be weighed one against the other.

III

TWO ANNOUNCEMENTS


To prepare the ground for this, it is necessary, in our opinion, that two concurrent announcements be made as to the objectives of major policy. The one without the other is not sufficient.

The one announcement would be: There is to be no Jewish State, there is to be no Arab State, there is to be a bi-national Palestine, a common country for two equal peoples; and there is to be the fullest measure of self-government.

The second announcement would be: 100,000 Jewish displaced persons are to be admitted without delay, and the objective of policy is to be numerical as well as political parity for the two peoples.

THE ARAB CONTENTION

The Arabs say that "the existence of the Jewish National Home, whatever its size, bars the way to the attainment by the Arabs of Palestine of the same national status as that attained, or soon to be attained, by all the other Arabs of Asia" (Royal



Commission, page 307). That is so. And they ask if they are not as fit for self-government as the Arabs of other countries. They are.

ARAB CONCESSIONS

But the whole history of Palestine shows, that it just has not been made for uni-national sovereign independence. This is an inescapable fact which no one can disregard. Although the Arabs can not have a uni-national independent Arab Palestine, they can enjoy independence in a bi-national Palestine together with their Jewish fellow-citizens. This will afford them a maximum of national freedom. What the bi-national state will take away from them is sovereign independence in Palestine. There are other Arab states with sovereign independence. But we contend that the sovereign independence of tiny Palestine, whether it be Jewish sovereignty or Arab sovereignty, is a questionable good in this post-war period, when even great states must relinquish something of their sovereignty and seek union, if the world is not to perish. We contend that, for this Holy Land, the ideal of a bi-national Palestine is at least as inspiring as that of an Arab sovereign Palestine or a Jewish sovereign Palestine.

JEWISH CONCESSIONS

On the other hand, the bi-national Palestine would deprive the Jews of their one chance of a Jewish state. But this bi-national Palestine would be the one state in the world where they would be a constituent nation, i. e., an equal nationality within the body politic, and not a minority as everywhere else. The absence of a Jewish state would make more difficult direct access by the Jewish People to UNO. To compensate for this, some form should be devised for giving the Jewish People a recognized place within the structure of the United Nations Organization.

Nevertheless, the concessions the Jews would have to make on these matters are, we think, more far-reaching than the concessions the Arabs of Palestine would have to make. But the hard facts of the situation are, that this is not a Jewish land and it is not an Arab land, it is the Holy Land, a bi-national country, DUCED PHOTOGRAPH - NOT TO DUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC D OFFICE, LONDON

and it is in the light of such hard facts that the problem must be approached.

THE ADVANTAGES OF A BI-NATIONAL PALESTINE


Before proceeding to outline our suggestions as to the political structure of the bi-national Palestine, we should like finally to point out some of the advantages of bi-nationalism based on parity in a country which has two nationalities.

Failure of Minority Guarantees

1. The breakdown of the minority guarantees provided for in the Versailles Peace Treaties is proof that in a bi-national country, the only safeguard for a minority is equality with the majority. There is no prospect of peace in a country where there is a dominant people and a subordinate people. The single nation-state is a proper form for a country where there is but one legally recognized nationality, as for example the United States. But in countries with more than one recognized nationality, and these are numerous in Europe and in Asia, bitterness is engendered among the minority because of the civil service, the military, the economic key positions, foreign affairs, are in the hands of the ruling class of the majority nation. Parity in a multi-national country is the only just relationship between the peoples.

Switzerland

2. The multi-national state is an effective method of affording full protection for the national languages, cultures and institutions of each nationality. That there can be full cultural autonomy combined with full allegiance to the multinational political state is proven in Switzerland's history for more than 100 years. The Swiss are divided by language, religion and culture; nor do the linguistic and religious groupings coincide in the various cantons. Yet all of these divergences have not been obstacles to political unity. This is a newer form of democracy which is as important for multi-national states, as the more familiar form of democracy is for uni-national states. The Swiss example is most relevant to Palestine, although there are of course many points of difference.



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Other multi-national countries

The Soviet Union is a newer example of a multi-national state. The new Yugoslav state is an attempt at multi-national federalism. Professor Seton Watson outlines a bi-national solution of the age-long problem of Transylvania. Roumanian domination, Hungarian domination, partition had all been tried without success.

Bi-Nationalism a High Ideal

3. In many senses the multi-national state represents a higher, more modern and more hopeful ideal than the uninational sovereign independent state. The old way of having a major people and a minor people in a state of various nationalities is reactionary. The progressive conception is parity among the peoples of the multi-national state. The way of peace in the world today and tomorrow is through federation, union. Dividing up the world into tiny nationalistic sovereign units has not been the success the advocates of self-determination had hoped for at the end of the first world war. (Cobban, "National Self-Determination"). The peoples who have been placed by fate or by history in the same country have warred with one another for domination throughout the centuries. The majority have tried to make the state homogeneous through keeping down the minority nationalities. The federal multi-national state, based on the parity of the nationalities, is a most hopeful way of enabling them to retain their national identity, and yet of coalescing in a larger political framework. It results in separate nationalities, yet a single citizenship. This is a noble goal, to which the youth of multi-national countries can be taught to give their enthusiasm and their energies. It is a modern challenge to the intelligence and the moral qualities of the peoples constituting multi-national lands.

IV

SELF-GOVERNMENT

We shall deal with this as with immigration—in periods.

FIRST PERIOD: SELF-GOVERNMENT DURING MANDATE

During the transitional period of the Mandate, i. e., up to the time when Palestine becomes a Trustee Territory, immediate

 steps should be taken by the Mandatory Power to institute a larger measure of self-government. Towards this end we would make two interim ad hoc recommendations:

- (a) The appointment of Jews and Arabs in equal numbers to the Executive Council of Government, to the Secretariat, as Heads of certain Government Departments, and as District Commissioners in appropriate places.
- (b) The appointment of a Consultative Body composed of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs. The High Commissioner would act as Chairman, and he would bring before this body such matters as he wished to communicate to the public and as he wished to have an expression of opinion on. The Consultative Body would have no legislative or executive functions.

SECOND PERIOD: TRUSTEESHIP

(a) We favour the transfer of Palestine to the Trusteeship System of the UNO.


REGIONAL TRUSTEESHIP

(b) We favour the setting up of a Regional Trusteeship Body for Palestine which is to be composed of representatives of the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League. The Administering Authority will be a Christian power, doubtless Britain, and will thus be representative of the Christian world. The deep interest of the Christian world in the Holy Land is not to be minimized. The Jewish Agency is representative of the Jewish world in matters affecting Palestine. The Arab League represents the various Arab states, which are for the most part overwhelmingly Moslem, and all of them are concerned with the fate of Palestine.

(c) We favour making the Immigration Board and the Development Board mentioned above responsible in the first instance to the Regional Trusteeship Body.

CONSTITUTION

(a) The working out of the first draft of a basic constitution for a bi-national Palestine would be entrusted to a special Commission on which, among others, the Jewish Agency and the



Arab League would be represented and which would in the first instance be responsible to the Regional Trusteeship Body. This Draft Constitution Commission would receive directives from the UNO, the main directive being the necessity of Jewish-Arab cooperation in all spheres in a bi-national Palestine based on the parity of the two peoples. The Draft Constitution Commission would have to secure the aid of competent experts, especially from the successful multi-national countries.

- (b) The draft constitution thus worked out would be presented to a Constituent Assembly of Jews and Arabs equally represented, in the hope that through clarification, open debate, give and take, an agreed constitution might result. In case no agreed constitution resulted, the matter would be referred for decision to the Trusteeship Council of the UNO, both the Jewish Agency and the Arab League being invited to participate in the discussion before the Trusteeship Council.
- (c) The Constitution would contain, among other things, a Bill of Rights guaranteeing religious, educational, economic and national freedom to all the inhabitants as individuals, and to the national communities and the religious bodies.


ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT

A. Federal Executive

(a) Head of the State

He is to be appointed by the UNO, if possible upon nomination by the Palestine Legislature. His term of office is to be four years, and he is to be eligible for re-election.

- (b) His functions are to be:
 - 1. To preside over the Legislature.
 - 2. To cast the decisive vote in case of a tie.
 - 3. To appoint, with the concurrence of the Legislature, the Heads of Central Government Departments (Federal Administration).
 - 4. To preside over the Federal Executive Council which is to consist of the heads of a given number of Government Departments (Federal Executive Council).



B. Federal Legislature

- (a) The Legislature is to be elected democratically.
- (b) The country is to be divided into a number of districts (cantons or counties). Some of these districts will be mainly Jewish, some mainly Arab, and some mixed. In some districts, such as Nazareth and Bethlehem, the Christian Arabs would be the important part of the population. The Legislature is to consist of an equal number of Jews and Arabs.

We prefer election by geographical districts rather than election on a communal basis. Regional patriotism is highly developed in some parts of Palestine. The difficulties of communal elections are apparent in India. Election by districts has the advantage: 1. of giving increased importance to local bodies, which is desirable generally; 2. of enabling Jews and Arabs in mixed districts to vote for members of both communities. In general, we assume that, "in vital matters some Jews and some Arabs will vote together" (Royal Commission, page 960). This would mean that separate national interests would not dominate every situation. There are economic interests, social security, standards of life, trade, agriculture, industry, labour, commerce abroad and other factors which will draw some Jews and some Arabs together.

- (c) The Legislature is to have the normal functions of a Federal Legislative Body, including the passing of the budget.
- (d) In case of tie, the Head of the State is to have the casting vote.

C. Local Districts (Cantons, Counties) including Municipalities

These are to have wide autonomy, including the right of taxation. As to the Swiss cantons and their relation to the Federal Government, Professor Janowsky says (pages 37, 38, 42, 44, 45):

"The Swiss State is a confederation of 22 cantons each enjoying broad powers of self government... Within 14 of her 22 cantons German is spoken by over 90% of the people; one canton is overwhelmingly Italian in speech and three French. The four remaining are linguistically mixed... The people are further divided by 'confessional' differences, 57.3 being

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Protestant and 41% Catholic. However, the religious and linguistic groupings do not coincide . . . German, French and Italian are all recognized as official languages in relation to the Central Government. The individual cantons, too, where the population is sufficiently composite, have assured equality of language . . . The peoples of the particular cantons also possess organic unity: a Swiss nation, yet a Bernese and a Genevese people . . . Swiss Federalism rests solidly on the decentralization of governmental functions and on respect for local sentiment. Cantonal and communal institutions are zealously guarded by the population . . . Clinging to their ancient usages, local and cantonal communities preserve the character of nationalities . . . Federalism has left the cantons some of the most essential functions of Government—law and order, education and direct taxation . . . To be sure, the development of commerce and industry has led to a strengthening of the Central Government. But its sphere of activity has been mainly economic and social—railroads, factory legislation, insurance, contracts, sanitary precautions. Educational and cultural affairs remain predominantly the province of local bodies . . . It is the multinational state which has rendered possible both political unity and cultural freedom."

D. National Communities

- (a) In the bi-national Palestine there would be two National Communities, the Jewish National Council and the Arab National Council, with powers of taxation. Their practical province would be cultural.
- (b) On the other hand there would be a Joint Commission of these National Councils for the purpose of devising ways and means of familiarizing the one people with the culture of the other.
- (c) Members of the civil service down to the lowest grades would have to be bi-lingual. This is not difficult to achieve, as the experience of the past twenty years has shown.

E. The Central Religious Bodies

The Central Religious Bodies are to have recognized judicial functions in questions of personal status, such as marriage and divorce (Mandate for Palestine, Article 9).

DUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITH ERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC D OFFICE, LONDON It has been our purpose in the above to give a bare outline of the problem of political structure in some of its aspects.

V

THE UNION OF THE AUTONOMOUS BI-NATIONAL PALESTINE WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

This has been referred to above. This Union is called for by historical, geographic, economic and political considerations.

It is beyond the frame-work of this Statement to discuss the political structure of this Union.

VI

IF THE ONE OR THE OTHER REFUSED

It may be asked what would be the position, if the one or the other of the two peoples refused their cooperation in carrying out such plans as we have proposed.

Our answer is, that both peoples would eventually cooperate, that indeed there would be no other way for them—Provided, that Jewish-Arab cooperation in a bi-national Palestine based on parity be clearly and sincerely and determinedly made the main objective of major policy.

OFFERS OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS

The history of the offers of a Legislative Council by the British Government is instructive in this connection.

The offer of 1922-23 was accepted by the Jews and rejected by important sections of the Arabs. It was therefore suspended.

That of 1930 was accompanied by the following statement by the British Government:

"His Majesty's Government desire to make it quite clear that while they would deeply regret an attempt on the part of any section of the population to prevent them from giving effect to their decision, all possible steps will be taken to circumvent such an attempt, if made, since they consider it in the interests PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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of the population of the country as a whole that the further step now proposed should no longer be deferred."

The offer of 1935 was accompanied by a similar declaration, but it was not implemented. The Jews refused, and the Arabs half refused and half accepted, waiting to see what the Jews might do.

The two peoples may be excused for thinking that these proposals had strings attached and were not made seriously.

JERUSALEM MUNICIPALITY

Last year Government made the interesting and constructive proposal for tri-partite parity in the political structure of the Jerusalem Municipality. The Jews accepted, the Arabs refused. Immediately, without further attempt, the proposal became a dead letter.

NEITHER PEOPLE COULD STAY OUT

Our contention is, that if any of these proposals had been gone through with sincerely and authoritatively, the side staying out would eventually have come in. Life itself would have been too strong, the insistence of their people would have been too compelling, to justify their absention for any length of time. The issues at stake, the welfare of the individual and the community, are too important for any responsible body to have maintained its opposition for long.

If a Regional Trusteeship Body is to come into being, if the Jewish Agency and the Arab League are to be invited to sit on this Body, if immigration figures, and absorptive capacity, and development, and a constitution are to be discussed in this Body; and if there is to be a Constituent Assembly, and Self-Government, a Federal Executive, a Legislature, Autonomous Districts, National Councils and other organs of Government—if these are to be, no side can stay out for long.

AN AUTHORITATIVE POLICY

What is required is, that Jewish-Arab cooperation be made truly and intelligently the basis of major policy, that this be announced with authority, that it be carried through with authorPUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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ity. The result would be such, as we are convinced, that Jews and Arabs would find the way of life, of friendship and partnership with one another, not only in Palestine but throughout this whole part of the world.

VII

A PALESTINE SOLUTION

What a boon to mankind it would be if the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine were to strive together to make their Holy Land into a thriving, peaceful Switzerland situated at the heart of this ancient highway between East and West. A "Palestine Solution" is required for the Palestine problem. This would have an incalculable political and spiritual influence in all the Middle East and far beyond. A bi-national Palestine could become a beacon of peace in the world.

Jerusalem, March 5, 1946.


J. L. Magnes, Chairman

APPENDIX

DECLARATION OF THE ASSOCIATION "UNION" (IHUD)

(September, 1942)

- (1) The Association "Union" adheres to:
 - (a) The Zionist movement, insofar as this seeks the establishment of the Jewish National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine;
 - (b) The struggle throughout the world for a new order in international relations, and a Union of the peoples, large and small, for a life of freedom and justice, without fear, oppression and want.
- (2) The Association "Union" therefore regards a Union between the Jewish and Arab peoples as essential for the upbuilding of Palestine and for meeting its basic problems. The Association "Union" will strive for cooperation between the Jewish world and the Arab world in all branches of life—social, economic, cultural, political—thus making for the revival of the whole Semitic world.
- (3) The main political aims of the Association "Union" are as follows:
 - (a) Government in Palestine based upon equal political rights for the two peoples;
 - (b) The agreement of the steadily growing Yishuv and of the whole Jewish people to a Federative Union of Palestine and neighbouring countries. This Federative Union is to guarantee the national rights of all peoples within it;
 - (c) A Covenant between this Federative Union and an Anglo-American Union which is to be a part of the future Union of the free peoples. This Union of the free peoples is to bear the ultimate responsibility for the establishment and stability of international relations in the New World after the war.



ORAL TESTIMONY

BEFORE THE

ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE
ON PALESTINE

Jerusalem, March 15, 1946

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[TRANSCRIPT]

ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY HEARING IN JERUSALEM, PALESTINE

Thursday, March 14, 1946

APPEARANCES:

Dr. J. L. Magnes,
Professor Martin Buber,
Mr. M. Smilansky,
Representing Ihud.

PROCEEDINGS

(The hearing convened at 2:35 p. m., Mr. Justice Singleton presiding.)

Mr. Justice Singleton: Dr. Magnes, you appear representing Ihud, I gather.

Dr. Magnes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Justice Singleton: And also Profesor Buber and Mr. Smilansky.


Dr. Magnes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Justice Singleton: Which of you would like to address us?

Dr. Magnes: Might I read you a couple of words first? Mr. Justice Singleton: Thank you.

DR. Magnes: In preparing the Written Statement which the Ihud Association had the honor of submitting to you we had assumed we would embark at once upon discussion with you. The procedure, however, is that witnesses have begun their testimony by addressing through you the public at large. We also feel this to be our duty. We shall, however, try to be brief so that the time for discussion may be ample.

We shall ask your permission to proceed as follows: Professor Buber will present a brief paper on what our Zionism



means to us and why we so ardently believe in the return to Zion. I shall then try to bring out some of the points of our written statement. Mr. Smilansky will in the course of the discussion want to emphasize two points, first, that Jewish-Arab cooperation is possible, and second, that there is sufficient land in the country for the absorption of a large Jewish immigration. Mr. Smilansky has lived and worked in Palestine for more than 55 years, and I venture the statement that there is no one who has so intimate a knowledge of these subjects. Professor Buber, who is now to speak, is not only an internationally known writer and scholar, but he was also one of the pioneers of the Zionist movement since the days of Theodor Herzl.

Professor Buber and I wish to make it clear that we are not speaking in the name of the Hebrew University. There are various opinions there as elsewhere. We are speaking as residents of the country and as Jews who feel it to be their duty to give voice to a view which, though differing from the official Zionist program, is nevertheless shared, as we know, by large numbers of the population.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: Professor Buber.

Professor Buber: Mr. Chairman, it is impossible to survey the problem you are trying to meet without an understanding of the very roots of Zionism. For only through this understanding will the observer realize that he faces something quite different from the well-known national antagonisms, and therefore that methods other than those of political routine are called for.

Modern political Zionism, in the form it has taken during my nearly fifty years of membership in this movement, was only developed and intensified, but not caused by modern anti-Semitism. Indeed, Zionism is a late form assumed by a primal fact in the history of mankind, a fact of reasonable interest at least for Christian civilization. This fact is the unique connection of a people and a country. This people, the people Israel, was once created by the power of a tradition that was common to some semi-nomadic tribes. Together these tribes migrated, under very difficult conditions, from Egypt to Canaan because they felt united by the promise to them of Canaan as their "heritage" since the days of the "Fathers." This tradition was spectacular and decisive for the history of mankind in that it

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confronted the new people with a task they could carry out only as a people, namely to establish in Canaan a model and "just", community. Later on, the "prophets"—a calling without any historical precedent-interpreted this task as obliging the community to send streams of social and political justice throughout the world. Thereby the most productive and most paradoxical of all human ideas, Messianism, was offered to humanity. It placed the people of Israel in the center of an activity leading towards the advent of the Kingdom of God on earth, an activity in which all the peoples were to cooperate. It ordered every generation to contribute to the upbuilding of the sacred future with the forces and resources at their command. Had it not been for this idea, neither Cromwell nor Lincoln could have conceived their mission. This idea is the origin of the great impulse that, in periods of disappointment and weariness, ever and ever again encouraged the Christian peoples to dare to embark upon a new shaping of their public life, the origin of the hope of a genuine and just cooperation among individuals as well as nations, on a voluntary basis. But within the people that had created it, this idea grew to a force of quite peculiar vitality. Driven out of their promised land, this people survived nearly two millennia by their trust in their return, in the fulfillment of the promise, in the realization of the idea. The inner connection with this land and the belief in the promised reunion with it were a permanent force of rejuvenation for this people, living in conditions which probably would have caused the complete disintegration of any other group.

This serves as an explanation of the fact that, in the age of national movements, Judaism did not simply create another national movement of the European type, but a unique one, a "Zionism," the modern expression of the tendency towards "Zion." In this age the hostile forces which consciously or not, see in Judaism the Messianic monitor, quite logically attacked it more and more violently. Yet simultaneously, in Judaism itself, a great regeneration had started. Out of an inner necessity this movement of regeneration chose for its aim the reunion with the soil and, again out of an inner necessity, there was no choice other than the soil of Palestine and its cultivation. And with an inner necessity the new Jewish settlement on this soil centers in the village communities which, in spite of their differing forms of organization, all aim at the creation of a

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genuine and just community on a voluntary basis. The importance of these attempts surpasses the frontiers of Palestine as well as of Judaism. Given the chance of unhampered development, these vital social attempts will show the world the possibility of basing social justice upon voluntary action. Sir Arthur Wauchope who, as High Commissioner in the years 1931-1938 had the opportunity of acquainting himself with this country and this work, was right in pointing out that these "astonishingly successful" communal settlements are an example of cooperation for the whole world and can be of great importance for the foundation of a new social order.


At one time the productive strength of the people Israel in this country was a collective strength in the most sublime sense. Today the same might be said of the productive strength which the returning Jews have started to display in this country. It is the productive strength of a community directed towards the realization of real Community, and as such, it is important for the future of mankind. Mankind is fundamentally interested in the preservation of a vital and productive Jewish people, such as can grow if fostered by the unique connection of this people and this country.

From this the principle of Zionism results. It is concentration in Palestine of the national forces fit for renewing their productive strength. This principle again results in the three irreducible demands of Zionism. They are:

First: Freedom to acquire soil in sufficient measure to bring about a renewed connection with the primal form of production, from which the Jewish people had been separated for many centuries and without which no original spiritual and social productivity can arise.


Second: A permanent powerful influx of settlers, especially of youth desiring to settle here, in order incessantly to strengthen, to amplify and to revive the work of reconstruction and to protect it from the dangers of stagnancy, isolation and the forms of social degeneration particularly threatening colonization in the Levant.

Third: Self-determination of the Jewish community about their way of life and the form of their institutions, as well as an assurance for their unimpeded development as a community.



These demands, formulated simply in the concept of a "National Home," have been recognized, but not yet adequately understood, by large parts of the world. The tradition of justice, which I have mentioned and which must be realized within every community and between the communities, makes it clear that these demands must of necessity be carried out without encroaching upon the vital rights of any other community. Independence of one's own must not be gained at the expense of another's independence. Jewish settlement must oust no Arab peasant, Jewish immigration must not cause the political status of the present inhabitants to deteriorate, and must continue to ameliorate their economic condition. The tradition of justice is directed towards the future of this country as a whole, as well as towards the future of the Jewish people. From it and from the historical circumstance that there are Arabs in Palestine, springs a great, difficult and imperative task, the new form of the age-old task. A regenerated Jewish people in Palestine has not only to aim at living peacefully together with the Arab people, but also at a comprehensive cooperation with it in opening and developing the country. Such cooperation is an indispensable condition for the lasting success of the great work, of the redemption of this land.

The basis of such cooperation offers ample space for including the fundamental rights of the Jewish people to acquire soil and to immigrate without any violation of the fundamental rights of the Arab people. As to the demand for autonomy, it does not, as the greater part of the Jewish people thinks today, necessarily lead to the demand for a "Jewish State" or for a "Jewish majority." We need for this land as many Jews as it is possible economically to absorb, but not in order to establish a majority against a minority. We need them because great, very great forces are required to do the unprecedented work. We need for this land a solid, vigorous, autonomous community, but not in order that it should give its name to a state; we need it because we want to raise Israel and Erez Israel to the highest level of productivity they can be raised to. The new situation and the problem involved ask for new solutions that are beyond the capacity of the familiar political categories. An internationally guaranteed agreement between the two communities is asked for, which defines the spheres of interest and activity common to the partners and those not common to them, and



guarantees mutual noninterference for these specific spheres.

The responsibility of those working on the preparation of a solution of the Palestine problem goes beyond the frontiers of the Near East, as well as the boundaries of Judaism. If a successful solution is found, a first step, perhaps a pioneer's step, will have been taken towards a juster form of life between people and people.

Mr. Justice Singleton: Thank you, sir.
I understand, Dr. Magnes, the most convenient course is for you to address us now, is it?


Dr. Magnes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Justice Singleton: Thank you.

DR. Magnes: Our view is based on two assumptions, first, that Jewish-Arab cooperation is essential for a satisfactory solution of the difficult problem, and second, that Jewish-Arab cooperation is not only essential, it is also possible. The alternative is war, but the plain Jew and the plain Arab do not want war. There are many thousands here, Jews and Arabs, who stand aghast at the revelation, that Jewish and Arab militarists seem to be eager to fight it out on the field of battle. We do not know who would win this war. We only know that thousands of innocents would be the victims.

The militarist mentality throughout history is not able to believe, that complicated situations can be resolved other than by force of arms. I would like to assure you, gentlemen, that the vast majority of plain, inarticulate Jews and Arabs are not anxious for war. They want understanding and cooperation, and to achieve this they would make many concessions and sacrifices. It is necessary to give them the chance for this. But hope must not be too long deferred. All the world today is pressed for time; time presses also in this ancient land.

At the beginning of the war there was a real opportunity for bringing Jews and Arabs together in the face of the common danger. A proposal was therefore made to Government for the appointment of what was called a Consultative Body, consisting of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs, for the purpose of bringing Government and the population closer to one another in the war effort. This proposal was rejected, the more's the pity. A




great opportunity has come again. Who knows if there will be another? It is our fervent prayer that your Committee will be able to meet the challenge with which destiny has faced you.

This is a land suigeneris, a Holy Land for three monotheistic religions. It is therefore not just a Jewish land or just an Arab land. The Arabs have natural rights here. They have been here and tilled the soil for centuries. The Jews have historical rights here. They have yearned for this land for centuries. The Bible was created here, and the Jews by their labor latterly have shown themselves worthy of these historical rights.

We regard the Arab natural rights and the Jewish historical rights as, under all the circumstances, of equal validity. We look upon Palestine as a bi-national Jewish-Arab land, a common motherland for these two Semitic peoples, who have the privilege of acting as trustees for millions of their co-religionists all over the world. In such a land it is not fitting that one people should dominate the other. A Jewish State means domination of the Arabs by the Jews; an Arab State means domination of the Jews by the Arabs. The fear of this domination is deep and genuine in both peoples. This fear is the double-edged sword of the problem. It becomes the task of statesmanship to find the way of dissipating this fear and of supplanting it with cooperation, development, peace.

You are thus faced with the necessity of trying to establish an equilibrium between two forces. What is it that most Jews want? It is immigration. Give us the chance of an ample immigration and many of the sincerest advocates of the Jewish State will forego the State. What is it that most Arabs want? It is self-government. They are certainly not behind other Arabs in their capacity for self-government. Give them the chance of ample self-government, and many of the sincerest opponents of Jewish immigration will acquiesce. But to achieve this double objective, immigration and self-government, concessions have to be made by both peoples. No one can have all he wants in this country. A feasible and honorable compromise must be sought.

The purpose of our statement to you is to help you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, to find the way of reasonable, constructive compromise. We therefore suggest to you that you adopt concurrently two basic principles, and that you announce




these principles concurrently. One without the other would be but fragmentary.

These principles are, first, that Palestine is a bi-national country for two equal peoples, both of whom are to have equal political rights and duties. We call this political parity. Second, that Jewish immigration is to be encouraged up to parity with the Arabs. This is numerical parity. And the immediate thing to be done in this direction is to admit, without further delay, President Truman's 100,000 displaced persons.

Let me first deal briefly with immigration. We postulate three periods. The first period is now, today. You are authorized to make ad hoc recommendations as to the unhappy thousands languishing without a home. We pray you to help these 100,000 come back home to this Jewish National Home, and this without further delay. They might be divided into 25,000 children, if there are so many left, 25,000 parents, relatives, older persons, and 50,000 young people. You would thus help to bring creative forces into the country and you would be performing an historical act of great compassion.

These 100,000 are not a threat to Arab numbers. In reality they would constitute a net gain for the Jews of not more than 33,000. According to Government figures the Arab natural increase during 5 years of war was about 150,000, 30,000 a year. The Jewish increment was only about 83,000, including natural increase and all forms of immigration. Thus, there would be a net Jewish gain of not more than 33,000, and this is not such a frightening number. The total Jeewish population would then be 700,000. This is a smaller number than was envisaged during discussions between some Jews and Arabs, in 1936, after the outbreak of the Arab revolt. They were trying to find the basis of an understanding, and it was agreed between them that after 10 years, this very year 1946, the Jews would constitute 40 percent of the population, that is 800,000 persons. I find it difficult to reconcile myself to the thought that this agreement was not ratified. Had it been, there would be 800,000 Jews here today instead of 600,000, and that with Arab good will.

If some Arabs say they oppose the entry of one single extra Jew because that is one step nearer to the Jewish State,



it is but a figure of speech symbolizing their deep opposition to Jewish domination through a Jewish State. But to achieve a Jewish State there would have to be a Jewish majority, and an additional 100,000 Jews are far from being equivalent to a Jewish majority.

As to the second immigration period, we envisage the opportunity for the Jews of becoming one-half of the population. How long might this take? Government figures show that at the rate of 60,000 a year it would take 11 years from now, that is up to 1957; at the rate of 50,000 a year, up to 1960; at the rate of 40,000 a year, up to 1964; at the rate of 30,000 per annum, 24 years, that is up to 1970. Any annual Jewish immigration below 30,000 would never let the Jews catch up with the Arabs, owing to the much larger Arab natural increase.

As to absorptive capacity, I recall that during Sir Herbert Samuel's administration it was believed that the country, which in 1924 had 805,000 inhabitants, of whom 628,000 were Moslems, was capable of absorbing up to 3,000,000 with agriculture as the chief industry. In his recent speech in the House of Lords, with the general tenor of which we are in accord, Lord Samuel speaks of the possibility of $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions within a generation. He can say this because the Jews through devotion and capital and science have proven that the absorptive capacity is much larger than the experts once thought. But to enlarge the absorptive capacity to the full requires the implementation of a great cooperative development plan for the benefit of all the inhabitants.

For these two basic matters, absorptive capacity and development, we propose the creation of two Boards to consist of representatives of the Mandatory, of the Jewish Agency, and of the Arab League. We look upon the Mandatory as representative of the Christian world, the Jewish Agency as representative of the Jewish world, and the Arab League as representative of the Arab and the Moslem world. This may indicate also the stress we lay upon the international and interreligious aspects of the Palestine problem.

In the third stage of the immigration policy the question arises as to the situation, if and when parity in population may have been reached. The answer to this would depend upon two factors, first, upon whether by then the two peoples have




found the way of peace together, and second, upon the formation of a wider United Nations Regional Organization, a regional Union of neighboring countries in which the bi-national Palestine would be an autonomous member. Such a Union would afford the Palestine Arabs a wider Arab background and would thus help to remove the present acute importance of majority-minority in Palestine.

The second principle, the adoption of which we urge, is the bi-national Palestine based upon political parity. This brings us to the problem of self-government. Concessions will have to be made by both peoples. The Arabs would have to yield their ambition to set up an independent Arab State. But the whole history of Palestine shows that it has not just been made for a uni-national sovereign independence. Yet the Arabs will be able to enjoy the maximum of national freedom in a bi-national Palestine, equally with their Jewish fellow citizens. What the bi-national State will take away from the Arabs is sovereign independence in Palestine. We contend that sovereign independence in this tiny land, whether it be Jewish sovereignty or Arab sovereignty, is not possible. It is moreover a questionable good in this post-war period, when even great states must relinquish something of their sovereignty and seek union if the world is not to perish.

We contend that for this Holy Land the ideal of a cooperative, peaceful, bi-national Palestine is at least as inspiring as that of an Arab sovereign Palestine or a Jewish sovereign Palestine.

On the other hand, the bi-national Palestine would deprive the Jews of their one opportunity of a Jewish State. Nevertheless, this bi-national Palestine would be the one country in the world where the Jews would be a constituent nation, that is, an equal nationality within the body politic and not just a minority as everywhere else. Moreover, the absence of a Jewish State would make more difficult direct access by the Jewish people to the United Nations Organization. To compensate for this some form should be devised for giving the Jewish people a recognized place within the structure of the United Nations Organization.

Bi-nationalism based on parity has distinct advantages in a country which has two nationalities. It is a comparatively



new way. Full cultural autonomy is combined with full allegiance to the multi-national State. National identity is safeguarded, yet there is coalescence in a larger political framework. That this is possible is proven by Switzerland during the past 100 years. The Swiss are divided by language, religion, and culture. Nor do the religious and linguistic groups coincide in the 22 cantons. Yet all these divergences have not been obstacles to political unity.

There are various forms of the multi-national State. In some ways the United Kingdom is one form, Soviet Russia is another, South Africa another, the new Yugoslavia another. Professor Seton Watson in his new book, "Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941," tells of a plan under discussion now for a bi-national Transylvania. Hungarian domination, Roumanian domination, and partition had been tried in vain.

Multi-nationalism based on parity is a newer form of democracy which is as important for multi-national States as the more traditional form of democracy is for uni-lateral States. The old way of having a major people and a minor people in a State of various nationalities is reactionary. In many senses the multi-national ideal represents a higher ideal, more modern and more hopeful than even the uni-national sovereign State. There is no prospect of peace in a country where there is a dominant people and a subordinate people. Parity in a multinational country is the only just relationship between the peoples. This is the progressive conception. It is a noble goal to which the youth of multi-national countries can be taught to give their enthusiasm and their energies.

Let me take up briefly the question of self-government in the bi-national Palestine. We divide this also into three periods. As to the short term, for as long as the Mandate persists—we ourselves favor transfer to trusteeship—two immediate steps should be taken: One, the appointment of Jews and Arabs in equal numbers to responsible positions in the Central Government—as members of the Executive Council, as members of the Secretariat, as heads of Departments, as District Commissioners, as Presidents of Courts. There are no Jews or Arabs in any of these positions. It is a sad commentary that after 25 years of the Mandate, which requires the establishment of a full measure of self-governing institutions, the country is further away from this than ever.

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We renew also the proposal for a Consultative Body to be presided over by the High Commissioner. It would have no legislative or executive functions, but the High Commissioner would bring before it all matters of public concern on which consultation was regarded by him as beneficial. This would be good preparation for the next stage, that is, the period of Trusteeship.

We have presented you with certain suggestions as to the political structure of Palestine under Trusteeship. We may be charged, perhaps justly, with engaging in the favorite pastime of constitution-making, and we make no claim that better suggestions cannot be put forward. Yet our justification is that we have given these matters considerable thought.

The first step which we propose in this period of Trusteeship is the setting up of a Regional trusteeship body, to be composed of representatives of the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency, the Arab League. The Absorptive Capacity Board which I mentioned before, and the Development Board which I mentioned before, are to be responsible, in the first instance, to this Regional trusteeship body until other provisions are made.

We propose further the appointment of a Commission on Constitution, on which there should be representatives of the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency, and the Arab League. When this Constitution, with its Bill of Rights, is drafted, it is to be brought before the Regional trusteeship body. Then a Constituent Assembly, composed of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs, is to be convened. Where they don't agree, the decision is to be left to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations Organization.

I am near my conclusion. I shall give, but very sketchily, some of the headings we presented in our written document for the consideration of the proposed Constitution Commission.

The Head of the State is to be appointed by the United Nations Organization. He is to appoint the heads of departments, with the concurrence of the legislature, and preside over the Executive Council. The Legislature is to consist of equal numbers of Jews and Arabs. In case of a tie, the Head of State, who presides, is to have the casting vote. The Legislature is to be elected democratically by districts, or they may be called



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counties or cantons. Some districts would be mainly Jewish, some Arab, some mixed; some districts would be mainly Christian-Arab as, for example, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nazareth.

The two National Councils, Jewish and Arab, would have cultural autonomy and there would be a Joint Commission for the purpose of planning how to familiarize the one people with the culture of the other.


It may be asked what if the one or the other of the peoples refused?

Our answer is that both peoples must eventually cooperate. Indeed, there would be no other way for them, provided, and this is basic to our whole conception, provided that Jewish-Arab cooperation in a bi-national Palestine based on parity be clearly and sincerely and authoritatively made the main objective of major policy. It has never been the main objective of major policy.

The issues at stake are so important for the welfare of the individual and the community that no responsible body could stay out for long. Offers of a Legislative Council were made in their day and then abandoned. A tripartite political structure for Jerusalem was proposed and then dropped.

Our contention is, that if any one of these proposals had been gone through with sincerely and authoritatively, no side could have stayed out for long. If now, under our proposals, a Regional trusteeship body is to come into being, if the Jewish Agency and the Arab League are invited to sit on this body; if an Absorptive Capacity Board is to be appointed; if a Development Board is to be appointed; if appointments are to be made to high responsible positions in the Central Government; if, then, a Constitution Commission is to be appointed; if there is to be a Constituent Assembly and self-government, federal executive, legislature, autonomous districts and other organs of government—no side can afford for long to withhold its adherence. The demands of life itself, the insistence of the people would be too strong.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, what a boon to mankind it would be if the Jews and Arabs of Palestine were to strive together in friendship and partnership to make this Holy Land into a thriving, peaceful Switzerland in the heart of this ancient highway between East and West. This would have incalculable



political and spiritual influence in all the Middle East and far beyond. A bi-national Palestine could become a beacon of peace in the world.

Mr. Justice Singleton: Thank you, Doctor Magnes, for your instructive address. I am not proposing to ask you any questions about the details of it, but I'm not sure whether you would like to answer this question or not. You need not. Have you been able to discuss this matter with those whose views have been put before us at all in the last few days or weeks?

A. Well, there is incessant discussion going on, and there is discussion going on in the press. Our little organization issues a monthly publication that is taken up and answered, and the discussion goes on in that way. If you refer to a tete-a-tete discussion recently on these problems, I regret to say that such has not taken place.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: Doctor Magnes, I imagine the members of the Committee heard with a great deal of satisfaction your statement that the problem before us is a complicated one. We have been repeatedly assured on both sides that it was extremely simple. But it looks difficult to us, and we are glad to know other people think it difficult.

I would like to ask you questions about one or two details. You said that you thought cooperation between Arabs and Jews was possible. You said that you thought the situation had deteriorated in recent years. I would like to ask you whether you think the setting up of political Zionism as a goal for the Jews had had the effect of preventing friendly relations between Jews and Arabs—whether that had been partially responsible for the deterioration in these relations.


A. Would you permit me to formulate your question a little differently?

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: Yes.

A. Perhaps you mean to say not the setting up of political Zionism but setting up the program of the Jewish State.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: That's what I mean, yes.

A. Might I formulate the other part a little differently? Not to prevent friendly relations, because there are friendly



relations between Jews and Arabs today, but whether these friendly relations are as consistent and as intensive as they used to be.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: Didn't I understand you to say that relations between Jews and Arabs had somewhat deteriorated in recent years?

A. I didn't use that phrase. I did say that in 1934, even after the Arab Revolt had broken out, a number of Jews and a number of Arabs—not the least in their communities—met in order to try and find the way of understanding. I said further, that at the beginning of the war, at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, Arabs and Jews came closer together in face of the common danger, and I contended that at that time there was the opportunity of establishing a Consultative Body which might bring Arabs and Jews and Government into closer touch with the purpose of cooperating the better in the war effort. Since then, I think it is true to say that the relations between Jews and Arabs have not improved—that, on the contrary, in many senses, they have deteriorated.

Then, in order to answer your question fully: There is no doubt that setting up the program of the Jewish State as the official program of the Zionist Organization has helped in this deterioration.

Doctor Aydelotte: That was the question that I wanted to ask. And I would like to ask you another question about this matter of parity. I think you know about Professor Notestein's paper which indicates that in his opinion, at least, equal numbers of Jews and Arabs would be forever impossible because of the different rate of natural increase. Suppose, for one reason or another, parity were impossible; suppose it were impossible for that reason, or suppose that the economic absorptive power of the country was found not to be great enough to admit that many Jews? Would the fact that parity could not be attained be fatal to your plan?

A. On your assumption, which I do not share, as to absorptive capacity, because I believe the absorptive capacity of this country is very great, that would not invalidate the conception of a bi-national state. Even though the Jews remained a minority over a period of years, the conception of a bi-national state based

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on parity would give this minority—or if the Arabs ever became a minority—equal political rights as a community. That is the basic thesis of our contention. That is what we mean to say when we put forward this idea of the multi-national state, based upon parity among the various nationalities.

There are two aspects to it in our case. One is the political aspect; the other is the numerical aspect.

I assume you accept in your question the political aspect.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: I was assuming for the moment the numerical one seems to be harder to predict.

A. It is harder to predict, and in these figures that I gave, you will observe that if the Jewish immigration is ever less than 30,000 a year, there is absolutely no chance for the Jews to catch up, because the Arab natural increase is greater than the Jewish. It is 2.7 for the Arabs and 1.3 for the Jews. Might I add a word on that?

Assuming that 60,000 Jews a year were permitted to come in for eleven years, so that the Jews would reach parity with the Arab population, there would always be this difference, owing to the increase in the Arab population, and thus a further chance for Jewish immigration to catch up to the Arab increase, which is larger than the Jewish increase. I don't know if I have made myself clear.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: Yes, I see the point. Yet you have also got to contemplate the possibility, that there wouldn't be enough Jews in the world who would want to come to Palestine to keep pace or bring the population to parity in the long future.

A. I don't know on what grounds you base that, but my own opinion is this:

DOCTER AYDELOTTE: Your opinion is doubtless much better than mine. I thought it was one of the possibilities, at least. I would like to ask another question.

You spoke with great regret that the agreement of 1936 wasn't accepted and consequently, 200,000 Jews who might be in Palestine at this moment are not here. I think the Committee would be interested to hear you say anything you think it wise to say about the circumstances of that agreement—the reasons



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for its not being accepted—but I don't want you to say anything you don't think wise to say.

A. I should have to consult those who with me signed the document, who were among those who conducted these discussions, before I should feel free to tell you who the people were or to let you know further about it.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: If you feel free to make any further comments on the subject in written form, it would be a matter of great interest. I would like to finally ask a question of Professor Buber. Did I understand you to say, sir, that the majority of the Jews do not, in your opinion, favor a Jewish State in Palestine?


PROFESSOR BUBER: I think that state and majority are not the necessary bases for Zionism.

DOCTOR AYDELOTTE: I gathered that, but I thought I saw the sentence in your paper to the effect that the majority of Jews do not favor a Jewish State.

- A. You see, there are no statistics for it. A great part of Judaism cannot tell what it thinks about it. We have no communication with them, but I think a very great part of the Jewish people think a Jewish State is necessary for Zionism.
- Q. You think a great part of the Jewish people think a Jewish State is necessary?
- A. Yes, a great part think—a very great part—think it is necessary—that a Jewish State is necessary.
- Q. The sentence I was referring to in your paper is as follows: "As to the demand of autonomy, it does not . . ." I beg your pardon, I think I misunderstood your sentence. Thank you very much.

MR. CROSSMAN: I would like to say two sentences before I question Doctor Magnes. I was asking about you this morning, and somebody told me you were the only reasonable man in Palestine. When I was listening to you, I began to see why he paid you that compliment.

I am not going to discuss the details of your plan because I feel if that were possible, nobody would possibly not want to see it done. The real problem is whether it is practical, and it



is entirely on that question of the practicability of your ideas that I wanted to get your advice. I would like to put something to you first:

Do you agree that the success or failure of your complete scheme depends upon the following four things:

- 1. Agreement between the political leaders on both sides;
- 2. Decrease on both sides of nationalistic fervor among the rank and file;
- 3. Confidence on both sides that the other side is going to keep to its agreement to give up its ultimate desires—confidence that it will go on agreeing to that later on;

4. An administration capable of the extremely skillful job of conducting this together.

Those four are very important elements for success?

- A. Permit me not to deal with the fourth for the moment.
- Mr. Crossman: Yes.
- A. You question the practicability of this plan.
- Mr. Crossman: Just discussing it.
- A. I question the practicability of your questions.

 (Laughter.) I will tell you what I mean. This plan, or a plan similar to this, is designed to do those very things that you have in mind and that you have these grave doubts about. Your doubts are not only grave but justified. But how are you going to get agreement among the political leaders?

Mr. Crossman: That is what I was going to discuss.

A. Yes, how are you going to get this confidence? How are you going to get the other points that you made? Our answer is, through life and not just through discussion, through establishing vital interests for both of the peoples, by establishing contact not in a debating society but in Boards, which have to do, with the determination of the absorptive capacity of the country. Both peoples are interested in that—maybe one pro and the other contra. There will be a third man representing the mandatory or administering authority. Then—through establishing a Development Board. I should say both peoples are interested in that affirmatively. Both peoples would benefit from it. If you, therefore, establish a Regional trusteeship council repre-

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senting both peoples, and go through all these organs of government which I have mentioned here, that is the way to bring people together who are at the present time unhappily far apart and who simply can't be brought together by appealing to abstract qualitiles.

- Q. Thank you, sir. You have been putting forward your pamphlets for some time since 1943, and therefore these ideas of yours are pretty well known in Palestine. What is the size of the membership of your organization?
- A. The membership is a small membership— a few hundred. The organization is not a political party. It has never attempted mass meetings for the purpose of gaining memberships; it has never distributed membership blanks around; its purpose is to clarify some of these problems; to put forward a program; to arouse discussion. This little publication that I mentioned to you, this monthly, I think has about 500 regular subscribers, aside from the number sold here and there. But we do know this little publication penetrates into every editorial office and to other places and arouses thought.
- Q. Now, so that there has been time for these ideas to get fairly well known here?
- A. Yes. Might I add, Mr. Crossman, it isn't only our organization that believes in the bi-national Palestine; there are other organizations who are political parties and who are out for large numbers of members, who also believe in this program. There may be differences between us and them on this or that point, but our general tendency and theirs is the same.
- I should like to add to that, that we know from ever so many indications that a large part of the inarticulate section of the population believes more or less as we do. This inarticulate part of the population isn't organized either because of our fault, or because a moderate program doesn't have the same attractiveness in days of war as an extreme program has. The point I would like to make is, there are large numbers of inarticulate persons in the community who also feel more or less as we do.
- Q. But because they have no political form of expression, they vote for the more extreme policy?

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- A. I don't say they even vote for the more extreme position; they aren't counted.
- Q. But still you feel that Arab-Jewish relations have deteriorated lately, despite all the efforts of getting together?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Taking the leadship on both sides, do you feel in the Jewish Agency today there are men in the key positions who sympathize with your ideas?
 - A. I hesitate to speak for them.
- Q. It is a vital question because here you have an organization which you agree has a very strong control over the Jewish community here.
 - A. I think you would get a clearer answer by asking them.
- Q. Yes. Now, do you agree that since the Jewish Agency is mentioned as a key agency in the conciliation, the question of whether or not it would accept your views is a key to the success or failure of the scheme?
- A. Put these things before the Jewish Agency and the Arab League and see.
- Q. You feel that the Agency as at present constituted could, in fact, take part in this conciliation?
 - A. What do you mean by "as at present constituted"?
 - Q. With its present executive and its present structure?
- A. Well, I'm talking of the Jewish Agency as an organization that has been recognized internationally by the Mandate. It isn't a Jewish Agency composed of this or that person or this or that number that I have in mind. I have in mind the Jewish Agency.
- Q. I see. Then, on the side of the Arab League, what part could the Arab Higher Committee play in your plan?
- A. That is a problem, of course, that undoubtedly would arise, and I can't give a clear answer because I am not authorized to give that answer. But what I should like to say is this:

 That we make the Jewish Agency and the Arab League

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parallel. Why? We haven't put in here the Vaad Leumi, which might perhaps be parallel to the Arab Higher Committee. The Vaad Leumi is a local body. The Arab Higher Committee is a local body. We mention international bodies, including the Administering Authority as representing Trusteeship Council—the Jewish Agency as representing the Jews all over the world, and the Arab League as representing the Arabs and Moslems of the world, insofar as Palestine is concerned. So that there is a counterpoise. There is the Jewish Agency, an international body here, and the Arab League, an international body there. What would be the relationship later on between the Vaad Leumi and the Jewish Agency, or the Arab High Committee and Arab League is something we haven't dealt with here. It is something we have discussed, but we believe that would be complicating the problem if we discussed it now.

- Q. On the fourth point I made on the administering of it, you feel there would have to be changes in the structure of the Palestine administration, apart from the addition of the Arabs and Jews, as suggested, in key positions in order to carry this out?
- A. Yes, I feel there would have to be self-government, but I have been talking about self-government upon the basis of parity.
 - Q. I meant in the transitional period.
- A. Yes, in the transitional period during the Mandate, yes, I think there ought to be immediate changes. It seems to me—well, I was going to say inexcusable. You will excuse me if I use the word. It is probably inexcusable that there isn't a larger measure of self-government in this country, and that doesn't mean that the hundreds of English officials who are here are not good men. They are. They are all interested and they all do their work as far as is required of them. But they are not part of this country. There are hundreds of minor positions which would be very well filled by Jews and Arabs, and I venture to say very often as well, and perhaps in some instances, even better. I am not directing criticism at anyone; I'm only talking about the situation as it has developed. What I referred to here, however, was not these hundreds of minor

positions here and there; I referred to these important responsible offices in the central government.

I realized that when reading I made a mistake by saying there wasn't a single Arab or a single Jew in the Secretariat. There is a Palestine Arab in the Seretariat. There is no Palestine Jew, so far as I am aware, in the Secretariat. But aside from that little error, there is no Jew in the Executive Council of the Government, or Arab. There is no Jew or Arab in what is called the Advisory Council; there is no Palestinian Jew or Arab at the head of any department. I could name departments to you that could be very well filled—non-controversial departments—that could very well be filled by Jews and Arabs. There is no Jewish or Arab District Commissioner; there is no Jewish or Arab President of a Court.

That is a situation which we contend is impossible. It is treating a community as though they were children. This is a mature community. The only way, after all, to teach self-government, is to distribute responsibility. You can't get self-government by having other people govern. That is something which we contend ought to be done now. And this Consultative Body that we have suggested to you, that ought to be done now.

- Q. What it comes to is, you feel there would have to be a profound change of heart in the government and in the Arabs and Jews, and the declaration of policy and principle which you outlined would be the beginning?
- A. Not a mere declaration; it would have to be really meant.
 - Q. Quite.
 - A. It is a very important point.
 - Q. I agree.
- A. You probably know of that passage in the White Paper of 1930, when the British Government proposed the establishment of a legislature similar to that proposed in 1922, and in the statement it was declared that no matter what side stayed out, this thing was going to be put through, but it wasn't.

One can't blame the communities for thinking, that when these declarations of policy are made, there is a string attached to them.

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What we propose to you is, that this declaration of policy be meant and be put through authoritatively. It can't be put through overnight. Doctor Aydelotte said this was a complicated problem. We regard it as a very complicated problem.

What we mean by making Jewish-Arab cooperation the main objective of major policy is this: That it has to be done day by day and year after year, and people have to be trained especially for the service. There is a great English Colonial Service in the Sudan. You have to train them to understand what it is all about, and not regard this as merely the day's job and that is the end of it.

I remember years ago having a talk with a good friend of mine, who is unfortunately not now in the British Administration, an Englishman, on this very problem, and when I advanced arguments similiar to these, he said, "But this is not our job; this is your job," that is, the Jews and the Arabs. It is indeed primarily the job of Jews and Arabs.

But it can't be done unless there be this authoritative Body with all of the weight that government everywhere has standing behind it.


MR. CROSSMAN: Thank you very much indeed.

MR. CRUM: Doctor Magnes, suppose that this Committee recommended a bi-national State to our respective Governments and that that suggestion also included the suggestion that the Mandatory Power attempt to put it into force or into effect. Is it your suggestion that British and American arms be used for that purpose, if need be?

A. Well, Mr. Crum, I don't know just how many arms in general would be necessary. It would depend, I think, very largely on the way it was put—on the conviction with which it was meant—on the men who are going to try to work all of this out.

If your Governments will decide on the policy of a binational Palestine, you just can't put it into effect overnight. You have to go through a long process, and it is some of the steps in this long, rather wearisome education process that we have tried to outline.

Q. In one of your articles, which I think was filed here,



you suggested, I believe, that the English and American Governments should back the proposal.

- A. Yes, I did. I proposed that in an article in the Foreign Affairs in January, 1943. And I proposed a Commission like yours at the time.
- Q. I would take it you meant by "power," by force, if need be.
- A. I suppose so, in the last analysis, I don't want to shirk that problem. If one starts out on the assumption, however, that force is going to be used, one will have much less patience in trying to work it through without force. You have to try to determine in advance that this is reasonable; that this is just, more or less, all around; that there are men of good will to be found everywhere, and of course, committees or boards who are going to try and pick out good men; who are going to have expert advice; who are going to do it gradually. You can't introduce a bi-national state all at once. But if, in the last analysis, the time comes when a show of arms will have to be made, well, then I don't want to invite the United States Army here. I should regret very much to see it here, if you want to ask me my personal opinion. May I add one more word:

At that time, presumably, there might be agreement in the Security Council of the UNO which would know how to do this thing better than if we invited the British Army or the American Army or any other army.

Mr. Crum: Does your organization reject completely the idea of partition?

- A. I would like to give you my own opinion. We have no official stand on that. My own opinion is, that I reject partition absolutely. I think it is a moral defeat for everyone concerned. It is a confession of failure.
 - Q. Let us assume that.
 - A. But you mustn't assume that.
 - Q. It might be the only answer.
- A. No, it isn't at all the only answer. You have, in the first place, in these two tiny partitioned states, the same prob-

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
lems in small as you have in this larger bi-national State. You have a majority and a minority. How are you going to treat them? If you are going to treat them as majorities and minorities—one dominant people and one subservient people—that is one way to do it. If you are going to treat them as we propose, on the lines of parity in the Jewish State or in the Arab State, why not do it in the complete state? Moreover, you would find, I think, that the administrative boundaries would be very hard to set up.

And what is of greatest importance to me is this: That you then separate the Jews from the Arabs instead of bringing them together. You separate them as though they were two dogs fighting on the street and you had to put them into separate kennels. That is not the case. Some people may use that figure of speech, but it isn't true. The only way to get people to work together is to get them to live together, to get to know one another, and you can't do that by putting them into separate compartments.

If you put them into these compartments, what is going on now in both the Arab and Jewish schools will be accentuated to a very large degree. Unfortunately, at the present time you have a large amount of the bitterest nationalism, which you might call chauvinism, being given expression to both here and there.

I dread the day, when a few years' time, after this partition, you will get a group of young Jews and a group of young Arabs on both sides of this irridentist border going after one another, in just the same way as our militarists today want to have the field for a trial of arms. Why do that? It's a large problem. No one can guarantee its success, but it is worth trying. It is a great challenge; it is the Holy Land. Why mangle this conception of the Holy Land? Here are two peoples, descendants of the great Semitic peoples of antiquity. They can naturally work together. We have to find the way; we have to try to convince everyone this is just and that is sound. You don't have to do this partitioning. It is entirely artificial. It may seem simple; it is only facile.

MR. MANNINGHAM-BULLER: You regard the desire on the one hand to maintain a majority and the desire on the other to



attain a majority as perhaps the chief factor in keeping the Arabs and Jews apart, is that right?

A. Yes.

- Q. You spoke of an internationally guaranteed agreement between the partners. I wasn't quite clear about it, but you said something to Mr. Crossman about it being imposed in advance. If it was imposed in advance, you would not be suggesting a guaranteed agreement, would you, stopping one side from going on in its desire to attain a majority?
- A. Pardon me if I say I don't quite catch the implication of your question. I don't think I used the words "imposed in advance." What I did mean to say was, that a policy should be declared in advance—a policy of the bi-national Palestine, based upon parity between the two peoples. I said that that policy would have to be adopted and announced concurrently with a further statement about immigration. Then I said in order to have this policy carried out, this policy of political parity, there would have to be a number of stages, and we propose a number of these governmental institutions.
- Q. If you made that declaration of policy now, it would in no way silence the clamor for a majority, would it?
- A. It certainly would not, in the beginning, at least. It wouldn't silence anything at the beginning. That policy has to be carried out, as I tried to indicate before, over a period through these various channels.
- Q. Assume you declare that policy and assume you carry it out in the way you suggest. Would you not still be met with the demand, perhaps, on one side to maintain its majority and a demand on the other side to attain its majority?
- A. Yes, undoubtedly, and that would be fought out in this Regional Trusteeship Council in the first place, and we propose this Absorptive Capacity Board, or call it Immigration Board, and other boards and committes.
- Q. Do you think it would be fought out within the conciliation which you suggest?
- A. Oh, no. Naturally, it would give rise to a large discussion everywhere.

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Q. In your paper in the paragraph about the rate of immigration, you said, "Although these calculations—meaning the Royal Commission's calculations—were made in 1936, it would appear that the ratio of Arab increase and Jewish increase has remained stable."

A. Yes.

- Q. It is a fact, is it not, that the Royal Commission trend of population figures have been subject to a certain amount of criticism?
- A. Well, I took the precaution of discussing these figures with officials in the Immigration Department of the Government. We went over them rather carefully and what I have said here is the result of those discussions.

Q. Thank you.

MR. PHILLIPS: Assume for the sake of argument that your plan met with the interest of other Governments, how would you begin, what steps would be the first ones to take to set your plan in operation? I think I understood you to say you regarded the centre as the most important part of the machinery, would you therefore start by appointments at the centre of Arabs and Jews; if so, how would you attract them, would you give them portfolios at once, that form of responsibility, or would they be in the first instance merely assistants to the High Commissioner? How yould you start the ball moving?

A. If I venture to mention the names of certain Government Departments, I am sure that those who head them will not think that I am directing my attention to them personally. I would start by appointing Arabs and Jews in equal numbers as heads of certain departments; as for example, I would begin with the most innocuous department in all of Government, the department of archaeology. I know the Director of the Department; he is a most efficient man, most obliging, a good head of this department, but I know some Jews, I know some Arabs who could be equally good heads of that department. Take, for example, the Department of Health. The Director of the Department of Health, who served in that capacity for over 20 years, has now gone. The present Director is about to resign. I think I read some place a new Director had been appointed

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or was about to be appointed. I said to myself at the time: Are there no Jews and no Arabs in this country who are medically well enough trained and who know enough of administration to head this most humane of all the departments of Government? Take, for example, the Department of Agriculture and of Forestry. We have a large number of Jews and of Arabs here who know a great deal about agriculture and about forestry. My friend, Mr. Smilansky, knows a great deal about agriculture. He was Chairman of the Farmers' Association for a large number of years. Take the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the Director has resigned and is now the Chairman of the Jerusalem Municipal Commission, an excellent man, if he will pardon me saying so, he may be here or he may not, but at any rate, a man who is very well liked everywhere. But when he left the Department it was only natural that the Englishman, his name is Irish, so he may be an Irishman, was appointed in his place. I said to myself at the time, is there no one here in Palestine who is fit to be the head of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs? Take the railroads, the Director of the Railroads is really an excellent man. What I mean to say is, he has improved the service, he knows his job and he is an expert at it. That is the thing for which he was trained. I doubt whether some of the others were trained for these jobs I have been mentioning. I am sure there are some men who could handle that job. I would not put a Jew or an Arab as head of the police; I would not put a Jew or Arab at the head of the Department of Education; I would not make a Jew or an Arab at the present time, at any rate, a Chief Secretary; I would not make a Jew or an Arab Chief Justice. There may be some others perhaps. I would not make him the Financial Secretary at the moment, although I think you could find Jews and Arabs who know something about figures. They might come in later. I have just tried to give you an indication of what I think can be done without too much delay. It has been delayed long enough, and if this Commission is really—pardon me saying this—is really to do something vital as I know it wants to do, here is the field for it, living men. Take the districts. The District Commissioners are most important people. They are important because they come into contact with the population. They and their assistants or the Assistant District Commissioners know what is going on in the village and in the farms and


the factories and the rest of it. They do the best they can. Most of them get to know at least one of these two languages, Hebrew and Arabic, for the most part Arabic; but that is just the place where people living in this country and making it their permanent home, born here, educated here, would fit in very well. They could come into touch with the population through all of its stratifications in a much more thorough-going way, I think at any rate, than the best of men with the best of goodwill who come from the outside. The Consultative Body that I mentioned I believe would be a wonderful training ground for the future Legislature.

- Q. And so you would begin first at the centre?
- A. Yes, as the first step, and the second step might be the Consultative Body.
- Q. Yes. Just one other thought, in describing the set-up of your Council, did you or did you not refer to the world wide interest, the Christian interest, in the Holy Places?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Have you thought of any representation of that in the Government?
- A. Well, I tried to indicate, that in our view the Administering Authority, the Mandatory Authority, Great Britain, is the representative of Christianity. In the Mandate for Palestine, I think it is Article 9, you have a paragraph giving religious courts certain jurisdiction. We have not really addressed ourselves with any detail to that. There are a number of views about it. As far as the Holy Places are concerned I believe you would not find a single person, I think that is not exaggerated, you would not find a single person who will not agree, that as far as the Holy Places are concerned, there must be some kind of special dispensation, so that they could remain Holy Places and that one could have free access to them for pilgrims and for others who want to visit them. I think if you would seek that area where there is least difference of opinion you would find it right there.

MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you very much.

MR. McDonald: Just one question, Dr. Magnes, perhaps you will remember we last discussed problems of refugees and inter-related matters in Brooklyn some seven, eight, nine years ago, and since then there has come this supreme tragedy which even the most pessimistic of us then did not imagine, so my question to you on your scheme is just this: could it be put into effect in your judgment in time to be instrumental in saving this last remnant which many of us have seen in our recent tour through Europe?

A. I emphasized that. I said, in all the world time presses and time presses also in this ancient land. I said further, there are three stages in connection with this immigration policy: the first stage is now, today. We pray, let us have these 100,000 people. What is the delay? When the terms of reference to this Committee were published on November 15th there was a great deal of discussion in this country, and I happened to be one of those who thought he could find within it a large number of positive aspects. I thought the association of America with it was one of these; I thought the emphasis on the desire for an agreed settlement was one of these, and I thought this was a positive side of it, that your Committee was authorised to make ad hoc interim recommendations. In the first place, the policy declared there would be no interruption of the then quota of Jewish immigration. There was this interruption unfortunately, though the numbers have been made good since. I would like to tell the Committee I have never seen quite so much distress, quite so much tension among all persons whatever political views they held as one could observe and feel then when it was realised that this quota of 1,500 a month had stopped. It stopped, I do not remember exactly for how long but for a couple of months I think, and then one was told: despite what is said in this document by the Secretary of State that everything was to be done to ensure that there was to be no interruption of the present rate of immigration, it was nevertheless interrupted. Then the Committee was authorised to make ad hoc interim recommendations upon its findings in Europe, and it seems to me the Committee did a wise thing, that was discussed here pro and con, in going to Europe first, because there is the scene of this tragedy. You have been there. Will you pardon me if I ask a question. Why are not the 100,000 permitted to come in? I am asking you now instead of you asking me.



- Q. I suppose your question is, why did we not recommend in an interim report that they should be admitted?
- A. I should not want to put the thing in that way, that would be getting too close to the skin.
 - Q. You asked us why are they not admitted.
- A. That is what we are interested in, not in the interim report. We are interested in having them come. We want them and I can tell you, I have been attending these sessions and I have heard questions as to the economic absorptive capacity. We think economic absorptive capacity is a criterion of immigration in the long term policy, but not with these 100,000. We want them in and we will share with them, if the country has not enough work—there is enough work we think, there is enough money here; there is more money in this country, unfortunately I would like to say, than there ever has been in its long history. Well, let some of that money be spent. There are some houses that have more rooms than they ought to have, let them be occupied. The people here are ready, I think you can accept it literally, people here are ready to share what they have. Give them the opportunity for it. These 100,000 will open their hearts, it will be a saving work. I cannot put it in any other way. Why should it not be done? Why not? You have the authority to recommend it.
- Q. May I say first, so far as the interim report is concerned, I am sure its not having been issued was no indication that every member of this Committee did not feel the poignant tragedy and also the urgency of the problem, but I come back to my question, would it not be assumed that the admission of these 100,000 on the basis of your conception of the agreement between Jew and Arab would be dependent upon Jewish-Arab agreement on that point?
 - A. Absolutely not.
- Q. You mean you would ask the Mandatory Power to open the door?

A. Yes.

SIR FREDERICK LEGGETT: I take it you make your proposal with one important objective in mind, that is to provide

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A. Yes.

Q. I take it you do that because the whole history of mankind shows agreements are not made between equals; they are often made between people each of whom can do the other very great harm. Now taking the evidence we have heard, is it not true that unless both sides see clearly the objective to which they are going and can agree upon it, that to bring new people here now would be to bring them into a battlefield.

A. No, I do not think so.


Q. Do you agree it is absolutely essential that the two sides should agree upon the objective?

A. I think it is very very desirable, but I do not think you are going to get that now. I think that is just chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. You will get it, not by sitting down and working for agreement in advance; you will get it through life, through these steps or other steps in actual practice that you take. It depends what the steps are. If they are steps directed to that end, I am sure you will get it in the course of many years. It will not come from today to tomorrow.

Q. I am afraid I did not make myself quite clear. Is it not your view that if these steps are taken, minds which are at present locked on one particular idea will begin to see the practical ways in which they could get to greater agreement, just as, for example, between the employers and workpeople in a particular industry, if there is a means by which they can get together and discuss matters, though they are not equal, they will probably find a way in which they can live together?

A. All the better if you can achieve that, if you can bring the Jews and Arabs together you will be fulfilling one of your great functions. I do not know if that is an answer to the question.

Q. It is partially, I think. Now may I raise another point. You were talking about urgency, and all of us who have been in Europe agree upon that urgency, but we saw there young men



who were thinking they were coming here to fight. Since we have been here we found something of that atmosphere. I again ask you whether it would be right to bring those young children here if the only way open or the only way determined upon by either side is to fight.

A. I am going to give you an extreme answer-even though it were the only way I would bring them. But that is not the only way. All over the world young people have learned how to fight, that is what this war has been, teaching them how to fight. It is impossible after a war of these dimensions to unlearn that today or tomorrow. That fighting atmosphere is unfortunately going to persist for years and years to come, a whole generation has been brought upon it. Unfortunately also a generation of my own people. A generation of Americans too has now been brought up on something entirely new. There is probably going to be conscription or compulsory military service even there. Why should our young people be regarded by you as exceptions? It is the Jews who should take exception to this militarism among our people. I take exception to it. I take exception to this militarism, to this chauvinism, to this, I cannot use any other words, to this atmosphere of terror. We know it; you hear about it. We feel it in our flesh and blood; you read about it. You do not know the forms that this terror takes. It is not only the terror of the bomb, and there are those among us who know what this is very well from their own experience. Nevertheless, I answer you again. If this were the only way, if we knew they were coming here in order to do this fighting, yes. But they are not coming here to do this fighting. Mr. Smilansky would just like to say a word. He says it becomes our duty to try and create conditions, so that this spoiling of our young cease. That is what we want.

I cannot tell you how we condemn these things. I would like to say one more thing which will not be particularly popular, I am afraid. I have heard here in these sessions people express their great regret at what our youth are doing, some of our youth are doing. They mean that very sincerely. What I would like to say is, this is not just a question of our youth. Some of these young men who go out with bombs and guns are among our most idealistic youth, idealistic men and women, just as you find in other countries where rebellion goes on, ready to sacrifice their lives for what they believe to be a higher cause,

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to save their people, and the question I ask is, who sends them? It is not the young men who send them, it is older men who send them. Those are the people you should be directing your attention to.

SIR FREDERICK LEGGETT: Thank you. May I just say how wonderful it has been to hear this afternoon a counsel of conciliation put forward.


MR. Buxton: You said something on a subject which may go to the very heart of the decision we are trying to make. You said that perhaps a great many Jews would forego their aspirations, their passion for a Jewish State if liberal immigration were allowed; if that is your belief or conviction, not merely a hope or expectation, would you give me two or three reasons for that belief.

A. One reason is this, that some of my friends, not all, who are for the Jewish State, have no hesitation in saying, when they argue privately, that although they believe in the Jewish State with all their heart for the various reasons that have been adduced here, they feel it probably will not be granted, and what they really do want is immigration. The argument oscillates back and forth between state and immigration. Some say, if we cannot get a Jewish State in all of Palestine, we want a Jewish State in part of Palestine, partition, because in that way the Jews would be recognized internationally as a unit, as an entity, and that has its advantages in helping Jews in other parts of the world. The argument is put forward, supposing Jews had a seat in the United Nations Organization it would not be necessary for somebody else to come and plead their cause. There are very good reasons for wanting this political representation. Some say if we cannot get the State, give us immigration; others will say if we cannot get the State, give us partition. There are many people, if you would talk to them, who say, to be sure, immigration is the thing that we want, and the reason we want the State is because through the State we will get immigration. There are on the other hand some who want the State for the State's sake. They are State mad, not realising that the State is something these days that perhaps needs revision in its whole conception and practice. They want the State for the sake of the State. There are others, however, who want the State for the sake of immigration. That is another reason why I say, if

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immigration were given without the State there would be many people who would not be satisfied a hundred per cent, but whowould acquiesce, would forego the State.


- Q. You are inclined to think that the fervour of these folks would die down somewhat if they had this immediate relief to the Jewish problem?
- A. If you could arrange in some way the immediate release, you might say from captivity, of these 100,000 human beings who are our brothers and sisters, I can almost guarantee you, that the tension which fills our lives and which destroys the morality of so many of our young people, would be relieved.
- Q. There is another question somewhat more abstract, in your discussion of the bi-national State you would set up a new Agency, a group of Arabs, and you refer to the Jewish Agency. Is not that in a way, Dr. Magnes, an indication of a lack of trust in the ability of the Jewish population, as a population, the Jewish people and the Arab people to manage their own affairs without the intervention of outside agencies?
- A. Mr. Buxton, this little country which has been fought over through the centuries by all the armies of antiquity and by the armies of modern times, is a place sui generis. It has the interest of millions of people throughout the world. It is not as though it was Bulgaria, for example, which is of interest to the Bulgarians, perhaps also to another Power at the present moment. Bulgaria is a little country that revolves on its own axis and of which one hears nothing concerning its literature, its music, its schools or its ideals. But Palestine is a country that is peculiar. Our Bible calls the Jewish people a peculiar people. They are a peculiar people, as Professor Buber pointed out, peculiar in this, that they have this peculiar relationship to this peculiar country. You cannot therefore say that the Jews of Palestine are the only Jews in the world concerned with this country. The same thing, if not to the same degree, applies to the Arabs. The third Holy Mosque in Islam is the Mosque of Aksa. The Dome of the Rock is one of the most beautiful architectural monuments in the whole Moslem world, therefore Moslems outside of Palestine are also concerned with this country. Mahomet's mystic flight is said to have had its origin here. Turning this over to the Arabs of Palestine is just as short-



sighted, we should say, as turning it over to the Jews of Palestine. Now there are organizations representing these Jews and these Arabs on the outside. There is the Jewish Agency. That has been the great instrument for the building up of this country. You go around this country and most of what you will see is due to the efforts of the Jewish Agency. The Arab League is but a young creation. It has not had the opportunity, let us say, of doing anything at all comparable to what the Jewish Agency has been able to do for Palestine, but it is the only body that we know of representing the Arabs and the Moslems on the outside; and this Jewish Agency is recognized by the Vaad Leuni here and this Arab League is recognized by the Arab Higher Committee, accepting them for the moment as the counterpart of the Vaad Leumi. For that reason, because of the international character of Palestine, because of its inter-religious character, we talk about this Regional Trusteeship Council which is to include also a representative of the Mandatory or of the Administering Authority, Great Britain, which is also interested in this country, not because the British live here, not because their officials are here, but because this is the Holy Land of Christianity. This is where Christianity had its origin, where it had its great decisive historic experiences. It was peopled by Jews at the time; and Great Britain is interested and the rest of the Christian world is interested because of that. Therefore we say, it is not sufficient to have a local Government, although, as you see, we propose local self-government. But on certain of these basic problems we propose, at first at any rate, that this international force, represented through the Administering Authority, the Jewish Agency and the Arab League, should come together and try to work out a number of these things such as we propose.

Q. I daresay you are right, but what you say seems a little paradoxical to me. A few minutes ago, you were stressing the value of allowing native Arabs and native Jews to assume active management of their own affairs. On the other hand, you say let us bring together two international groups to manage their affairs for them. Will you not reconcile those two points of view for me, please?

A. It is a perfectly legitimate question, yes. The objective is to have the local Jews and the local Arabs conduct their




own affairs, conduct their own government. How are we going to bring that about? That is our whole argument. We are going to bring it about, so we think, by steps something like those we have proposed. We do not go at once to the Vaad Leumi and the Arab Higher Committee for that, because we feel that the problem of immigration, taking that in the first place, is something that goes beyond the borders, beyond the confines and the ability of just local groups. Immigration concerns the rest of the world. One of the sources of Jewish immigration is the rest of the world; it is the source of Jewish immigration, and it is the Jewish Agency, which is an international body, that has thus far been dealing with immigration. All of the Jews are interested in that, just as all the Arabs throughout the world are interested in that, therefore as a first step we say, in order to help bring this about, do not go to the local people; local people are fighting around too much, go to the international authority, go to the wider background. It is our conviction, at least our hope, that the Arab League is going to be much more moderate than any local Arab body in any country. I think the Arab League has thus far given evidence of that in its constituent documents. If you read the paragraph on Palestine you will find that, I think. Recent statements made by one of its representatives indicate that we have to encourage them. It will not be so easy for the Arab League to be more moderate than the local people, any more than it is so easy for the Jewish Agency to be more moderate. But I do think that will be the case, and for that reason we feel at the beginning, however it may turn out afterwards, in order to bring this about, in order to bring people together, which is what we want, and we want to bring them together upon the basis of actual live practical things, their own interests, you have to bring into the picture these larger international forces to persuade and to be persauded. If it were possible just to say that this thing could be carried out, as we propose it, through turning it over to the local people, it would be very good. The way we propose is more complicated. I think, however, it is more practical.

- Q. You foresee the time when the local people will take over their own affairs, will that be in a decade, or a couple of decades?
 - Q. However long it may be, yes, that is the objective.

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MR. CRICK: A few miscellaneous questions, first a domestic one. You are the head of a relatively young seat of learning which I suppose is governed by a Trust Deed or some such instrument, is that so?

- A. No, it is not so. As I said at the beginning I am not representing the Hebrew University today, so this question—
 - Q. ... is purely personal.
- A. Is asked in the knowledge of that statement. The Hebrew University is organized upon the basis of what is called the Hebrew University Association, which is a company registered in accordance with the laws of Palestine, an educational association.
 - Q. How many students have you?
- A. I think there must be 700, 750 now. At the peak of the registration before the war there were over 1,200. On account of enlistments—this might also be interesting to you as being characteristic of what the Jewish community tried to do during the war, the number went from 1,200 to 300. It has now risen to 700 or 750.
 - Q. What proportion of the student body is non-Jewish?
- A. A very small proportion. You mean the Arab, yes, there are a few Arab students at the University even today, I say even today.
- Q. I take it, there are no restrictions on a religious basis on entry into the University?
- A. On the contrary, we can furnish you with a copy of the Constitution of the University and the first paragraph says, that entrance to the University is open to all persons regardless of religion, race, colour or social standing.
- Q. I take it you would greatly welcome an influx of non-Jewish students?
 - A. We should indeed.
- Q. Would you be prepared, you personally, would you be prepared to consider as one gesture of conciliation the possi-



bility of changing the name, let us say, to the University of Palestine? (Laughter.)

A. I am not inclined to laugh at that question at all.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: If I may suggest it, I am not sure that Dr. Magnes ought to be called upon to say whether he personally would consider changing the name of an Institution of which he is the head.

- A. I would nevertheless like to answer that question with your permission.
 - Q. Just please yourself.
- A. I think it a very serious question. The choice is open to the Hebrew University to be either the University of Palestine or the University of the whole Jewish people. With our eyes open and quite consciously, thinking that we knew what we were doing, we chose the Hebrew University, the University of all the Jewish people, for a very simple reason. It has to do in a measure with the basic remarks that Professor Buber presented here. We are in Palestine in order that we may fructify and revive Judaism. That is the basic reason. The reception of displaced persons is something we had not any knowledge of when the Hebrew University was established, although there was a sufficient amount of persecution of the Jews, but not to that extent. Our basic conception is, that by the establishment of this Jewish community here we shall be strengthening the Jewish people in its mind and in its spirit, in its ethical and in its religious aspirations. You may ask why? The reason is peculiar to this peculiar people. If you will permit me to say so, in Christianity it is primarily the Church that is the visible society which Christianity, in accordance with its basic principles, is bound to see incorporated in the world. In Judaism it is not the Church. In Judaism it is the People. That is one of the basic peculiarities of Judaism. It is hardly a Church at all. It certainly is not an Ecclesia. It has no head, it has no synod, it has no sanhedrin. It is a voluntary association, as Professor Buber has pointed out, for the purpose of trying to establish a just society, and it is the conception of Judaism, that this just society has to be established first of all by the Jews among the Jews, and that through establishing it first of all among the

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Jews, perhaps it will be possible to help establish the just society in other parts of the world. The Hebrew University is there in order to study Judaism, in order to delve into its sources, in order to study Judaism and bring it into touch with all the disciplines of mankind. The Jewish people has had contact with almost all the cultures and civilizations and races of mankind, and we have our experience of them. It seems sometimes that every one of us has seen and has known these other peoples; and for that reason too we must try to get at the sources of our own life and of our own mind. One of the sources of our life is this country itself, this Holy Land, where our mind, our spirit reached its greatest florescence. We have to try and get to our sources in literature. We have therefore a great library. I say great, because it is great for this part of the world. This is the largest library in existence anywhere round here. It has 460,000 volumes on its shelves. It has a large manuscript collection. It is endeavouring to become a great spiritual centre. That is the reason I have tried to convey to you why we have accepted this choice, a Hebrew University which has to be the University of the Hebrew people, of the Jewish people. On the other hand, I should not like you to have the impression that we are not trying to serve this country, that we are not trying to be as far as we can the University of Palestine. Our University is open to everyone, and I am glad to say that people of various kinds have availed themselves of the facilities of the Hebrew University. If you come to our library any day wou will probably see some monk in his gown, and in our Department of Arabic Studies, the Hebrew University has a greater library of Arabic and Moslem literature in the European sense of the term than any Arab University or any Arab Library. The Arab Libraries have more manuscripts than we have, more Arab editions, but the Hebrew University is one of the great libraries in the world bearing upon Arabic studies. I recall the days several years ago—the fact that it does not happen now is an indication of this deterioration you were speaking of-when pupils attending Arab institutions were brought into our library in order that they might see with their own eyes for the first time what their own people in times gone by had created. Moreover, there are many other ways in which we serve Palestine. I do not wish to go into the whole thing.

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
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Mr. Justice Singleton: I think you have answered it.

- A. This is the purpose now of my remarks: we extended an invitation to the Committee to visit the University; we have not yet had an answer from the Committee and we do hope you will come.
- Q. I can assure you that one does, and I think we all hope to come.
 - A. I do not know if there are any further questions.


JUDGE HUTCHESON: I would like to ask a question. I would like to preface my questions by saying, Dr. Magnes, I am not ready to assess your proposals, but I am a fairly old man and I recognize moral power when I see it. I want to say, Sir, that I can say in the words of my Leader—"Behold an Israelite indeed in whom there is no guile". I would like to take up the illustration which was presented to us, I do not know whether it was by Mr. Ben Gurion or somebody else, I have lost the author of it, but the illustration sticks, of some person coming in here from Africa or some other place, knowing nothing about this business, sitting down hearing what we have been hearing in this room. I want to ask you as a man who has wisdom to gather together and the courage to propound, what seems at first blush without more careful analysis certainly to be inspired by a sense of justice and fair play whatever its other merits, I want to ask you a question as to how this stranger coming in here would see these proceedings. I ask you first, would he see the Jew in this way, chafing under and in rebellion against his minority status. In all the countries in the world the Jew has for some time now been engaged in a determined effort to acquire majority status and a Jewish State in Palestine, which he claims is his home, by converting the Arab majority there into a minority. Is that a fair statement, not a full statement, but a fairly close statement of the effect of these various demands on a stranger who knew nothing about the underlying situation?

- A. I am afraid it is.
- Q. The Arab, claiming Palestine as his home and quite unwilling to accept minority status, the Arab proposes to resist to the utmost all efforts to bring this about and demands the im-



mediate setting up of an Arab State. Is that a fair analysis of what we have been hearing?

- A. I think it is.
- Q. The Mandatory, desirous of propitiating and ultimately reconciling the dissidents and unwilling therefore to take a firm and final stand for either, the Mandatory, like Veblen's famous leisure class, has throughout this whole period exhibited a certain amiable inefficiency when confronted with force or fraud, and then he goes on: "The Christian neglected if not completely forgotten by both warring factions, the Christian, with his Holy Places sacred to all Christendam, many of them Arabs, having equal and in many instances better birthright claims to Palestine, their very existence apparently ignored by the great Christian nations of the world, stand helplessly by, caught in the whirl of the conflict but unchampioned and undefended". Have you heard any one do anything much for the Christian people in this land during these controversies or say anything much; I have not.
 - A. Do you mean during the years?
- Q. I am talking about in these hearings. Now I want to ask you whether that person, having gone through all that business and then come here today and heard you, might begin to think maybe there are some more like you. Would he have any real justification for thinking so, are there any moderates like you, who have the moral courage to stand against a stream of vigorous tendency and propound the theory he thinks is just?
- A. If you will just modify the question a bit and instead of saying moderates like me, say moderates, my answer is in the affrmative. I have two friends here, I look about this room and I see many friends over here, and as I look around I can point out large numbers to you.
- Q. You think there are other moderates here with the courage and the character that you exhibited.
- A. That I exhibited, I do not know; the courage and character, yes.
- Q. I would like to ask you one final question, you are not denominated a Christian but you talk as I should like Chris-



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tians to act. Are you also by any chance from America? (Laughter.)

- A. I seem to be better known to this gathering than I am to you.
- Q. I knew you had been there. I did not know that you had lived there.
 - A. You said you were an old man; I am older than you.
 - Q. I doubt it.
- A. And in order to prove it you have to go to the records of San Francisco, California, where I was born.
 - Q. In 1879?
 - A. In 1877.

MR. JUSTICE SINGLETON: You have Mr. Smilansky with you. Is there anything he wishes to say. There is also one question I want to ask you.

- A. Mr. Smilansky says he has handed in his statement in writing and is not particularly anxious to talk. He would be talking in Hebrew and I would be translating.
- Q. If he will hand in the statement translated, will that serve the purpose? Then if we have anything to ask him on that we can do so another day.
- A. I would like to repeat that I wish you could get something of the fervour of his conviction, that Arab-Jewish relations are possible of adjustment. He has written about it, he has talked about it, he has worked for it, worked in it. That is the point, and I think just his presence here, without his having said a single word, the presence of a man who has been faithful to this ideal for more than 55 years, is eloquent testimony to the fact that Arab-Jewish relations are not incapable of being improved. He believes it with his whole heart. He is older than any of us here, and he is struggling every day in order to prove it in life.
- Q. I should have been very glad if I could have been taken round some part of Palestine by the one time President

of the Farmers' Union. That matter can be discussed another time.

- A. He says with the greatest of pleasure.
- Q. What I was going to say to you was this, I notice in your scheme, the document you have let us have, you talk about the Legislature. The Legislature would have to deal with the question of immigration I suppose, or some officer under the Legislature.
 - A. That is a basic question.
- Q. What I am leading up to is, you say in case of an impasse the head of the State is to have the casting vote. I wonder, have you considered in such circumstances, where you could find the head of the State.
 - A. I say among members of this Commission.
- Q. I am sure, Dr. Magnes, it would be the wish of every member of the Committee that I should thank you and those with you for coming to see us this afternoon and above all for your very helpful answers to questions.
- A. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you in the name of my friends here, in the name of all of those who do believe in reconcilation between these brother peoples, who speak languages that are very closely related to one another, who have a long, ancient and honourable tradition together, I want to thank you for all of them for your patience and kindness.

(The witnesses withdrew.)

(The Committee adjourned until the following day, Friday, 15th March, 1946.)

STAND OF PALESTINIAN JEWS

START OF SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW URGED BY CREATING WORK FOR JEW AND ARAB

To the Editor of The New York Times:

May I tell you how deeply thankful large numbers of the Jews of Palestine are for the recommendations of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee?

The prospect of giving a home to 100,000 refugees has filled us with renewed hope, and is testimony to the existence of a conscience in the world. Too many of our people had lost faith in this.

Many of those whose sole concern had been a Jewish state are now confronted with this tremendous practical task, and it can safely be assumed that much of the propaganda for a Jewish state will give way to the need for uniting the forces of the whole Jewish world in order that the 100,000 may be absorbed in the briefest possible time.

This will require of the Jewish Agency the setting up of a great organization with the participation, it may be hoped, of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and other Jewish bodies. The implementation of this great program requires the aid also of international bodies, such as UNRRA, the Inter-Governmental Committee, the Displaced Persons Committee of UNO, and other bodies.

The report stresses the urgency of carrying out this humane project during 1946, if in any way possible. It is therefore of importance that the British and American Governments adopt the report as their official policy promptly, and let nothing whatever stand in the way of carrying this policy out.

Nothing but good can be said of the report on this side of its findings.

But may I point out what seems to me to be its great defect? We accept the principle, "that Palestine shall be neither an Arab nor a Jewish state," but we do not accept the principle that, "setting up of self-governing institutions is dependent on the will to work together on the part of the two peoples." On the contrary, this will to work together can be furthered best by setting up self-governing institutions. It is fatuous to think that good-will can be engendered through abstract formulas. Good-will can come through life, through the creation of common interests vital to both peoples. Active, responsible participa-

tion in government is perhaps the most important of these common vital interests. Both peoples want this. Why not proceed with it, beginning now during the period of the mandate, and not waiting until the trusteeship agreement is worked out?

The report says that, "British officials hold all the important positions. They exercise as much authority as in a country where the mass of the inhabitants are in a primitive stage of civilization." Why not show a bit of faith in the two peoples and begin with appointing a few Jews and a few Arabs to positions of authority in the central government?

Moreover, we must take exception to the proposition that, "once the will to work together appears, representatives of both sides will be of help in framing a constitution; until that happens no step can be taken." On the contrary, the will to work together will appear, only if the opportunity to work together is given or created by government. Charge representatives of the two peoples with the task of helping to frame a constitution, and the will to work together will thus appear.

This is true not only of working together in government but in all walks of life. It is the function of those in authority to seek out the vital interests common to both peoples and to set them to work at these.

Proposing that good-will first appear and that only then the two peoples can come together, is putting the cart before the horse. The dangers of this vicious circle ought to be avoided by concrete action, by listing the large numbers of practical interests common to both peoples, and making them responsible for day-by-day work in meeting these problems. There is no time to wait until some abstract good-will puts in an appearance. Let a large measure of self-government begin now.

J. L. MAGNES,

Chairman Ihud (Union) Association.

Jerusalem, May 5, 1946.

PALESTINE AND THE MIDDLE EAST By Judah L. Magnes

NBC broadcast, National Network, from New York, Saturday, June 22, 1946, 4:45 to 5:00 p. m., E.D.T.

I am expecting to talk on five main points.

The first is, the entry of the 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine.

The second is, what I believe to be the new and forward-looking British foreign policy in the Middle East generally.


The third point is, the unfortunate absence of a similar forward-looking British policy for Palestine.

The fourth is, the imperative need of starting self-government in Palestine without delay.

And the last is, the need of Jewish-Arab cooperation in a bi-national Palestine, based upon the equality, the parity of the two peoples, the Jews and the Arabs.

I can speak, I think, for the Jews of Palestine, in thanking President Truman and the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry for proposing that 100,000 Jewish refugees—brands plucked from the burning -be settled in the Holy Land. There can be no doubt but that these 100,000 will be admitted, no matter what the stumbling blocks. This is inevitable. There is no other way out. What a pity, that the unanimous recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee were not adopted as policy at once by the American and British Governments. I am convinced that had this been done, we should have been spared much of the bloodshed and violence of the past few days. The whole question has now happily reached the practical stage, and the recently appointed American and British Committees of Experts, who are discussing the practical aspects of the problem, can, I am sure, count on the cooperation of the entire Jewish people. But the aid also of governments and of international bodies such as UNRRA will be required to make Palestine capable of absorbing this large number of newcomers. They will be coming home, to the Jewish National Home, and that insures the success of the whole vast enterprise.

This homecoming of the 100,000, together with the liberalizing of the land transfer act, will aid in bringing Britain's policy on Palestine into line with Britain's new and forward-looking policy in other parts of the Middle East. It is disappointing that Palestine alone seems, as



yet, to be an exception to this new, liberal policy, whose outlines are now beginning clearly to emerge.

In the first place, what is happening in India is one of the greatest acts in history of political courage and wisdom, and of political vtiality. Here, a vast empire is sincerely trying to liquidate itself. There may be great difficulties in liquidating the hatreds and the hostility of generations; and one holds one's breath each day as the great drama unfolds. This chapter may indeed be called the end of the old British Empire, but the beginning of the true British Commonwealth.

Second, take Egypt. For more than 60 years Great Britain has occupied Egypt. Promise after promise was made to evacuate it, commencing with Mr. Gladstone. But it is only today that this evacuation is being discussed sincerely, for the first time.

Third, the British proposal for an autonomous United Lybia, to include Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, is in line with this new policy, and it is unfortunate that this has met with so little support.

Fourth, the new treaty between Britain and Iraq will doubtless give greater independence to Iraq. The French and the British are out of Syria, and are on the way out of the Lebanon and the change in the status of Trans-Jordan, does, whatever else may be said of it, increase the independence of this sparsely populated country.

In the midst of all this we find Palestine. British policy here has not yet proved to be forward-looking. The old imperialism is still at work here. This is distressing. But Palestine, this bridge of antiquity, this communications center of our own day, cannot remain for long outside the orbit of the new British policy in the Middle East generally.

The deep interest of America in the Holy Land is fortunately helping Britain to find the way in Palestine. The entry of the 100,000 refugees from nazi and fascist bestiality will bring forward-looking, hard-working men and women into the country. Without America this would hardly have been proposed, nor will it now be possible without America. The good offices of America and America's financial participation can be the deciding factor in breaking down such resistance in Britain as may remain over from the old British imperialism.

The new forward-looking British policy will find itself definitely and firmly on the right path in Palestine, the moment the Labor Government decides, that one of the primary objectives of policy is cooperation between the Jews and the Arabs. Such a policy of cooperation

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has been announced by the British Government on many occasions, but never sincerely adhered to. With the passing of the years this Jewish-Arab cooperation has been made more and more difficult. But it is by no means too late. The ordinary Jew and the ordinary Arab, the plain people do cooperate even today. They are for peace, not for war.

In respect of Jewish-Arab cooperation, the report of the Anglo-American Committee was really disappointing. In the brief references to this burning, basic problem, it was declared, that nothing could be changed in the present political relations between the two peoples, until they showed the will to work together. This is putting the cart before the horse. On the contrary, the two peoples will show the will to work together, they do work together, whenever opportunities for that are created. That is just the problem: How create these opportunities of working together, how create common interests in life of so compelling a nature as necessarily to bring the two peoples together. Abstract good will is not enough.

Granting self-government—that is the chief and most immediate need. That will bring the two peoples together more than anything else. My friends and I have been proposing this for many years. We have worked out concrete proposals for setting up a bi-national Palestine based on equality between the two peoples. This would not be a Jewish state. It would not be an Arab state. It would be the state of Palestine, the bi-national country of two equal peoples.

There is no time to be lost in beginning real self-government at the center; and American help in this regard would be entirely in accord with the tradition of American democracy.

We envisage the development of self-government in three stages.

The first stage is now, while the Mandate is still operative. There is not a single Jew or a single Arab in the Executive Council of Government. There is no Jew or Arab at the head of any central Government Department, or as president of a court, or as district commissioner. This is government by the colonial bureaucracy in the most extreme form. There are hundreds of British officials in this tiny country. The Anglo-American Committee itself stated: "British officials hold all the important positions. They exercise as much authority as in a country where the inhabitants are in a primitive stage of civilization." The inhabitants of Palestine are not in this primitive stage. There is absolutely no valid reason why a Jew and an Arab should not be appointed to the Executive Council of Government now,



and some Jews and Arabs made heads of non-controversial government departments now.

The second stage in self-government would be the transfer of Palestine to the Trusteeship System of the United Nations as soon as possible. A Constitution, including an elected Legislative Assembly, can be worked out by the two peoples together with the Trustee. This constitution would provide for the bi-national Palestine based on the parity, the equality of the two peoples, regardless of majority or minority.

All of this should be directed towards the third stage of self-government, namely, the eventual independence of the bi-national Palestine; and this autonomous bi-national Palestine should become an equal member of a wider Arab Union or of a Middle Eastern Federation.

Some arrangement should likewise be come to rapidly whereby the Jews would have a voice within the United Nations Organization.

It is fatuous to think that this complicated situation can be settled by force of arms. If one people were to conquer the other today, this would leave a legacy of hate for generations. It is equally fatuous to think, that either people can subdue the British Commonwealth through guerilla tactics or revolution.

Instead of fighting on two fronts, as is too often the case today, the two peoples must be helped to try the ways of understanding and cooperation. This is perfectly possible. The common interests of both peoples in all walks of life are numerous and can be developed. There is no basic racial antagonism. The Jews and the Arabs are the sole descendants of the great Semitic peoples of antiquity. Together, they can not only develop the Semitic East, but they may be able once again to bring profound spiritual messages to a world now so deeply in need of spiritual refreshment and regeneration.


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Lynn, Mass.
Dec. 17,1946

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Enter Rati- Lur.

Hon. Prime Minister Clement Attlee of England and all the English People London, England.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The law of the United States, in our beloved Constitution, tells me if you love America you must love the land of your birth and therefore, I am entitled to the right to help to protect the great nations of Arabia.

Now the time for the English people has come to act and do something for the Arabian and Mohammedan people, which has come to 450,000,000. The Mohammedan people in Arabia have done much for England and all the European nations for the last 700 years and it is time for the European countries to leave the Arabians alone and give them their freedom because life without freedom is not worth living.

The Holy Land, Palestine, has been Arabian country for over a thousand years and it should be turned over to the Arabians now to make a democratic government, which makes freedom for all the people all over the world and justice regardless of nationality, color, class and creed. There is no law in the history of civilization which gives the right to the Jews to take the Holy Land, Palestine, and rule it because they were driven out from this precious country which is the foundation of the great Christianity and Mohammedan faith. The only way for peace, happiness and prosperity, not only in the Holy Land, Palestine, but in all the Eastern countries is to turn the Holy Land, Palestine, into the hands of the Arabian people. Otherwise, there will never be peace in that country for a hundred years to come because there are 650,000,000 good Christian and Mohammedan people all over the world who will fight for the Holy Land, Palestine, to the last man. This precious country is the foundation of their religion and they will never give it up to anyone. These good Christians and Mohammedans want a lasting peace for all the nations but if you are going to give the Holy Land, Palestine, to the Jews there will never be peace for a hundred years to come. I am very happy to say and proud also that I myself was with our great American Expeditionary Forces in the First World War and helped to fight the Germans not only to save England but all the European countries. I trust and hope the day is not far off when His Majesty's government will tell the whole world that the Holy Land, Palestine, does not belong to the Jews but belongs to the Christians and Mohammedans.

At this Christmas time I am going to ask you in the name of

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Hon. Prime Minister Clement Attlee of England and all the English People London, England

our beloved Holy Jesus of Nazareth, the name of the government of Your Majesty and in the name of humanity to do your best to give complete control of the Holy Land, Palestine, to the Arabians and Christians.

I am, always,

Very sincerely yours,

Rev. Sheikh Mahmoud Abraham Kael
The Officiating Imam
18 Joyce Street

c/o The Col-Inn Hotel

Lynn, Massachusetts

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Jan 1947

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we enclose a copy of a letter addressed to The Irine White let by Kev Keikh Mahmond Abraham Kod

Please send a suitable acknowledgment if you think fit.

Yours ever,

Eastern Department.

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

(E.414/46/31)

25th January 1947.

Dear Chancery,

We enclose a copy of a letter addressed to the Prime Minister by Reverend Sheikh Mahmoud Abraham Kad of Massachusetts.

Please send a suitable acknowledgment if you think fit.

Yours ever,

EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
Washington.

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ABROGATION WANDAT PROCLAMATION INDEPENDANCE TOTALE PALESTINE ARABE UNE = ELSHAWI PRESIDENT XXXX ASSOCIATION ++

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
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URGENT YOUR EXCELLENCY BE FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN

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LEAGUE FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN PALESTINE BEN H FREEDMAN SECRETARY.

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Your a stoomely

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Charles of Simmons

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JUN TUO

Dear Chancery,

We enclose a copy of a telegram 5 addressed to the friend winiter by water Elbanna, and sake H

WE HARR PACHA

Please send & suitable acknowledgments if you think fit.

Yours ever,

Eastern Department.

Classery. Cairo.

BULLE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1. 27th February 1947.

(E.414/46/31)

Dear Chancery,

We enclose copies of 2 telegrams addressed to The Prime Minister by Hassan Ebbanna, and Saleh Harb Pacha.


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Yours ever,

EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

The Chancery,
British Embassy,
Cairo.

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Vous incerely,


acknowledgments have been sent.

R.O.C. McAlpine, Esq., Foreign Office.

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
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
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ENTITY OF ARAB PALESTINE STOP WE SUPPORT

Enquiry respecting this Telegram should be accompanied by this form. Mark Your Reply VIA IMPERIAL.

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OUT FILE VAS.

Registry No. E414 46/31

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Dear Chancery,

We enclose a copy of a telegram

addressed to W Becen

oy M. Tamil Beyfum

of Beinet.

dated Jan 31. 1947

Please send a suitable

acknowledgment if you think fit.

Yours ever,

Eastern Department.

Plancery Reinet.

1613. 24 h

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE Reference:
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FOREIGN OFFICE, D. W.1.

10th March, 1947.

(E 414/46/31)

Dear Chancery,

We enclose a copy of a letter addressed to kr. Bevin by Monsieur Jamil Beyhum of Beirut dated the 31st January, 1947.

Please send a suitable acknowledgment if you think fit.

Yours ever,

Rastern Department.

The Chancery,
British Legation,
Beirut.

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Teleg.: Jemil Beyhum - Beyrouth Télép.: 77 - 94

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M. JAMIL BEYHUM
414 46/31

Beirut, January 31st. 1947.

Mr.Beavin, British Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Dear Sir,

I have the honour to present to your Excellency herewith a copy of the decisions enacted, by the Lebanese all-Parties-Union for the Resistance against Zionism in Palestine,

We hope that your Excellency would take them up in the meetings of the London Conference on Palestine and that the Conference will give them due consideration.

I beg to remain Sir, Yours truly.

Jamil Beyhum.

INDEXED

اتحاد الاحزاب اللبنانية

لمكافحة الصهيونية

Beirut, 30/1/1947

تــلفون ٧٧

Mr. BEAVIN, Minister for Foreign Affairs in H.M.B.G. in his capacity of Chairman of the London Conference on Palestine. London (England)

Your Excellency,

The Lebanese all-Party union for the Resistance of Zionism in Palestine, in a full dress meeting has passed unanimously the following resolutions concerning the position of the union in regards to the London conference on Palestine:

First:- to refuse the following :a- The continuation of the British Mandate on

Palestine. b- The maintenance British Troops in Palestine c- The continuation of Zionist immigration

into Palestine. Second: The Lebanese all-Party union protests

against the resuscitation of Racial Ideology embodied in the Zionist aspirations of the jews. This ideology leads, as its predecessors, to Nasimm and fascism which brought forth desaster and destruction to civiliza-

tion and humanity. Third: - The Union deems it incombant upon itself to call the attention of the negociators to the fact that it will be difficult, from now on to persuade the Arab peoples that peaceful negociations will be of any avail.

Fourth: The Union is aware of the feeling of Arab masses that all conferences and enquiry commissions are but attempts to gain time and to stand in the way of any possibility for the arabs to benefit by international circumstances.

Fifth: The Lebanese all-Party Union feels it its duty to warn that the non recognition of the points above mentioned will lead to the disturbance of peace in the Arab East.

> Jamil Beyhum chairman,

Mfamil Beylum

يتألف من: اتحاد الشبيبة الاسلامية اتحاد نقابات العمال الاتحاد القومي الحزب الشيوعي اللبناني الصحافة اللبنانية عصبة العمل القومي عصبة مكافحة النازية والفاشستية الكتائب اللبنانية الكتلة الاسلامة اللجنة القومية الموءتمر الوطني منظمة الفساسنة منظمة النجادة اخصائيين في قضية فلسطين

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO HIGH COMMISSIONER JERUSALEM.

Lord Inverchapel D: 11.11 a.m. 11th January, 1947 No. 7 11th January, 1947 R: 5.50 a.m. 12th January, 1947 Repeated to Foreign Office. No. 211.

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Homer Bigart cabled a circumstantial account from Tel Aviv on January 7th published in New York Herald Tribune of January 9th, of some sixty or seventy Jews selected at random from [grp. undec.] district being forced to run the gauntlet by the British soldiers and police, with resulting casualties. This is reported to have occurred in January 2nd. A [grp. undec.? detailed] enquiry was to start on January 8th.

Palestine are certainly no worse than American troops now in Germany and that both are composed largely of young recruits who under the strain are liable to lose their heads. He goes on to say that no one could deny that British troops in Palestine have suffered provocation and that anti-semitism is inevitable product of terrorist acts just as terrorism appears to be the only recourse of people who feel that legal efforts for achievement of security and freedom have failed. He is known here to be an honourable and reliable journalist and his story has therefore caused concern outside ordinary Zionist Lobby.

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
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enquiry is being held by competent British authorities, results of which will be made known and to ask responsible enquirers to suspend judgement meanwhile. Do you agree and can I take it that results of enquiry will in fact be made known? If the story is substantiated in any degree we should not fail to bring out, as Bigart himself has done that terrorism brings such things in its train.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair



TO PALESTINE (O.A.G.) INDEXED FROM S. OF S. COLONIES.

Sent 9th January, 1947, 15,20 hrs.

No. 58.

Following is Palcor Agency message dated Jerusalem, January 4th. Begins:-

Shortly after the attack on Tel Aviv on Thursday, police routed out all male residents from their homes in the Montefiore quarter, and forced them to run, many in their pyjamas, to the Sarona police station, including the aged and invalids.

According to eye-witnesses as the people ran the police followed them firing over their heads. Within sight of Sarona they were forced to run the gauntlet of hundreds of troops and policemen who beat them with butts of rifles and tripped them up, kicking and beating those who fell.

When the Jews reached the police-station they were allowed by the police officer to wash the blood off. They were then taken in three trucks to C.I.D. Headquarters in Jaffa. In one of the trucks four Jews Many had their wounds dressed there, were unconscious. but some were taken to hospital and later all were taken home in trucks. All were interrogated in Jaffa. Ends.

Please telegraph brief report.

Copies sent to:-Foreign Office War Office (M.O.4)

- Mr. H. Beeley - Lt. Col. J.G. Atkinson

PUBLIC RECORD Mary Service ~3 C

INWARD TELEGRAM

Cypher (0.T.P.)

473 /46 /21

FROM PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

INDEXED

D. 11th January, 1947.

16.45 hrs.

No. 72 Secret.

Addressed to S. of S. Repeated to Washington, No. 7-

Your telegram No. 58.

Allegations of misbehaviour of security personnel.

Allegations, some of which have appeared in the local press, have been made that following terrorist outrages on the night of 2nd/3rd January, which were reported in my telegram No. 22, soldiers and police took Jews from Monteflore quarter of Tel Aviv to police quarters in Sarona, where they were subject to ill treatment. Specific allications have been made in terms identical with those quoted in your telegram.

- comprising military and police members. For your information, I am afraid that there may be some basis for these allegations, though they are probably exaggerated, but until the findings of the court of emquiry are available, I am not in a position to express a definite opinion.
- 3. I will, of course, inform you of the findings as soon as possible.

Copies sent to:Foreign Office
War Office (M.O.4)

- Mr. H. Beeley

Lt.Gol. J.G. Atkinson

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Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (C.A.G.)

TO SOF STANDARD COLOR TOTAL

D. 15th Jamuary, 1947. R. 15th

21.-35 brs.

No. 108

Addressed to Hall. Arbanseder, Woolington, No. 10. Repeated to S. of S.

Your telegram No. 70

Allegations against security forces.


Please sea my telegram of 13th December, to Colonial Office, repeated to you as my No.7.

2. Result of enquiry will be made known.

Copy sent to:-

Foreign Office - Communications Department.

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3. PALESTINE - STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

J.P. (47) 1 (Final)

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign ...ffairs, in which he proposed that there should be provincial autonomy in Palestine, to be followed after an interval by partition..

LORD TEDDER, referring to Annex I of the report, said he did not think that the necessity of retaining Arab goodwill had been sufficiently stressed. Even if a solution to the Palestine problem satisfied our strategic needs there, it could at the same time elienate Arab goodwill. Such a solution would be unacceptable as it would endanger our wider interests in the Middle East. Loss of Arab goodwill would deny us the freedom of movement throughout the Middle East, which was so essential.

SIR JOHN CUNNINGHAM suggested that it should be made clear that the reply of the Chiefs of Staff to the Foreign Secretary's proposals were based on the views of the Chiefs of Staff.which were given in their report "British Strategic Requirements in the Middle East". It was also suggested that the possible use of Gaza as a supply port, and the right to set up an early warning system in Palestine, should be included in the paragraph on our military requirements in Palestine. With regard to the question of concluding satisfactory treaties with the Succession States, he doubted whether such treaties would have a lasting value in view of the increasing nationalist feeling now sweeping the Middle East.

LIEUT. GENERAL SIMPSON, referring to paragraph 8 of Annex I, thought that sub-paras. (c) and (d) tended to show the difficulties arising from protection in an erroneous light. The retention of the present regime in Palestine might well engender greater hostility by both Jews and Arabs than by a solution based on partition. He suggested therefore that these two sub-paragraphs should be omitted from the report, and the only complication that should be mentioned should be the point made by the First Sea Lord of the difficulty of ensuring that any treaty when concluded, would be adhered to without an early demand for its renewal on more generous terms, or alternatively an appeal from the Succession States to U.N.O. for the evacuation of our forces.

In setting out the size of the reinforcements required in Palestine, the possibility of the Arab forces there becoming disloyal had not been considered. Should this occur, additional troops to those already mentioned would be required.

Consequential amendments in the light of the above discussion were proposed and agreed.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Approved the report, as amended in discussion, and instructed the Secretary to submit it, over their signatures, to the Defence Committee.

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ANNEX

PALESTINE - STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS Draft Report by the Chiefs of Staff

I. We have examined the memorandun circulated by the Foreign Secretary. Our replies are based on the assumption that His Majesty's Government has accepted the view that the defence of the Middle East in war is vital to the whole Commonwealth defence strategy, and that it is the intention to maintain our position there in peace.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF PALESTINE

2. Any defence plan for the Middle East must centre on the defence of Egypt, an essential base both for defence and for the air counter-offensive. The defence of Egypt can only be conducted effectively against attacks from the north by holding Palestine. In war, therefore, the security not only of Egypt, but also of Palestine is essential to the defence of the Middle East.

Palestine in addition is of strategic importance because of the oil pipelines, both existing and projected, and their terminals. It also lies on the land and air route to Transjordan and Iraq.

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN PALESTINE

In peace such forces as we wish to retain in the Middle East must be located in or near the area on which our defence will be based. Under the Treaty now being negotiated with Egypt we shall not be permitted to station such forces in her territory. Since for various reasons no other Middle East country except Palestine will at present meet our requirements, we must be able to locate them in the latter country if they are to be effective at the outbreak of war.

At the outbreak of war, therefore, we must be ready in Palestine with such forces and airfields as we consider necessary to defend it and meet the coming threat.

- 4. Our requirements in Palestine can be summarised as follows:-
 - (a) Retention of full military rights in Palestine for the purposes of organisation of defence.
 - (b) The power to locate in Palestine such forces as our defence interests require. This will entail:-
 - (i) The use of Haifa as a supply port and for operating such naval vessels as may be necessary.

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- (ii) The location of army forces with their administrative organisation within the civil districts of Haifa, Lydda and Gaza, and the sub-districts of Tulkarm, Nazareth, and Beisan.
- (iii) The use of an airfield system in the general area of central Palestine, together with the necessary administrative and supply organisations and the right to station our forces in these bases.
- (c) The retention of complete freedom of movement in Palestine.
- (d) Suitable conditions so as to ensure the free flow of oil to the Mediterranean terminals.

If we are unable to obtain these requirements, our ability to defend Palestine - and therefore our whole strategic position in the Middle East - Will be gravely prejudiced.

5. In addition to the above military requirements for the defence of Palestine, we would emphasise the strategic requirement that any solution of the Palestine problem must ensure the retention of the goodwill of the Arab world. Moreover, stable conditions in Palestine are essential if we are to make full use in peacetime of the oil pipelines and terminals in that country.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SCHEME PROPOSED BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY

6. We examine below to what extent our requirements as given above could be met under the various conditions enumerated by the Foreign Secretary and, where opposition is envisaged, the measures we must take and the forces required to deal with it.

No strong opposition to the scheme.

- 7. During the transition period we shall be responsible for the maintenance of law and order and shall continue to control the defence organisation. During this period, therefore, our strategic requirements would be met.
- 8. When the final partition of the country is made our military requirements would only be met by the conclusion of satisfactory Treaties with the Succession States. On the assumption that such Treaties were obtained and that they covered the requirements in para. 4 above, there would still be two inherent difficulties affecting their fulfilment:-
 - (a) In spite of a clause allowing us freedom of movement throughout the two States, the existence of disputes between them would almost inevitably lead to difficulties over the movement of military traffic between one State and another.
 - (b) Although the Succession States would be independent and we should have no direct responsibility for law and order there, it would be difficult to avoid the intervention of British forces and consequent political implications in the event of serious communal rioting and civil strife.

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Active opposition by the Jews alone

- 9. During the transition period disorders by the Jewish community will cause an internal security problem which may well be prolonged. The jewish extremists will continue their campaign of violence and the leaders will probably decide to support them actively. In this case widespread action by the Hagana will occur. The tasks of the British forces will be:-
 - (a) To maintain stability in the country and enforce the new settlement.
 - (b) To put down by force the Jewish armed organisations.

We consider that the British forces now deployed in Palestine and the canal area will be sufficient to prevent disorders reaching dimensions which would seriously interfere with the satisfaction of our strategic requirements in peace.

10. As regards the ultimate partition, if the Jews alone opposed it we assume that the Arab State would be set up. In that case we would have Treaty rights with the Arab State alone. This would not satisfy our military requirements, which could only be met by retaining control of the Jewish province — a commitment which we could undertake without increase of forces.

Active opposition by the Arabs alone

ll. During the transition period disorders by the Palestine Arabs alone will cause us temporary embarrassment only. If they are supported, however, by the Arab world in the form of volunteers and supplies of arms, an internal security problem of considerable magnitude will result. There might also be attacks on British personnel and property throughout the Middle East.

We consider that the task of maintaining law and order in Palestine will be within the capacity of the British forces now available in the Middle East. Additional forces of the order of one division as a general reserve might be required to defend British interests elsewhere in the Middle East.

12. With regard to ultimate partition, if the Arabs alone opposed it, we assume that the Jewish State would be set up. In that case we should have Treaty rights with the Jewish State alone. Provided we remained in control of the Arab province, this would meet our narrow military requirements in Palestine, but it would sacrifice our major strategic requirement of retaining Arab goodwill.

Active opposition by both communities

13. During the transition period the disorders which would result from active opposition by both communities would be extremely serious. Maintenance of law and order in Palestine would require reinforcements of the order of one division. In addition, other forces also of the order of one division as a general reserve would be necessary to defend British interests elsewhere in the Middle East.

-5-

14. If actively opposed by both sides, we do not consider that partition would be possible: in such circumstances the transitional period would be prolonged. If it were considered possible politically to declare that a state of partition existed and British troops were thereupon withdrawn without satisfactory Treaties, none of our military requirements would be met.

Strong and lasting resentment in the Arab States

15. The retention of Arab goodwill is one of our essential strategic requirements and this alone might cause the Arab States to gravitate into the Russian orbit, thereby setting us at a great disadvantage in the event of a future war.

AVAILABILITY OF REINFORCEMENTS


16. In the worst case outlined in para. 13 above, army reinforcements of the order of two divisions would be required for the Middle East. The main part of the air forces required for Palestine is already deployed in the Middle East. No significant air force reinforcements other than small temporary moves would be necessary. Naval requirements could be met from the Mediterranean and East Indies fleets.

In view of the extent of our existing world-wide commitments, we see no possibility of supplying sufficient army reinforcements to the Middle East except at the expense of slowing down demobilisation or reducing our occupational forces in Germany. This latter course would entail grave risk, as our forces in that country have already been reduced to a minimum. Any additional air forces would probably also have to come from Germany.

CONCLUSIONS

17. We conclude that:-

- (a) The preservation of our strategic position in the Middle East as a whole would be gravely prejudiced if our right to station British forces in Palestine were not retained.
- (b) The present proposal would secure our essential military requirements provided that at the end of the transitional period satisfactory Treaties could be negotiated with the Succession States and provided that the scheme did not cause strong and lasting resentment in the Arab States.
- (c) If the proposal meets with active Arab opposition, reinforcements of one division will be required for the Middle East. If it is actively opposed by both Arabs and Jews, two aivisions will be required. These forces can only come from Germany.



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Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff

J.P. (47)1 (Final)

5TH JANUARY, 1947

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

PALESTINE - STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

In anticipation of instructions we have examined a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs making a proposal for provincial autonomy in Palestine to be followed, after an interval, by partition.

Foreign Secretary's Memorandum

- 2. In his memorandum the Foreign Secretary recapitulates the views on Palestine given by the Chiefs of Staff in their paper "British Strategic Requirements in the Middle East" and notes that these views are apparently shared by the United States Government.
- 3. The Foreign Secretary considers that the Cabinet should know whether the Chiefs of Staff still maintain their previous view that the right to station British forces in Palestine is essential to the preservation of our strategic position in the Middle East as a whole; and whether that view is endorsed by the Defence Committee. If the Cabinet then decide that we must remain in Palestine, he proposes that we should enforce a scheme of provincial autonomy, but should state that our ultimate object is Partition, to be effected not more than five years later.
- 4. In considering a proposal to impose a settlement on these lines the Cabinet should have before them answers to the following questions:-
 - (a) Would it be possible under this proposal, both during the short period of transition and after the partitioning of Palestine, to

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secure our essential strategic requirements? In what way would the answer to this question be affected by each of the following assumptions:-


- (i) that there would be no strong opposition to the policy.
- (ii) that it would be actively opposed by either the Jews or the Arabs in Palestine.
- (iii) that it would be actively opposed by both communities simultaneously.
- (iv) that it would cause strong and lasting resentment in the independent Arab States.
- (b) If the enactment of this policy met with opposition from one or both of the two peoples in Palestine, what measures would be necessary to overcome this opposition? What forces would be required? Could the necessary forces be made available?
- 6. Our answers to these questions are attached at Annex in the form of a draft report from the Chiefs of Staff to the Defence Committee.

(Signed) J.H.M. POETT G.H. MILLS R.D. WATSON

Ministry of Defence, S.W.l. 5TH JANUARY, 1947.

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C.P.(47) 3

7TH JANUARY

PALESTINE: USE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies

In accordance with D.O. (47) 1st Meeting, Minute 1, I submit the attached paper on the use of the Armed Forces in Palestine, to which is annexed a revised Directive to the High Commissioner regarding the employment of troops in the maintenance of law and order. paper and its annex have been prepared in consultation with the Secretary of State for War and the High Commissioner for Palestine, who are in agreement with my recommendations.

A.C.J.

Colonial Office, S.W.1. 7th January, 1947.

- 1. Discussion in 1938 on the relative powers and responsibilities of the Military and Civil Authorities regarding action to be taken in the event of disturbances in Palestine reached the following conclusion (Meeting of Ministers, 13th October, 1938 SP(38) 1). "The constitutional position of the High Commissioner as head of the civil government must remain unchanged, and it follows that on any matter which may produce major political repercussions it will be necessary for the General Officer Commanding to consult the High Commissioner and only act if the High Commissioner agrees".
- This principle was reaffirmed in June 1946 at the time when action was being prepared against the terrorist organisations and the leaders of the Jewish Agency who were implicated in the organisation of acts of violence. The following Directive was sent to the High Commissioner:

"In the circumstances contemplated, final responsibility rests with you as Head of the Civil Government after the Minister of Defence has decided that such action is appropriate. In that event either you will request the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to take certain action or he will seek your agreement to take Executive orders to troops concerned such action. will, of course, be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, but these will not be given without your prior concurrence in the course of The decision whether the action proposed. action you desire is practicable with the forces available and in the light of other commitments remains with the Commander-in-Chief in view of his wider sphere of responsibility."

No modification to these instructions indicating a change of policy has been sent to the High Commissioner. In September 1946 he reported that in all action which had been taken against terrorism the provisions of this Directive had been scrupulously observed and that no major military action had been undertaken without his permission. He described his policy in applying this Directive as follows:

"The Army can only take action without previous permission if the local situation demands it, e.g. the imposition of a curfew in an area which an illegal ship is believed to be making for, or small-scale searches for terrorists. In deciding whether to take military action on a

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The decision was taken by the Cabinet in June 1946 (C.M.(46) 60th Conclusions) that the High Commissioner should be authorised to take such steps as he considered necessary to break up the illegal organisations in Palestine, including the arrest of certain persons connected with the Jewish Agency, but that he should not attempt at that stage to secure the wholesale disarming of individuals. Action to this end was taken on the 29th June, 1946.

large-scale, I have been influenced by

(a) that there should be as little interference as possible with the civil life of the communities;

the following factors:

- (b) that military action should never be in the nature of reprisals, but that it should have a definite object against illegal organisations;
- (c) that it should only be taken on reliable information."
- 4. At the meeting of the Defence Committee on the 1st January, 1947 (D.O.(47) 1st meeting) the view was expressed that to continue this policy in Palestine in present circumstances placed the Armed Forces in an impossible position. I was accordingly invited to draw up a new Directive to the High Commissioner for Palestine in the light of the discussion at the Defence Committee in consultation with the War Office and the High Commissioner for Palestine. It was found possible to arrange a discussion between myself, the High Commissioner for Palestine and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, before the latter left this country, at which a revised Directive was drawn up and agreed. The Directive forms the Annex to this paper.
- For the information of my colleagues, I may add that vigorous steps are being taken in Palestine to reorganise the police force and to increase their numbers. The effect of these measures will be increasingly apparent.
- 6. I recommend:
 - (a) that the revised Directive annexed to this paper be issued to the High Commissioner for Palestine;
 - (b) that final responsibility for the nature of the action taken to implement this Directive remain with the High Commissioner for Palestine as Head of the Civil Government:
 - (c) that the High Commissioner be invited to concert with the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, such action as he considers appropriate for the immediate implementation of the revised Directive.

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ANNEX

DIRECTIVE TO HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PALESTINE ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM

- 1. His Majesty's Government have decided that further efforts will be made to stop lawlessness and terrorism.
- They have also decided that all possible steps will be taken at once to establish and maintain law and order in Palestine, using the police and military forces at your disposal as may be necessary.
- There can of course be no question of taking reprisals which would merely bear hardly on innocent people. Apart from this, the efforts of police and troops should be designed to take the offensive against breakers of the law and to ensure that the initiative lies with the forces of the Crown.
- 4. Such action as you take to implement the policy outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 above will receive the full support of His Majesty's Government.

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
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Red Influence Among Arabs in Palestine Gains

Communist Membership Is Doubled in Year; Jewish Party's Growth Retarded

By Homer Bigart

Gopyright, 1946, New York Tribune Inc.
JERUSALEM, Dec. 28 (Delayed).
—Despite British wooing of the
Arabs as botential allies against
Russian expansion, Palestine Arabs
are turning to Communism in
numbers alarming to British occupation authorities.

Within a year the Arab Communists in Palestine have doubled their membership and tightened their control of the Arab Federation of Trade Unions, which says it has 20,000 members. Meanwhile, Jewish Communists have gained only a few hundred members and remain almost as weak as they were in the elections of August, 1945, when they won only three of 171 seats in the Jewish Assembly.

Moscow's influence among Palestine Jews continues to be retarded by the hostility of Soviet authorities to Zionism. Recently, conflicting statements in Soviet organs of propaganda indicated a relaxation of the Kremlin's attitude, but here in Palestine both the Jewish and the Arab Communist press still assail Zionism as a reactionary instrument of Anglo-American imperialism in the Middle-East.

Moscow always has evinced sympathy for Arab aspirations toward independence. Since the Palestine Communist press unanimously opposes partition and creation of a Jewish state, the Communists stand to gain among Arabs if the British turn to partition as the only solution to the Palestine problem.

The line followed by the Jewish Communist paper "Kol Haam," which has a circulation around 2,500 and also publishes editions in Hungarian and German, runs like this: Palestine must be a democratic state in which both Jew and Arab will enjoy equal rights. Displaced Jews in Europe should be admitted, on humanitarian grounds, but the idea of a Jewish state fostered by Zionists is rejected as reactionary.

The Arab Communist press follows the same line, but opposes further Jewish immigration. Communist leaders of both Arab and Jewish groups frequently meet to discuss policy. Their directives come from the Russian Legation at Beirut, center of Soviet propa-

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At present all Communist papers stress anti-British propaganda, demanding immediate surrender of the mandate and urging appeal to the United Nations Security Coun-

Both Jewish and Arab Communist papers have run afoil of British tensorship. "Kol Haam" received a month's suspension for printing a cartoon showing Jewish women and children crushed under the tread of a British tank. The Arab daily "Al Iftihat" also was suspended for thirty days for refusing to submit material for censorship. "Al Ittihat" has a circulation around 4,000 and prints an Armenian edition called "Myoutoun."

Arab Communists hide under the title of the Arab League for E 15

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
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Arab Communists hide under the title of the Arab League for National Liberation, and their leaders are Boulus Farah, strong man of the trade unions, and Emil Touma, editor of "Al Ittihat." Haifa is the center of Arab Communism. Jewish Communists, with headquarters at Tel Aviv, are led by Samuel Mikunis, general secretary of the party who is a native of Russia, and Meyer Willner, born in Vilna.



JOURNEY INTO FUTILITY

BY EDWARD P. MORGAN



A life belt is tossed to two of the refugees who tried to swim to the Palestine shore from the illegal immigrant ship. One of them is a young girl

RADIOED FROM JERUSALEM

Palestine is a many-sided problem. Here is the human side, as seen by a Collier's correspondent

HE searchlight of the mine sweeper H.M.S. Rowena cut through the moonless midnight like a sword slashing across a black velvet curtain. Suddenly, it stabbed the gray outline of the little schooner and impaled her cleanly on its blinding beam. The mine sweeper moved in to make contact.

So, four nights before the Jewish New Year, after a weird and tragic little battle that lasted an hour and cost the life of one passenger, the 300-ton caïque Palmach was seized off Ras el Nakura on the Lebanese frontier, some miles north of the port of Haifa, just as she was preparing to land 630 European Jews, men, women and children, illegally on the shores of Palestine.

Even before the lightning of the searchlight struck, the Palmach's passengers knew that time was running out on them. Already four sister ships had been intercepted by the British, and 3,778 Jews deported to the Caraolos detention camp in the island of Cyprus. Still, several hundred more in at least three contraband craft had managed to sneak through. One responsible Jewish source

claimed that 2,000 had made it.

But even if the odds had been

multiplied tenfold, the Palmach's load would have risked it. Some of them had been waiting fourteen months for the chance, and nearly all of them, like tens of thousands of others still left part way behind on the long and tortuous underground trail, had fled out of Central and Eastern Europe swearing they could never go back to the graveyards that Hitler and the war had made of their old homes.

Since clearing an anonymous port in Southern Italy nearly a fortnight ago, the two-masted caïque had managed to dodge past the myriad islands of the Eastern Mediterranean and make at least three secret night rendezvous to take on more human cargo. At last, with her water supply virtually exhausted, she had crept silently into the forbidden waters of Palestine. Now she was subject to capture by the blockade fleet of the Royal Navy. But her luck had not yet run out. With her tiny decks deserted, flocks of refugees huddled miserably in the stinking hold; scarcely daring to breathe, she had sailed innocently past one patrol vessel earlier that day, seen but unchallenged.

By midnight the 630 Jews were in a frenzy of suppressed excitement. In another half hour, they calculated, perhaps only fifteen minutes, they could lower the small boats and strike out for the shore. There, they hoped, members of the Haganah—the illegal Jewish defense army in Palestine—would be on hand to cover and speed their landing. (The Palmach had

been named in honor of Haganah's military "striking force.")

It was then that the Rowena found them. The mine sweeper came alongside. The skipper announced he intended to send a boarding party over, prepared to use force if necessary. Resistance was folly, but the Jews were drenched now in a sweating fury of frustration, fear and despair. They answered with a chorus of angry shouts and a shower of missiles. In the floodlit darkness, grappling irons and boathooks were laid onto the Palmach. The Jews slashed the lines with case knives and cleavers. They broke the poles with axes and metal bars. They hacked and chopped with such force that they stove in a section of the planking on the port side of the schooner.

Water Jets and Tear Gas

The Rowena countered by spraying the Palmach with fire hoses. Against the punishing jets of water, the Jews barricaded themselves behind upturned table tops, benches and wooden boxes, but when five tear-gas grenades were exploded on the decks

they gave in.

At the height of the melee, Yechiel Schwartz, a 31-year-old Hungarian Jew, was shot and instantly killed. Several members of the boarding party suffered minor injuries and a score of Jews were hurt, most of them burned by tear gas. Later, Jewish eyewitnesses insisted that three more of their comrades, blinded by

the gas, had plunged overboard and been lost, but this was never officially confirmed. It took the rest of the night to tow the Palmach, with armed guards mounted on her bow, into Haifa Harbor.

It had been arranged for six correspondents, including myself as the only American, to witness the transfer of these Jews to a former troopship and then travel with them to Cyprus the following day. The atmosphere on the cargo jetty where we assembled at dawn was somewhat tense. A dozen military ambulances were lined up on the dock. After the night's battle, the British army was expecting worse trouble, the more so since a search of the Palmach had yielded several sticks of Italian TNT concealed in a case of soap, eighteen homemade detonators and a length of safety

Moreover, nobody knew exactly how many people the Palmach carried. The Royal Navy had first estimated the number at nearly 900.

The S.S. Oceanvigour, 10,000-ton Kaiser-built British victory ship, was steaming in from Alexandria to pick up the refugees. The plan was to execute the operation in the outer harbor, where the Palmach was now anchored.

The officer in charge was a tall, blue-eyed, kindly-faced brigadier of artillery named W. D. McNeil Graham. He wore a wide, flat beret, matching his sandy hair, and desert shorts. He was patient, efficient and cool, but you got the impression he

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"Called on Account of Darkness" is the title of famed Cartoonist Dan Fitzpatrick's ironic commentary on the Paris Peace Conference

RADIOED FROM PARIS

N THE street outside the great stone gate of the Luxembourg Palace, a very fat, violently blond woman stood and stared. She had bare white legs and wore a black cloak and, underneath, a black lace dress that was both dirty and tattered. She had no age and no obvious profession; if she were a housewife, she must be married to a ragpicker; or perhaps she had once been an opera singer and had fallen into poverty, but retained the black lace

She looked very strange indeed, and she represented the Public, for no one else—out of the millions in Paris—seemed interested, or could spare the time, to come to this street. Movie stars would of course always draw a big crowd; inside the Luxembourg the attraction was nothing but the politicians of twenty-one nations who were setting the pattern of peace.

From the courtyard behind the gate a voice announced over the loud-speaker: "Car 28, Brazilian Delegation... Car 47, Russian Delegation..." Only the blonde, and the cops who guarded the gate, watched the shining black cars which bore the delegates of the Peace Conference away to lunch.

This was the recess between the morning and afternoon sessions. The automobiles looked magnificent, rich and certain; the delegates did not look different from most of the people you see nowadays in the streets of any European capital, a little shabby but respectable, pallid, tired, and not very happy. After a while, the astounding blonde shook her head—with wonder or with sorrow?—and walked away down the Rue de Seine.

At lunchtime, the enormous palace of the Luxembourg became like a theater when the curtain is down and the audience has left: the stagehands took over. I went upstairs to the Hall of Lost Footsteps where the big commissions on the Italian peace treaty held their meetings. At the doorway to this hall, I met two cops, for there were cops everywhere. The cops, who were proud of the Luxembourg Palace, offered to show me around.

The great conference hall is very grand, with much heavy gilt carving and a complete and depressing set of Gobelin tapestries around the walls, telling the story of the life of Orpheus in a million stitches. The cops extolled the beauty of the room and said it was a pity that the delegates did not like one another more, and have more pleasure, as it were, working in such a handsome place. "They don't like one another?" I said.


"Not at all," said the cops. "How do you expect them to like one another when they agree about nothing?"

"Ah," I said wisely.

"In all cases," said the youngest cop, "when there is another war, poor France will get it in the neck as usual."

The cops advised me to pick up some lunch in the journalists' bar, which was a small white and gold salon, once no doubt the boudoir of a princess, where now a loud-speaker relayed, in three languages, incomprehensibly, the proceedings of the peace commissions. There I met a lovely girl called Marie-Rose, with gay slanting eyes and black curly hair.

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THE TALKED OF PHAGE

BY MARTHA GELLHORN

The Paris Conference has come and gone—a warning that peace cannot be made by delegates, but only by all people everywhere

she was twenty-one and an interpreter. She remarked that the last conference she interpreted for, which was an international gathering of meteorologists, was better than this one, because the men were scientists and therefore naturally more honest and serious than politicians.

She said this peace conference was on the whole a droll affair; the delegates insulted one another, without the slightest embarrassment. Her

parents were stunned when she repeated the impoliteness of these peace gentlemen. There seemed no hope for the future at all, she said, but (for she was twenty-one and lovely and alive) perhaps all this cynicism and despair would finally lead to something good. How that was going to happen, she could not tell.

Presently the great sleek cars returned and the delegates clambered out of them. They gathered around

the vast table in the gilded conference room, and if you did not see the little cardboard plaques stating the names of their countries, you could not have distinguished the Belgians from the Norwegians, the Czechs from the Yugloslavs, the Canadians from the Americans; they just looked like men, any men at all. The moment they opened their mouths, you realized your mistake: All men are not (Continued on page 83)

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longed to go back to the neat, calculable trigonometry of his cannon and leave this explosive human riddle to the politicians and statesmen.

Somehow you knew that nothing that transpired on the green waters of Haifa Bay that morning, or over the baize-covered round table at the Palestine conference in Lancaster House, London, was going to solve anything.

Here were the Jews hammering at the gates of Palestine and crying with bitter passion that they could call no place else their home. Beyond the hills were the Arabs, who in an agitated but unsurprising surge of nationalism protested that Zion threatened their own solemnly promised independence. Between the two stood the British, trying clumsily to figure a way out that would still protect the "strategic interests of Empire" not only in Palestine but through the restive Middle East. In the farther distance were the Americans, whose ready, moralizing but aloofness to responsibility seemed only to madden everybody the more. Then there were the Russians, less distant, and a towering question mark.

The contagion of futility began to touch you too.

An Attempt to Reason

The brigadier had already boarded the trim army cutter Dart, and was on his way out to try to reason with the Jews. We wallowed in his wake in an unhandsome little launch which kept nuzzling rudely into the swell and drenching us with spray. Hovering watchfully behind the Palmach was His Majesty's Mine Sweeper Storm Cloud. The caïque herself was lashed to a squat tugboat named Roach. There must have been 350 people swarming the captive vessel's open decks. Most of them were packed rib to rib against the port rail amidships watching the Dart, bobbing importantly alongside and listening to the brigadier's message coming to them first in Hebrew and then in German from a loud-speaker mounted atop the cutter's bridge.

Their faces were a writhing fresco of beards, white teeth, tangled hair, tight, sunburned skin and angry, fearful eyes. There were several people who appeared over forty but most of them were young, and, from what you could tell at a glance, surprisingly healthy-looking. There were twice as many men as women.

"We wish you to board the transport peaceably," the brigadier's interpreters were saying. "You will be given hot meals, plenty of soap and water, and a clean place to sleep. If you resist it will only make it more difficult for everybody. You cannot stay aboard your ship and you cannot come ashore."

Anguished cries of protest drowned out the interpreter. The Jews jeered and whistled and shook their fists. Out of the hubbub rose the piercing wail of a woman. She was standing right in front. Her reddish hair was frazzled and her cheap cotton dress was soiled and creased. Oddly enough, she wore a gleaming wrist watch. Her whole body shook with sobs and her voice was squeezed tight in hysterical grief. She beat her fists down on the rail so hard that you half expected it to split in two. "They gassed my husband," she cried. "We have been persecuted, persecuted! What have you here, the Gestapo again? We are not going to move (Continued on page 114)

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The Jewish refugee above still showed signs of fight after being lassoed and hauled aboard a British ship. Below, another swimmer, almost exhausted, protests to reporters on the press boat. Two of the swimming refugees may have made their escape



HOUSING: THE HOMELESS SOUTHWEST

BY FRANK GERVASI

HE Los Angeles area needs houses more urgently than any other metropolitan district in the nation. This is the opinion of everyone from National Housing Expediter Wilson Wyatt to Los Angeles' Mayor Bowron. The area's housing shortage and its resultant human hardships aren't merely big and acute. They are, as they say in Hollywood, colossal.

Los Angelenos, natives and new-comers, are living in the trailer towns and steel-hut communities that are the hallmark of this Houseless Era. Their plight was graphically described by Jim Marshall in Chaos on the Coast in the September 21st issue of

Collier's. They are living in old trolleys, abandoned busses, tents and in shacks built from surplus Army gliders.

House hunters pay from \$150 to \$1,000 in small bills to racketeers for a lease on an apartment or a home. A number of such grafters have been indicted, but hundreds of others continue to prey on Californians. Hundreds of families are being evicted from homes bought out from under them by financially more fortunate folks.

No other metropolitan region has had so phenomenal a growth in the war years. From 2,700,000 in 1940 the population of Los Angeles County

has grown to 3,600,000. According to the best local brains, Los Angeles itself needs homes for the families of at least 50,000 veterans and some 35,000 civilians. Its satellite towns require an additional 50,000 to 75,000 dwellings.

The same is true in greater or smaller degree throughout the Southwest. The war brought to the region new industries and businesses and people, hundreds of thousands of them, all in search of homes. Housing is the principal preoccupation of people in all stages of the Southwest's society. The rich are crowded by their kinfolk. The well-to-do, unless they own their homes, wonder whether and

when their dwellings will be sold. The poor jam in with their unhappy relatives and haunt the streets looking for places to rent. They find only FOR SALE signs even in the worst slums.

The obvious way to overcome a housing shortage is to build homes. On paper, Los Angeles, for one, proposes to do so. The files at City Hall disclose that in the first eight months of the year, building permits were issued for the construction of 34,095 homes. But less than half of these had been completed. The Home Builders Institute reported that approximately 18,000 houses in the Los Angeles area were unfinished and unteranted.




In swank Beverly Hills, near Los Angeles, there is no shortage of materials to build this tenroom, three-car-garage house at the corner of Sunset Boulevard and Foothill Road. Bricks, plywood, cement lie around in obvious abundance. But in Culver City, also near Los Angeles, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Emmons and Steve, 4, have to convert a bus in order to have shelter. The bus cost \$300, plus \$1,000 to convert. A place to park it will cost \$40 to \$50 a month



In Culver City, near Los Angeles, you can get this bargain. One builder says its prewar cost would have been \$300. House is one room, 14½ x 20 feet. With lot, foundation, heating, plumbing and wiring, the house costs up to \$4,000 today.

TAKE ME HOME FOR \$1295.
AIRPORT VILLAGE PRE-FAB



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Continued from page 21

And we will remain here, dead or alive." She buried her face in her hands.

arms, the numbered hallmarks of Nazi from their mouths and strike on. "Dachau! Daconcentration camps. chau!" they shouted.

Two men hoisted a crippled boy over the gunwale in their arms and dangled his twisted legs in front of the brigadier leaned over the rail amidships, calmly brushing his teeth and spitting carefully into the narrow strip of water separating him up to the cutter. the Palmach from the Dart. Suddenly a decks; it was "Hatikvah," the Jewish national anthem, meaning "hope." Directly before them, barely three miles off, the hills behind Haifa gleamed inshinnied up the mainmast and fastened the blue-and-white Star of David flag any interruption. to the rigging.

been shedding their shirts and trousers. They milled around now in tight swimming trunks.

One tall, bronzed fellow in rose-colored trunks climbed clean over the side and stood on the anchor, his hands holding the rigging behind him.

Forty Who Plunged Overboard

Six times in two hours, Brigadier Graham pleaded with the Jews. Each time their excitement seemed to grow. It was now 8:55. "Achtung! Achtung!" the loud-speaker barked. "This is the last warning." This was the signal. Two boys sprang over the Palmach's bulwarks and plunged into the water twelve feet below. Twenty more followed in as many seconds, tumbling off the schooner from stem to stern in clumsy dives, belly-flops, bottom-busters, any

The Tarzan in rose trunks arched off the anchor. In ten minutes the water was alive with forty heads bobbing like melons, splashing frantically toward shore. Three of the swimmers were girls.

and waited. The brigadier circled us on the Dart. "Pick them up," he ordered through his tin megaphone. We headed for weapons and they had to drop their kits on the Z-craft.

A cargo sling then scooped up this He capsized, and came up sputtering but still clinging to the ring. "Please, gentlemen," he said, "I know I shall be arrested. But first I want to swim ashore and kiss a battered mess kit and a Wehrmacht the soil of the Promised Land." We made canteen covered with mouse-colored felt. for a girl in a white bathing cap. "Will mighty cheer.

These were the famous wartime "Buffaloes" which served so well as floating barbed wire. docks and landing craft along Omaha Beach.

lines our launch and the police boats dinner plates. had thrown them and allowed themselves Three or four boys had made almost a man's land. mile. Between strokes, they somehow

from this place. Palestine is our country. don't want charity, we want freedom! We don't want to die, we want to live! Palestine or death!" they sang in Yid-Two youths about twenty were gestur- dish, loudly, with a terrible courage. ing wildly at purple tattoos on their Then they would hack the salt water

"Transfer swimmers to Z-craft," the Dart said. We had three aboard then, but one jumped back into the water. The press boat picked up nine in all.

In a kind of bulldogging technique, as if they were manipulating some the rest of the swimmers were rounded ghastly puppet show. During the whole up, one by one. Two officers and six demonstration, one man of thirty, with men aboard the Dart had stripped. The a towel wrapped around his red neck, cutter would bear down on a refugee, and four men would plunge in after him, force a rope around his chest and hoist

An hour and a quarter after the break whirlwind of strong music swept the began, the swimmers had been retaken. The brigadier thought perhaps one or two had escaped. The caïque was promptly towed out to the Oceanvigour and, with a Z-craft wedged in between vitingly in the sun. A lad of twelve the two as a floating bridge, the transfer was made in ninety minutes with scarcely

Through the winding aisle of riflemen Inconspicuously, a score of youths had the Jews moved obediently onto the



"The man I marry must be the executive type, or business type, or professional typeor any type, for that matter" JEFFREY MONAHAN COLLIER'S

The Tommies aboard the Palmach Z-craft's platform, down the three steep whipped their guns level with the crowd steps, across the deck and up the ladder

A cargo sling then scooped up this gear and dumped it in a messy pile aboard the transport.

Here was a roll of G.I. blankets, there

On the forecastle the troop comyou take me to Palestine?" she taunted. mander, a pudgy, sweating major with a Then she swam majestically away and rare-roast-beef complexion, was watchthe crowd aboard the Palmach let go a ing the Jews being sprayed with DDT from giant flit guns and then sorted out The Dart had radioed the port and to their bunks in the holds. The whole now two "Z-craft," as the British call foredeck of the ship had been completely them, came churning toward us with closed off by stretching a tough wire their broad steel decks lined with netting around steel poles ten feet high, soldiers holding rifles and Bren guns. sprouting skyward from the rail like giant spikes crowned with a coil of

There were two steel gates to starboard and port, guarded by Tommies with Some of the swimmers were beginning Bren guns standing on the deck above, to tire and reluctantly they took the and fastened with padlocks as big as

All this was obviously a precaution to be hauled aboard. We flung life belts against riots and to prevent the desperate to others who kicked them angrily away from jumping overboard. But the major and swam on. The more some were seemed uneasy about how it gave the coaxed, the more defiant they became. ship the atmosphere of a floating no

"It's a shame all this has to be done," found breath for snatches of a song. "We he said, "but they must be moved, you

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"The mail must go through"—and does, with the help of today's AC's in thousands of mail cars and trucks. Yo can enjoy utmost reliability in spark plug performance by having your plugs checked to be sure they are ritoday's driving and fuels.

AC SPARK PLUG DIVISION . GENERAL MOTORS CORP



LOOK FOR THIS SIGN

SPARK PLUGS CLEANED AND ADJUSTED "I METHOD" MAY SAVE AS MUCH GAS AS 1 GAL

know. You are see they get plenty of shouted. "Do you have to carry some-

screamed when a Tommy accidentally trived deliberately to insult them. pumped the powder full in their faces. young captain, hurried along the passageis going to have a miscarriage."

and acute hysteria. The doctor's biggest job was dressing tear-gas burns.

The soldiers were working hard to make the Jews as comfortable as possible. From two chow lines they served dry bread and tea and heaping ladles noon the sunny foredeck

was filled with Jews lathering themselves luxuriously for their first bath in weeks.

Half an hour after supplies were distributed, trouble developed in Number One hold. A young man wearing a stubbly beard and shorts sprang atop a bunk and started shouting to his companions. "We need no charity or gifts," he cried. "We have our own things. Take nothing from the English. The only thing we want they will not

Don't eat their food! Revolt! Beat the towns. There were Czechs and Ru-English soldiers with sticks!" Then he manians, Bulgarians, Austrians and collapsed, weeping. Instantly the air was Greeks and even a Russian or two. By and shoes. People threw them from all centration camps, but they had lost parts of the hold, and they landed in a almost everything but their lives. growing mound at the young man's feet. Was it fair to these people, you asked, There was a boiling of angry shouts. to keep the contraband ships coming in get it," a bewildered guard said. "How do you like that?"

The Soothing Voice of Cifroni

Somebody slipped past him down into the hold. It was Cifroni, one of our party, a Jewish newspaperman born in move," one informed Zionist had said, Palestine. Cifroni is a little man with a that reflects hearty deviltry or deep kind-

gentle voice, scarcely above a whisper, to a Jew. I wish there were more ships they listened and a deep hush settled strangely over the hold. "Listen," he said in Hebrew, "I know how you feel, think the British will be forced to let the but you'll only make things worse this Jews there enter Palestine before long." way. Calm down, and be patient if you But not all of them would take the clothing back.

Sometimes their unreasoning passion blew over you oppressively, like a desert wind, and their fierce pettiness was caught sight of the "Made in Germany" good cameras in America?" they schedule, she made contact en route with

thing made with filthy German hands?" In the **DDT** cage, two girls kicked and Then they moved away as if I had con-

For a long time no one would tell us The doctor, a serious, hard-working where he came from. "The Diaspora," they would say and nothing more. (Diway. "Have you seen a little woman aspora, to Zionists, means any place outstanding here?" he asked the guard. The side Palestine and is synonymous with guard said she had just gone below. exile.) Finally we discovered that a "Find her," the captain said. "I think she fatuous rumor had been flying around the ship to the effect that in Cyprus She didn't, but she spent the rest of everybody was going to be sorted out and her sixteen-hour voyage in the sick bay. deported back to his birthplace. Then There were some cases of exhaustion you asked yourself, a little ashamed, whether if you had been one of these people your behavior might not now and then seem a bit pathological too. Here were survivors of the most savage extermination campaign in human history.

For years the pattern of these people's of macaroni and meat. There was no lives had been bounded by barbed wire kosher food aboard, and a few orthodox and bayonets. Now they were trying, Jews would eat nothing but biscuits and some with foolish, desperate violence, to water. "We've tried to fix up the ship for hack down the bars that separated them them a bit," an officer said. "I hope it from some little pasture of happiness. makes them feel a little less bitter. It Who were they, the Palmach's cargo? isn't our fault of course. We've got a There was the young Lithuanian woman, job of work to do." He went over and graduate of Auschwitz, now eight began ripping open a case of canvas months pregnant and still weak from sneakers. "We're giving the women and typhus which she had survived in the kiddies shoes, towels and clean Bavaria. There were three 12-year-old clothes, as far as they'll go around." The Polish orphan boys who had spent the soap came in handy and by midafter- past six years wandering like nomads

LOVE IS BLIND—AND DUMB

She often calls her Date a drip, A jerk, a twerp, a comic strip; But when she thinks he's superfine-Superb, dynamic, and divine-Her agile tongue is nearly mute. She merely chirps, "He's kinda cute."

-Ada Farris

give us—Palestine. Return the clothing! through forests and fields and blasted filled with a rain of shirts and trousers no means all of them had been in con-

They're throwing it away and we can't the face of the immigration ban and the British blockade which made it almost certain they would land behind barbed wire on Cyprus, when they might have remained with more comfort and freedom in displaced-persons camps in Europe?

"Of course, it is partly a political quite candidly, "and we are making as barrel chest and a broad, pliable face much capital of it as we can. And how long do you think the Jews would sit in ness on a moment's notice.

He was almost swallowed up in the crowd but as he started to talk in a soft those camps in Europe if we weren't forcing the issue? Whether they're crowd but as he started to talk in a soft fenced in or not, those camps are prison

It is an open secret that voyages like can. They have let us come with you so the Palmach's are carefully organized we can talk to you and get your story. and paid for by Jewish organizations. I hope it won't be very long before the Sometimes the refugees themselves chip problem is solved." It wasn't so much in, but usually by the time they get to what Cifroni said as the way he said it. Italy—whence most of the sailings have They became subdued like a fractious apparently been originating—they are child who has spent himself in a tantrum. broke. On one recent journey it was estimated that the cost was about five hundred dollars per passenger. Some trips purportedly cost much more.

According to what we were able to piece together, the Palmach sailed from maddening. Three tough youths had a port between Taranto and Bari twelve jeered at me belligerently when they days before she was picked up. She had some Jews aboard then, some as crew, mark on my camera. "Haven't you got but she was not full. By a prearranged

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Shopping Time: ON

PINA

Some men just won't buy their of cause they expect a Pinaud Christ The gentlemen's choice for over a

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She wo have you that represent Fragran gift of grailed to chanting

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smaller darting out from island and mainland shores, packed with refugees.

One of these supposedly came from another part of Italy. Another was said to be a fast launch which put out from the Greek islands. A third sailed all the way down the Danube from Budapest carrying at least 100 Hungarian Jews and met the caïque in the Mediterranean only two days before she reached Palestine. At sea, somebody had smeared tar over the caïque's registered name, whatever it was, and nailed a piece of tin with "Palmach" painted on it to the back of the wheelhouse.

The Palmach had to ration water the last two days. The food, bought, scrounged or stolen from various places including UNRRA camps, consisted almost entirely of hard biscuits and canned stuff. The worst hardship for the passengers was having to spend most of the time hiding in the verminous hold where the five-tiered bunks were spaced scarcely ten inches above one another.

With nightfall, things quieted aboard the Oceanvigour. We were sailing due north to the harbor of Famagusta.

Precautions Against Sabotage

At Famagusta another Z-craft, serving as a ferry this time, carried the Jews from the transport anchored offshore into the old port. The unloading was without incident but slow. During the night, army authorities in Haifa had radioed a warning that an attempt to sabotage the Oceanvigour might be made and the vessel should be searched. Some more dynamite had been found in a water bottle on the Palmach, the message said. So the Jews had to leave their canteens behind with their baggage while everything was examined, but nothing more was found.


From the port, the Jews were taken in British army lorries to Caraolos camp, which lies a couple of kilometers north of Famagusta on a flat piece of shoreland covered with cinnamon-colored dust. A city of tents, the camp was designed to accommodate 6,000 but immigration had outstripped construction and it had already been badly overcrowded before the influx of the Palmach load, which would swell the population before sunset to nearly 4,500. As many as ten to twelve people were living in a single tent.


The lieutenant colonel in charge was doing his best to get more tents up. The fall rains were on the way and there was danger of the place becoming a quagmire before a few Nissen huts could be erected to improve the shelter.

One of the camp doctors was apologizing for not having had time so far to make a complete check of the inhabitants for venereal disease and tuberculosis. He feared the incidence of T.B. might be high. "But what these people are suffering most," he said, "is a kind of illness of the heart—homesickness, you might call it." There was a pause in our interview, and over the rumble of trucks outside, it was as if you could hear the fur-capped, bearded zealot leaning against the wailing wall in Jerusalem, reciting the fervid, insistent, uncompromising prayer of Rosh Hashana, a prayer that was more of a battle cry than a supplication.

As the lorries bumped through the camp gate in a cloud of dust, the Jews looked up wearily but without surprise at the enclosure, rimmed with a forbidding double fence of barbed wire twelve feet high, and at the wooden watchtowers rising from the corners where the British guards cradled tommy guns carelessly in their arms. So the voyage of the Palmach was finished. "How long shall we be here?" one of the Jews asked. "And after this, what will you do with us then?"

THE END





DRRIS th happily ev

L be so good to be home . . . tobac ose quiet, cozy evenings . . . the "great man" relaxes in his te chair. And what could be for that mellow mood, than a pipe and a choice of two superb cos to go with it ... REVELATION BOND STREET.

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M: Beeley

FOES OF DEMOCRACY ARE FORGIVEN... WILL ITS FRIENDS BE AMNESTIED?

A million "little Nazis" had a merry Christmas in the western zone of Germany. The American military government gave a blanket amnesty forgiving them for mass annihilation and war.

Arab killers who collaborated with Hitler and who murdered helpless Christians and Moslems even before the war began are being amnestied and brought back to Palestine, equipped to take up their terror and rioting again.

Axis Sallies who broadcast sedition and treason are being pardoned and released from prison.

Polish pogromists in Anders' army who are afraid to go back to Poland where they might face the consequences of their acts are being sent to Palestine where they will have renewed scope for their anti-Semitic excesses.

Merry Christmas, "little Nazis" with bloody hands and black hearts. Merry Christmas, little traitors. Joyous Yuletide, little Polish killers. Happy New Year little Muftis.

We don't want to ask what considerations of power politics lead our statesmen to turn loose the foes of democracy to try again to throw the world into bloody turnoil

We only want to ask when those enlightened statesmen are going to grant an amnesty to the friends of democracy. We only want to ask when the first victims and the staunchest foes of fascism are going to be forgiven the crime of being Hebrews.

In Germany are 250,000 surviving victims of the million "little Nazis." They huddle miserably together in bloodsoaked D.P. Camps. They are the Hebrews who managed not to be slaughtered by the million"little Nazis." No Christmas presents for them. Not even a Christmas visa marked "good for one passage to Palestine"

Maybe Christmas next year will be the Hebrews' turn—after tens of thousands more have died of hunger or freezing or despair in one sort of camp or another, after thousands more have been clubbed and shot by amnestied "little Nazis" all over Europe, after still thousands more have drowned trying to crash the British blockade of Palestine.

What is it that the Hebrew survivors of Dachau and Oswiecim want that the statesmen of the democracies find so difficult to give them? Do they ask for a piece of Germany, or of Italy? Do they want a lion's share of reparations? Do they want atom bombs, or a veto in the U.N.?

No. All they want is to be allowed to go home. Home to Palestine, which the world finally said was their country. Home, out of the bloody hell in which they have somehow existed in dwindling numbers for thirteen years. Thirteen Christmases which were not merry; thirteen New Years which were not happy.

To do what in Palestine? To throw out the Arabs who live there? NO. To build, side by side with them, a modern progressive democracy in what was once the cradle of democracy, and which they, and they alone, can restore to that role.

They are going. They are going the hard way, because they are not allowed to go the easy way. They have learned not to wait for Christmas crumbs from the table of the mighty. They scorn the conferences held in their name which give them nothing but wordy resolutions. They are packing up and heading for their own country. No frontier barriers, no bureaucrat's red tape, no blockade of ships will stop them.


140,000 Americans, who are members of the American League for a Free Palestine, have joined together to put an end to the crime against the Hebrew people. The American League's members have a quick, practical, and complete program. The program is as simple as the three R's:

REPATRIATION of the million-and-a-half Hebrews in Europe, with or without the consent of the Royal Navy, NOW. Transport every man, woman and child out of the horror where six million of their loved ones have died. Transport them to Palestine, with ships, not words, TODAY.

RECOGNITION of the Hebrew Nation, of a Provisional Government of Palestine, of its right to membership in the UN, so that Hebrews will become part of the normal world and cease to be the eternal objects of charity, toleration and pity.

RESISTANCE to British terror in Palestine until every foreign soldier leaves. The Hebrew patriots in Palestine fight for freedom-loving people everywhere. America cannot be neutral—we must back their struggle for survival. The Hebrews fight so their brethren in Europe can come home. They fight for national liberation. It's 1776 in Palestine.

When these three R's are added together they form a fourth: a free Republic in Palestine, modeled on the U. S., where the Hebrew Nation will live in dignity, where Moslems, Christians and Jews can together build the first democracy in the Middle East.



No Merry Christmas In D. P. Camps

WHAT YOU CAN DO

Join Us and end the need for continual charity to a proud and heroic people. You know that charity will solve nothing and that the answer lies in the Hebrews' having freedom and opportunity such as you enjoy. Every dollar you give to the American League goes to a final solution.

Join Us in the struggle for justice in Palestine. Your inaction helps the British legions hold the Middle East in bondage; don't prolong this agony. Back a program for justice to all Palestinians: Jew, Moslem and Christian. Your work and money can do the job, today.

Join Us in the rescue of the Hebrews remaining in Europe. Take away from the anti-Semites their favorite sport—hunting down D.P.'s. Restore the Hebrew Nation to its true dignity and deprive democracy's enemies of their choicest victims. Help turn a tragedy into a victory.

Join Us in the great adventure for the liberation of the Middle East. You're no feudal chieftain paid by Britain to oppress desert peoples in medieval squalor. Bring the land to life by irrigation and scientific farming. Push back the Dark Ages and build factories, power dams and highways. We think Americans should honor lives above oil, learning above ignorance, freedom above slavery.

POOL YOUR ENERGY, COURAGE, MONEY AND HOPE WITH OURS

Your active support can blast the British Empire out of occupied Palestine. Millions of other Americans, Frenchmen, Englishmen and men of good will the world over are with you. This is a campaign to end feudalism and install freedom in the Middle East; it means peace at the crossroads of the world, salvation for heroic Hebrews in postwar Europe, and finis to the problem of the Jews as a homeless, hounded minority.

We are facing a clear-cut conflict, one in which you have to take sides. Your silence in this conflict is your consent to the crime that is about to be committed. Your contribution to the American League, and your active membership in the American League, can underwrite a Hebrew victory—which means a victory for democracy.

AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR A FREE PALE	STINE, INC.
25 WEST 45th STREET, NEW YORK 19, NEW YORK	BRYANT 9-4600
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Gentleman:	
I want to back your FREEDOM program for Palestine. I enclose my contribution to be applied to your work at ho abroad in the amounts of \$ I want to know how I can become active.	me and
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Please make checks payable to Mrs. Louis Untermeyer, Tr	ensurer.



n: Buler

RS; hdb

30th December 1946

Dear Tom,

Those supporters of the "New Republic" who are wont to praise its liberal and unprejudiced outlook (I have heard it so described) may be inclined to change their opinion when they read the enclosed article "No Holds Barred in Palestine".

It is a nast; article, and could only be effectively answered by another article giving the other side of the picture. Whether the "New Republic" would accept such an article or note would be a test of their 'impartiality'. Do you not think that something should be done about it.

In any case I suggest that London might be advised of the kind of statement published by this American correspondent for the Palestine Post and United Press.

Yours ever,

Ronald Sinclair

T. E. Bromley, Esquire,
British Embassy,
Washington, F.C.

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EXTRACT FROM "NEW REPUBLIC" - DECEMBER 23, 1946

"NO HOLDS PAPERED IN PALESTINE"

Ey MORRIS PRILLIANT - An American is a correspondent for the "Palestine Post" and the United Press

"To a Palestine correspondent, the average American's picture of a bleeding, groggy Jewish community taking a beating from the Pritish and being terrorized by the Arabs is completely out of focus. In Palestine, some Jews have taken severe economic blows as a result of the British-imposed curfews and requisitioning. There are a number of discouraged Jews, but the overwhelming feeling is one of bitterness. These Jews are far from beaten.

.....This is an example of how jittery the British in Palestine get. They feel insecure even in their own heavily guarded camps. A soldier can never be certain whether the kilted Scot sitting opposite him at mess or the swarthy Arab peasant who serves drinks in the canteen is what he appears to be.

that the mere word of a police constable or army private is enough to imprision a Jew without trial. As for the Palestine police, they wear ordinary British-army uniforms with a special shoulder badge; they also have uniforms of their own. They are so afraid of Jewish terrorists that when they go off duty they remove their identifying insignia, hoping to be mistaken for ordinary British Tormies, who are not so much hated by the Jews of Palestine.

Court statistics show a large increase in the number of petty offenses by British policemen; that many have deliberately committed crimes so they might be convicted and receive the dishonorable discharge which inevitably follows.

The general morale of the soldiers is low, particularly in the Sixth Airborne Division, which garrisons southern Elestine, including Tel Aviv. These troops wear the proud scarlet berets of the famous "Red Devils", who did great work in the final push against Germany. But they stuff their distinguishing hats in their pockets, when they enter Jewish neighborhoods. The "Red Devils" have a veritable Levantine blood feud with Jewish extremists, arising from the initial operation in Tel Aviv when they fired into a Jewish crowd at a demonstration and killed a number of children. Ever since, Jews have called them "Kalanioth" (Hebrew for poppies), because they have red hats and black hearts.

Demoralization is not confined to the rank and file. Senior British civil, police and military officials who said goodbye to me on my departure for the U.S. all said: "We envy you."

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.....the demoralized Tommies, unable to come to grips with the extremists, take it out on the innocent. Civilians are assaulted, preperty is looted and destroyed. One indiscriminate attach had as its victim Robert Bigio, a visiting correspondent of the Reuter's News Agency, who was beaten within an inch of his life as he confidently strolled the streets of Jerusalem.

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ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,

LONDON.

7th January, 1947.

Man Gines (:

I enclose for your information a copy of a letter which I have sent to the Home Secretary and the Colonial Secretary about a matter of which I think you should know, in case there are any points to which you feel I ought to have regard.

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, EP, Foreign Office,

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7th January, 1947.

Sir Stanley Reed asked a question in the House on the 19th December as to whether action would be taken against the printers and publishers of a periodical called "The Jewish Struggle", which he said contained incitements to violence. I have considered the case, and it appears to me that there is a prima factor case of seditious conspiracy and very probably of treason against three young Jews in this country; the ringleader a British subject aged about 20; the others aliens. The periodical in question is published menthly, and about 20,000 cepies are understood to be printed each month.

I understand it is not thought by the Police that the propaganda it contains, which is in strong support of the policy of the Irgun Zvai Leumi in Palestine, is having much effect in this country. The general intention of the publication may be to support the campaign of violence in Palestine, rather than to incite to commission of violence in this country.

I have been told that it is feared by some that a presecution of the three Jews concerned might result in very serious repercussions, particularly undesirable at a time when the London conference on the future of Palestine is still to be held. If the presecution were fortreason, it would inevitably result in the imposition of death sentences, and this in particular might lead to reprisals on the part of Jewish terrerists.

The responsibility for deciding whether or not to institute proceedings in these dircumstances clearly rests upon me, and I do not wish in any way to shirk it. On the other hand, it is constitutionally proper for me to inform myself of all relevant circumstances which might properly affect my decision where the proposed prosecution is of such a character that matters of public policy may be involved. Indeed, on the 18th Recember, 1924, the then Prime Minister stated that it was the duty of the Attorney-General to inform stated that it was the duty of the Attorney-General to inform himself of the views of the Government or of the appropriate

Minister/

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Minister before coming to a decision.

I should be glad to know, therefore, whether there are any circumstances of which you consider that I should be informed, which might make it undesirable for a presecution to be instituted in this case.

to the Campbell case. I think it should be pointed out that what was concerned there was very different, namely, the withdrawal of proceedings already commenced, for Party political reasons. It is clearly proper to consider whether or not a particular prosecution is in the public interest, although there may be little doubt that, in law, an offence has been committed. It might also be relevant for me to add for your information that, whilst the authorities are keeping a very close watch on Pascist and anti-semitic activities in this country, I have not yet seen evidence which appeared to me to justify the institution of criminal proceedings.

The Rt. Hon. A. Greech Jones, M.P., Colonial Office, Downing Street, London, S.F.1. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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Manuary, 1947.

Dear Hartley,

Thank you for your letter of the 7th
January enclosing a copy of a letter which
you have sent to the Home Secretary and the
Colonial Secretary about a periodical called
"The Jewish Struggle".

Inhave no comments to make on this but

I am grateful to you for sending it to me.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) ERNEST SEVIN

The Right Honourable Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P.


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COLONIAL OFFICE,

DOWNING STREET, S.W.1.

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FOREIGN SECRETARY.

The problem of an interim period in which the Morrison plan could operate prior to the implementation of any partition scheme in Palestine has been considered by the High Commissioner and I would like to bring to your notice his views on such a proposal. He says:

"1. The essential requirements for the solution of the Palestine problem at this time are firstly urgency and secondly finality.

2. The principal objection to the proposal to use the Provincial autonomy scheme as transitional to Partition is that although the scheme holds the promise of finality, yet it is not final in itself. It will almost certainly be unacceptable to both sides, and even if it were acceptable to one or the other, it leaves the way open for claims and counter claims over a wide variety of questions, more particularly the boundaries, which would certainly not reduce the tension and as time went on would more probably increase it.

To the Arabs it will mean an opportunity to continue their preparations for organised violence which are already progressing uncomfortably fast, to the Jews it will present a long period of time for the application of their well known pressure tactics to improve their position backed by world propaganda and their illegal forces.

3. The Arabs will resist any form of partition and at this time are not ready for resistance of a type which could not be quickly suppressed.

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suppressed. If partition is to be introduced eventually, in so far as Arab resistance is concerned it would surely be better to deal with it once and for all proceeding resolutely direct to partition, than to have to suppress them once at the introduction of the transitional period, and again when Partition proper was introduced five years later, and they have had the opportunity of perfecting their organisation.

- 4. The scheme does not produce a solution to the problem of the Jewish illegal Armed Forces which will still remain in being to be used either actually, or as a threat in the event of disagreement with the Central Government.
- 5. The whole problem of security would be extremely difficult. If the Central Government were responsible for law and order the provinces would be in a position to pass contentious and irresponsible legislation without having to deal with resulting lawlessness. On the other hand, if responsibility for law and order were handed over to the provinces, the Central Government would not have the power to deal with such things as raids from one province into another or suppression of minorities in the provinces.
- 6. The proviso that the High Commissioner has the power of veto on all bills would place him in an unhappy position. The provincial legislatures will be encouraged to court popular opinion by passing laws which bear unfairly on a section of the community, e.g. the minority, or which do not fit in with the structure of the Government. The continuous use of the veto by the High Commissioner cannot fail to bring all the opprobrium on to his head, while leaving the provincial legislatures free to continue in the same way.
- 7. It is recognised that some of these disadvantages would disappear were there a certain degree of co-operation between the Central Government,

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the Arabs and the Jews. I regret to say that in the state of Palestine as it is now I see no hope whatever of such co-operation being forthcoming."

Mungows

9th January, 1947.

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COLONIAL OFFICE,

DOWNING STREET, S.W.1.

FOREIGN SECRETARY.

I have had further conversations with Mr.Ben Gurion. He will ask the Zionist Executive (or such members as are available) to come to London on Mednesday, 23rd January. They will be available for discussions on Palestine matters. The Jews make no conditions, but Mr.Ben Gurion confirms our view that there should be the minimum of publicity regarding their coming to London or regarding any conversations we have with them. The talks will be treated as normal Colonial Office consultation.

I have sent the above note to the Prime Minister and a fuller note to you on the conversations will follow.

Muca Jones

9th January, 1947.

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Rem. GABINET

FALESTING.

The London Conference on Palestine is

due to open on February 21st, and the

attached Aide Memoire sets out

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Draft.

The Cabint is now called upon to the line of policy we must follow, subject to constant reporting, as the Conference conference of further december of the Light of proceeds. Since the Conference at Basle closed, many suggestions have been put forward, but they all resolve into three main proposals:-

- (1) The British-American proposals, as announced by the Lord President;
- (2) The Arab proposals, as submitted by the Conference;
 - (3) The Jewish idea of partition.

As regards (1), it is quite clear that in their present form the proposals are unacceptable. Let the Postals.

As regards (2), the Arab proposals will be unacceptable to the Jews.

As regards (3), the Jewish proposal is unacceptable to the Arabs. 4 the whole to the Arabs.

But, to deal with (3) first, it will also be unacceptable to the United Nations, and, as I am informed, nothing can be done in this connection without the consent of the United Nations. I cannot conceive of any British Government, even aided by America,

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proposals on partition with the requisite majority. But since thewhole question of Palestine has proved so troublesome to H.M.G., I personally would have no very violent opposition if I thought that it would prove to be a solution. Acquisite with matter and the first matter of the provession of the

We must therefore consider our line of action. The only thing that we as a mandatory Power can do is to amend the British and American proposals by incorporating into them a good deal of the Arab proposals, and to eliminate from the Arab proposals the restrictions on immigration, provided that steps are taken to prevent a real flooding of immigrants and to effect a system of regulated immigration over a period of, say, 2 years, as a contribution to the European situation. If the Jews insist on partition or on a Jewish State, then, having regard to the terms of the mandate, the question must go to U.N.O. before anything can be done. But even if we follow the plan of merging the Arab and the British proposals, I think the issue would have to go to U.N.O.

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particularly if we went forward with the idea of an independent unitary State.

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[The text of this telegram must first be paraphrased if communicated to persons outside British or United States Government service or if retransmitted in a cypher system other than O.T.P.]

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BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird No. 49
January 17th, 1947.

D. 4.09 p.m. January 17th, 1947. R. 4.53 p.m. January 17th, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem No. 2
Cairo No. 9
Amman
Jedda
Beirut
Damascus

SSSSS

IMMEDIATE

B.B.C. English news this morning reported "from Reuters Bagdad Correspondent" that Arab rulers would be meeting in Saudi Arabia shortly to discuss Palestine.

- 2. The correspondent states that the statement appeared in Cairo newspaper Al Masri and that he had it confirmed from a "high source".
- 3. Regent states it is nonsense and that it seems latest version of the rumour exploded in my telegram No.944.

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1

FROM WASHINGTON TO JERUSALEM

Lord Inverchapel.

No.8

D.10.56 p.m. 16th January, 1947

16th January, 1947. R. 8.30 a.m. 17th January, 1947

Repeated to Foreign Office No.309

Your telegram No.8. 1

Further letter about Gruner from Senator Taft gives text of a letter from President of Hebrew Union College Student Association of Cincinnati. Relevant portion of this letter reads as follows.

[Begins].

The Student Association has learned through a letter to a sister in America, that Gruner was in the vicinity of a raid conducted against a British police headquarters only because he was applying for a position as an electrical engineer in a neighbouring power plant. sister has correspondence to indicate that, while serving with Allied forces in Italy, his intention had been to obtain such a position upon his discharge. [Ends].

2. I have informed the Senator of the circumstances of Gruner's arrest and trial.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].



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B JAN DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Inverchapel.

D. 11.34 p.m. 17th January, 1947.

R. 5.10 a.m. 18th January, 1947.

17th January, 1947.

IMPCRTANT.

Your telegram 304.

We are told that Dr. Emanuel Neuman, Vice President of Silver's Zionist Organisation of America and a member of the World Zionist Executive accompanied by a Mr. Harold Mansen, is in London staying at Claridges Hotel for a few days.

- 2. I have not been able to discover the reason for their presence in London, but as Neuman is said to be very close to Silver, it has been suggested to us that he might be invited to talk to Ministers or senior officials. We have been told Silver would appreciate this and that he has in fact instructed Neuman to cooperate with the British Government in every way.
- 3. We have as yet no official intimination of Silver's attitude towards the despatch of a Delegation to London to join in the unofficial talks. It is however possible that Neuman's visit might offer an opportunity of bringing this about.

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Si. O. Parier D. Ebb8

20 JAN 1947

called at short notice for a paper setting out the various proposed solutions of the Palestine question and the departmental view thereon.

A paper in accordance with the Secretary of State's directions has been prepared and the Secretary of State has asked for it immediately.

The attached copy is submitted to you so that you may know what is being done. I understand that after reading this paper the Secretary of State will make up his mind in what form he will submit it to the Cabinet on Wednesday morning.

R. S. Howl

13th January, 1947.

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TOP SECRET

Draft Cabinet Paper

PALKOTINE

The Present Position

- on 21st January. All the States members of the Arab League will again be represented, and on this occasion there may also be a delegation representing the Arabs of Palestine.

 The Zionist Executive are precluded from participating in the Confer nce by the terms of the resolution passed at their recent Congress in Basle, but they are arranging to meet in London on 22nd January and will be available for informal consultations which can be held at the Colonial Office while the Conference proceeds in St. James' Palace. It thus appears likely that the interested parties will be more fully represented in the forthcoming discussions than they were at Lancaster House last September.
- 2. The British Delegation cannot profitably resume the Conference with the Arabs, or open discussions with the Jews, unless it has clear instructions from the Cabinet based on a decision as to the objective at which British Policy is aiming in Palestine. Furthermore the local situation in that country makes it imperative that the decision of His Majesty's Government on future policy should be announced with the minimum of delay after the end of the forthcoming consultations. For both these reasons, it seems that the time has come for me to put before the Cabinet my present views and to ask for a decision.
- 3. It is already clear that there is no hope of reaching a settlement by means of a tripartite agreement between Arabs, Jews and ourselves, or even of devising a policy which His

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Majesty's Government could impose with the tacit acquiescence or both peoples. If we are to undertake the responsibility for giving effect to a settlement of this problem, we must be prepared to carry it out in the face of resistance from either Arabs or Jews, or in the worst case from both.

4. The only alternative to a firm decision by His Majesty's Government, and its resolute enforcement, is an attempt to divest ourselves of all further responsibility for Palestine either to the United States or by surrendering the mandate/to the United Nations. I we might announce our readiness to evacuate Palestine as soon as the United Nations were prepared to establish an alternative administration. Or we might go further, and announce that our troops and civil administration would be withdrawn on a given date, whether or not the United Nations were then in a position either to take over the Government themselves or appoint another State as a

5. We do not examine this possibility in the present of the (miles) paper, because the Cabinet will also have before them the opinion of the Staff Conference held on 13th January (See that the maintenance of our right to station troops in Palestine is essential to the preservation of our strategic interests in the Middle Rast as a whole. If this opinion is accepted, and unless the Cabinet dissent from the view that the maintenance of British influence in the Middle Bast is of vital importance to the Commonwealth, then we must remain in Palestine and accept responsibility for determining the future of that country.

> o. Assuming a decision to stay in Palestine, there appear to be only four possible policies for the Cabinet to consider:

- (i) enforcing the plan for provincial autonomy which was approved in principle by the Cabinet last July, as a basis for discussion with Arabs and Jews;
- (11) enforcing the plan for provincial autonomy and at the same time granting to both provinces the

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hangler an Voriled States, and the United Staling yerummen agreed to accept it, we should still how to effect the hamofor through the Nations.

Evan if we

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right to secede and so to become fully independent at any time after some such transition period as five years;

- (111) partitioning the country bow into a Jewish State and an Arab area which would be either absorbed into neighbouring Arab States or granted independence in the same way as the Jewish area;
- (iv) negotiating with the Arabs, with a view to reaching agreement on the establishment in Palestine of an independent unitary State with a constitution embodying certain features of the plan presented by the Arab Delegation at the first part of the London Conference.
- proposals, I must draw attention to our position as mandatory for Palestine in relation to the United Nations. We are not committed by the terms of the Charter to placing Palestine under trusteeship, but we are bound to observe the terms of a resolution passed with our concurrence at the final Assembly of the League of Nations in April 1946. This resolution to the expressed intentions of mandatory powers to continue to administer mandated territories in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective mandates "until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory powers".
- 8. It is clear that we could neither partition Palestine, nor create an independent unitary State such as the Araba propose, without previously obtaining the agreement of the United Nations. (On this point, see C.P. (47) 28). Even if we were to adopt the less far-reaching proposal for provincial autonomy, and although we should be within our legal rights in giving immediate effect to it, there would be strong political arguments against doing so without reference to the United

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Nations. The fate of Palestine is so underiably a matter of international concern that we shall in any case be required to account for our policy there. The only doubt, if we were to decide in issuar of provincial sutomony, would be as to whether it was better to present the issue to the United Nations ourselves or to allow some other Government to take the initiative. This being our international position in the matter, we must not overlook in considering that each of the four suggested policies, its probable rece tion by the United Nations of any policy we decide to had forward.

- (i) Provincial Autonomy
- 9. Under provincial autonomy as under partition, the greater part of Palestine would be divided into an Arab and a Jewish area. Their provincial Governments, however, while exercising extensive powers, would not have control of foreign relations, defence or tariff policy, and their autonomy would be limited by the emergency powers of a Central Government under a British High Commissioner. This system might be expected to develop either towards partition or towards the formation of a federal State; the choice between these alternatives would not be predetermined.
- of partition: e.g. the impoverished arab area would not be thrown back on its own financial resources, and since the complicated frontiers between the two areas would have only an administrative significance they would not cause the same degree of inconvenience. It is probable that the Jews would resent provincial autonomy less bitterly than they would a unitary State with an arab majority and possible that the Arabs would rind it less unpalatable than partition. The Jews would at least acquire a large; measure of control over their own immigration and development. And the Arabs would be given some guarantee against the further territorial extension of the

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Zionist invesion. An initial period of disorder and violence might therefore be followed by the reluctant acquiescence of both communities.

- autonomy has been formally and emphatically rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews. Its introduction would be resisted both by non-cooperation and by armed rebellion on the part of both peoples. And even if, for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs they were eventually to acquiesce in its operation, they would each continue the struggle for a final settlement more in conformity with their national aspirations. The Jews would not relax their pressure for more territory nor the Arabs theirs for less immigration.
- (11) Provincial Autonomy as a First Step towards Partition

 12. This proposal is identical with the last, except that Jews and Arabs alike would be guaranteed a right of secession which they could exercise at any time after some specified date approximately five years later than the entry into force of provincial autonomy. The regime of provincial autonomy would thus be given a more explicity transitional character, and partition would be suggested from the outset as its logical conclusion.
- 13. The advantage of amending the provincial autonomy plan in this way is that it might moderate Jewish opposition and make the plan more acceptable to opinion in the United States. Conversely, however, it might stiffen resistance from the Arab side.

(111) Partition

any particular scheme of partition would depend almost entirely on where the frontier was drawn between the Jewish and the Arab States. The frontier which was considered by a Cabinet Committee under the late Coalition Government was broadly similar to the line suggested as a provincial boundary in the more recent

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proposal/

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proposal for provincial autonomy. It may be assumed that, if partition were adopted in principle by His Majesty's Government, the frontier proposed would provide for a Jewish State of roughly the same dimensions.

approval of a substantial body of opinion in this country.

In principle the solution of partition also has strong backing in the United States, but this is largely due to the knowledge that it would be acceptable (again in principle) to the Zionists. The ionists, however, would indignantly protest against frontiers of the kind under consideration. Even if the leaders agreed in the last resort to administer a State within the area offered to them, they would first press te American Government to work for its enlargement, and in the long run they would not be able to suppress irredentist movements in their State. In these circumstances it i doubtful whether the settlement would command the support of American opinion.

which its enforcement would probably have on Anglo-Arab
relations generally. The reation of a Jewish State even in the
relatively restricted area now suggested would undoubtedly
involve serious injustices for the Arab population of
Palestine: a large Arab minority under Jewish rule, the loss
of a large proportion of the Arab community's taxable capacity
owing to the inclusion of nearly the whole citrus-growing area
in the Jewish State, and the severance of Arab Galilæ from the
rest of the Arab territory by a corridor of Jewish land.
Still more provocative of Arab resistance would be the fear that
a Jewish State would be driven to pursue an expansionist policy.

17. The threat of partition would provoke an Arab rising in Palestine. It is not possible to foresee precisely how strong the revolt would be, how much active support it would receive from the Arab States, or how deep and lasting would be the effect

on/

Britain. But the certainty of Arab hostility to partition is so clear, and the consequences of permanently alienating the Arabs would be so serious, that partition must on this ground alone be regarded as a desperate remedy. The risk cannot be excluded that it would contribute to the elimination of British influence from the whole of the vast Moslem area lying between Greece and India. This would have not only strategic consequences; it would also jeopardize the security of our interest in the increasingly important oil production of the Middle Hast (See C.P. (47) 11

- 16. As I have already said, partition could not be put into effect without the previous consent of the United Nations.

 I am convinced that this consent could not be obtained. The adoption of partition as our solution for the Palestine problem would therefore expose us to an almost certain defeat in the General Assembly, thus leading us back to our present situation, with the choice between continuing to govern Palestine in accordance with the mandate or beginning again to search for an alternative policy.
 - (iv) An independent unitary State
- made proposals under which Palestine would be granted its independence, after a short period of transition, as a unitary democratic State with an arab majority. There would be no further Jewish immigration except by Arab consent. The Jews would receive constitutional guarantees of their tivil and religious rights, and of their representation in the legislative assembly in proportion to their numbers. These guarantees could not be modified without Jewish consent. It was contemplated that the independent State would enter into Treaty relations with Great Britain.
- 20. These proposals, to which the British Delegation have not yet made any reply, are not acceptables in their present

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form. But if we decided to aim at agreement with the Arab States, it would probably be necessary to adopt their proposals as a basis for negotiation; and there is reason to suppose that in these circumstances the Arab delegates could be induced to make substantial concessions

21. The main issue on which the British Delegation would have to demand modification of the Arab proposals is of course Jewish immigration. It would not be possible for His Majesty's Government to adopt a policy leading towards the creation in Palestine of an independent democratic State with an Arab majority unless they were able at the same time, and as part of the same plan, to grant a substantial number of immigration certificates. It would have to be ascertained at an early stage in the discussions that the Arabs were prepared to pay this price for a general settlement of the kind they have advocated. His Majesty's Government would also have to satisfy themselves that the position of the Jewish National Home was adequately safeguarded in the constitution of the proposed independent State. To this end they might press for extensive powers of local self-government approximating to those contemplated in the plan for provincial autonomy, thus enabling Jewish cantons to be established within the framework of the unitary State.

settlement borrowing largely from that plan and washed out so far as possible by negotiation with the Arabs, which forms the fourth of the possible policies considered in this paper. If the Palestinian Arabs, with their more intransigent attitude, do in fact attend, the second part of the Conference, they will make it more difficult to reach any formal agreement. But it is reasonable to expect that a settlement on these lines would be broadly satisfactory to Arab opinion.

is that the Palestinian Jaws would not submit to it without a struggle. The great majority of them have come to believe that the Balfour Declaration contained or implied a promise of a Jawish State; they are better prepared than the Arabs for an armed rising or a civil wer; and, whatever the attitude of the Zionist Executive might be, leaders would be found to develop the present terriorist campaign into a major rebellion. This would occur during the period of transition in which ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of order would still rest with His Majesty's Government.

24. The amnouncement of this policy, and the ensuring clash between armed Jews and British troops in Palestine, would cause a violent outburst of indignation many the Zionists and their supporters in the United States. Much abuse of Britain would appear in the Press, and the Administration might be compelled to associate itself in some way with this explosion of feeling. It is however doubtful/

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doubtful whether American hostility towards us on this account would be either widespread or lasting. It is also to be noted that mone of the other proposed solutions would satisfy the Zionists, and that any one of them might therefore have a similar effect, differing no doubt in intensity, on American public ominion.

now under consideration is that it is the only one likely to be supported by either of the two directly interested parties. It also offers the best hope of progress towards a settlement by means of regotiation with either side. These arguments for the proposal become even more cogent if it is agreed that one of our principal motives in retaining responsibility for Palestine is to secure our political and strategic position in the Middle Rast, which depends to so great an extent on the maintenance of Arab goodwill.

the British Delegation to enter into serious discussions with the representatives of the Arab States at the resumed Conference. Any other course would lead to an early breakdown of the talks, and this might have disturbing consequences. For the failure of this Conference, followed by the announcement of a policy in Falestine which was unacceptable to the Araba, would be represented in the Arab countries as a defeat for the Arab League and for the present Arab Governments. This would give/an immediate imposus to embyeroive movements in Iraqi, Syria and possibly elsewhere.

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The present Iraqi and Syrian Governments, even if they were not swept away and replaced by Governments less friendly to ourselves, would probably be driven by fear of revolutionary nationalism to adopt a hostile attitude towards us in relation to Pelestine and to connive at least in the transit of arms and volunteers to support Arab disorder in Falostine.

other Arab countries would be so immediately affected. But any policy which aroused Arab hostility would be challenged in the United Mations by the whole of the Arab bloc. There can be little doubt that in this event the Soviet group would align itself with the Arabs. We should thus have helped to bring about a diplomatic combination which it should be one of the first aims of our policy to prevent, and which if it lasted would weaken our position not only in the Middle East but also at the meetings of the United Nations.

28. Finally, a policy siming at the early concession of independence to a unitary Palestinian State constituted on democratic principles would be in accord with the prevailing trend of world epinion on the treatment of dependent areas. It would therefore be more likely than any other policy to command the approval of the United Nations.

Conclusion

29. No course of action in Falestine is free from danger. Nevertheless a choice must be made. I have reached the conclusion that our next step should be to authorise/

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authorise the British Delegation at the forthcoming Conference to enter into negotiation with the Arab Delegations in order to ascertain what measure of egreement is possible on the lines of the fourth proposal discussed in this paper.

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
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The attached paper is for consideration at TODAY'S MERING (Feducate, 15th January, 1947) of the Capinet at 10.30 c.m.

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The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

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CIDINET

LLESTINE

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

- 1. The London Conference on lalestine is due to re-open on 21st January. The Cabinet is now called upon to determine the line of policy we must follow in the opening stages of the Conference.
- 2. The many suggestions which have been put forward resolve themselves into three main proposals:-
 - (a) the plan for provincial autonomy drafted last July by the conference of British and American officials;
 - (b) a unitary independent State, as proposed by the Arabs at Lancaster House;
 - (c) partition, which the Zionists went.

These proposals are examined in the memorandum annexed to this paper.

- 3. It is quite clear that proposal (a) in its present form is unacceptable to either Arabs or Jews. Proposal (b) is unacceptable to the Jews. Proposal (c) is unacceptable to the Arabs.
- 4. To deal with (c) first, partition would also be unacceptable to the United Nations, and I am advised that we could not give effect to this policy without previously obtaining the consent of the United Nations. Personally, I would have no very violent objection to partition if I thought it would prove to be a solution. But I cannot conceive of the British Government, even aided by the United States, being able to carry partition with the requisite majority.
- 5. We must therefore consider another line of action. We must take the proposals made by the British and American officials as our basis, while amending them in such a way that they point towards an independent unitary State and incorporating into them as much as possible of the Arab plan. We must of course make it clear that we cannot accept the Arab proposals on immigration, though steps must be taken to prevent a real flooding of the country by Jewish immigrants.

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6. With this as our aim, we can ask the British Delegation to re-open the Conference by telling the Arabs that we have not been convinced that their proposals deal adequately with the problem; that we have therefore not withdrawn our own plan; but that we are ready to examine with them the possibility of arriving at a compromise which would enable us to discharge our obligations in I clestine and to satisfy world opinion. The Delegation would report constantly to the Cabinet, and its course of action would be subject to review as the Conference proceeded.

7. If we allowed the Jews to insist on partition and the creation of a Jewish State (which was not promised in the Balfour Declaration) then we would face defeat in the United Nations. Even if we follow the plan of merging the Arab and the British proposals, I think the issue will have to go before the United Nations. But in that event I am satisfied that we should get sufficient support.

E. B.

Foreign Office, S.W.l.

14TH JAMUARY, 1947.

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The Present Position

- 1. The London Conference on Palestine is due to re-open on 21st January. All the States members of the Arab League will again be represented, and on this occasion there may also be a delegation representing the Arabs of Palestine. The Zionist Executive are precluded from participating in the Conference by the terms of the resolution passed at their recent Congress in Basle, but they are arranging to meet in London on 22nd January and will be available for informal consultations which can be held at the Colonial Office while the Conference proceeds in St. James' Palace. It thus appears likely that the interested parties will be more fully represented in the forthcoming discussions than they were at Lancaster House last September.
- 2. The British Delegation cannot profitably resume the Conference with the Arabs, or open discussions with the Jews, unless it has clear instructions from the Cabinet based on a decision as to the objective at which British Pelicy is aiming in Palestine. Furthermore the local situation in that country makes it imperative that the decision of His Majesty's Government on future policy should be announced with the minimum of delay after the end of the forthcoming consultations
- 3. It is already clear that there is no hope of reaching a settlement by means of a tripartite agreement between wrabs, Jews and ourselves, or even of devising a policy which His Majesty's Government could impose with the tacit acquiescence of both peoples. If we are to undertake the responsibility for giving effect to a settlement of this problem, we must be prepared to carry it out in the face of resistance from either Arabs or Jews, or in the worst case from both.
- 4. The only alternative to a firm decision by His Majosty's Government, and its resolute enforcement, is an attempt to divest ourselves of all further responsibility for Palestine by surrendering the mandate either to the United States or to the United Nations. wished to transfer Palestine to the United States, and the United States Government agreed to accept it, we should still have to effect the transfer through the machinery of the United Nations. We might announce our readiness to evacuate Palestine as soon as the United Nations were prepared to establish an alternative administration. Or we might go further, and announce that our troops and civil administration would be withdrawn on a given date. whether or not the United Nations were then in a position either to take over the Government themselves or appoint another State as a trustee.

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- 5. This possibility is not examined in the present paper, because at a recent Staff Conference it was decided that the maintenance of our right to station troops in Palestine is essential to the preservation of our strategic interests in the Middle East as a whole. If this opinion is accepted, then we must remain in Palestine and accept responsibility for determining the future of that country.
- 6. Assuming a decision to stay in Falestine, there appear to be only four possible policies for the Cabinet to consider -
 - (i) enforcing the plan for provincial autonomy which was approved in Principle by the Cabinet last July, as a basis for discussion with Trabs and Jews;
 - (ii) partitioning the country now into a Jewish State and an Arab area which would be either absorbed into neighbouring and States or granted independence in the same way as the Jewish area;
 - (iii) negotiating with the Arabs, with a view to reaching agreement on the establishment in Palestine of an independent unitary State with a constitution embodying certain features of the plan presented by the Arab Delegation at the first part of the London Conference.
- 7. Before further consideration is given to these three proposals, attention must be drawn to our position as mandatory for Palestine in relation to the United Nations. We are not committed by the terms of the Charter to placing Palestine under trusteeship, but we are bound to observe the terms of a resolution passed with our concurrence at the final Assembly of the Beague of Nations in April 1946. This resolution took note of the expressed intentions of mandatory powers to continue to administer mandated territories in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective mandates "until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory powers".
- It is clear that we could neither partition Palestine, nor create an independent unitary State such as the Arabs propose, without previously obtaining the agreement of the United Nations. (On this point, see C.P.(47)28). Even if we were to adopt the less far-reaching proposal for provincial autonomy, and although we should be within our legal rights in giving immediate effect to it, there would be strong political arguments against doing so without reference to the United Nations. The fate of Palestine is so undeniably a matter of international concern that we shall in any case be required to account for our policy there. The only doubt, if we were to decide in favour of provincial automony, would be as to whether it was better to present the issue to the United Nations ourselves or to allow some other Government to take the initiative. This being our international position in the matter, we must not overlook the probable reception by the United Nations of any policy we decide to put forward.

(i) Provincial Autonomy.

9. Under provincial autonomy as under partition, the greater part of lalestine would be divided into an Arab and a Jewish area. Their provincial Governments, however, while exercising extensive powers, would not have control of foreign relations, defence or tariff policy, and their autonomy would be limited by the emergency powers of a Central Government under a British High Commissioner. This system might be expected to develop either towards partition or towards the formation of a federal State; the choice between these alternatives would not be predetermined.

10. This plan would avoid many of the practical difficulties of partition: e.g. the impoverished has area would not be thrown back on its own financial resources, and since the complicated frontiers between the two areas would have only an administrative significance they would not cause the same degree of inconvenience. It is probable that the Jews would resent provincial autonomy less bitterly than they would a unitary State with an Arab majority and possible that the Arabs would find it less unpalatable than partition. The Jews would at least acquire a larger measure of control over their own immigration and development. And the Arabs would be given some guarantee against the further territorial extension of the Zionist invasion. An initial period of disorder and violence might therefore be followed by the reluctant acquiescence of both communities.

11. The fact remains that the proposal for provincial autonomy has been formally and emphatically rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews. Its introduction would be resisted both by non-co-operation and by armed rebellion on the part of both peoples. And even if, for the reasons stated in the proceding paragraphs they were eventually to acquiesce in its operation, they would each continue the struggle for a final settlement more in conformity with their national aspirations. The Jews would not relax their pressure for more territory nor the Arabs theirs for less immigration.

(ii) Lartition.

- 12. Partition is a vague word. The meaning and consequences of any particular scheme of partition would depend almost entirely on where the frontier was drawn between the Jewish and the Arab States. The frontier which was considered by a Cabinet Committee under the late Calition Government was broadly similar to the line suggested as a provincial boundary in the more recent proposal for provincial autonomy. It may be assumed that, if partition were adopted in principle by His Majesty's Government the frontier proposed would provide for a Jewish State of roughly the same dimensions.
- 13. Partition on these lines would meet with the approval of a substantial body of opinion in this country. In principle the solution of partition also has strong backing in the United State but this is largely due to the knowledge that it would be acceptable (again in principle) to the Zionists. The Zionists, however, would indignantly protest against frontiers of the kind under consideration. Even if the leaders agreed in the last resort to administer a State within the area offered to them, they would first press the American Government to work for its enlargement, and in the long run they would not be able to suppress irredentist movements in their State. In these circumstances it is doubtful whether the settlement would command the support of American opinion.

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14. A graver objection to partition lies in the effect which its enforcement would probably have on Anglo-Arab relations generally. The creation of a Jewish State even in the relatively restricted area now suggested would undoubtedly involve serious injustices for the Arab population of Lalestine: a large Arab minority under Jewish rule, the loss of a large proportion of the Arab community's taxable capacity owing to the inclusion of nearly the whole citrus-growing area in the Jewish State, and the severance of Arab Galilee from the rest of the Arab territory by a corridor of Jewish land. Still more provocative of Arab resistance would be the fear that a Jewish State would be driven to pursue an expansionist policy.

15. The threat of partition would provoke an Arab rising in a clestine. It is not possible to foresee precisely how strong the revolt would be, how much active support it would receive from the Arab States, or how deep and lasting would be the effect on the attitude of the Arab Governments and peoples to Great Britain. But the certainty of Arab hostility to partition is so clear, and the consequences of permanently alienating the Arabs would be so serious, that partition must on this ground alone be regarded as a desporate remedy. The risk cannot be excluded that it would contribute to the elimination of British influence from the whole of the vast Moslem area lying between Greece and India. This would have not only strategic consequences; it would also jeopardise the security of our interest in the increasingly important oil production of the Middle East (Sec C.i. (47) 11).

16. As has already been said, partition could not be put into effect without the previous consent of the United Nations. It is most unlikely that this consent could be obtained. The adoption of partition as our solution for the Lalestine problem would therefore expose us to an almost certain defeat in the General Assembly, thus leading us back to our present situation, with the choice between continuing to govern lalestine in accordance with the mandate or beginning again to search for an alternative policy.

(iii) An independent unitary State.

17. The delegations of the Irab States at Lancaster House made proposals under which lalestine would be granted its independence, after a short period of transition, as a unitary democratic State with an Irab majority. There would be no further Jewish immigration except by Arab consent. The Jews would receive constitutional guarantees of their civil and religious rights, and of their representation in the legislative assembly in proportion to their numbers. These guarantees could not be modified without Jewish consent. It was contemplated that the independent State would enter into Treaty relations with Great Britain.

18. These proposals, to which the British Delegation have not yet made any reply, are not acceptable in their present form. But if we decided to aim at greement with the Arab States, it would probably be necessary to adopt their proposals as a basis for negotiation; and there is reason to suppose that in these circumstances the Arab delegates could be induced to make substantial concessions.

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19. The main issue on which the British Delegation would have to demand modification of the Arab proposals is of course Jewish immigration. It would not be possible for His Majesty's Government to adopt a policy leading towards the creation in Falestine of an independent democratic State with an Arab majority unless they were able at the same time, and as part of the same plan, to grant a substantial number of immigration certificates. It would have to be ascertained at an parly stage in the discussions that the Arabs were prepared to may this price for a general settlement of the kind they have advocated. His Majesty's Government would also have to satisfy themselves that the position of the Jewish Mational Home was adequately safeguarded in the constitution of the proposed independent State. To this end they might press for extensive powers of local self-government approximating to those contemplated in the plan for provincial autonomy, thus enabling Jewish cantons to be established within the framework of the unitary State.

20. It is therefore not the Arab plan, but a settlement borrowing largely from that plan and worked out so far as possible by negotiation with the Arabs which forms the third of the possible policies considered in this paper. If the Palestinian Arabs, with their more intransigent attitude, do in fact attend the second part of the Conference, they will make it more difficult to reach any formal agreement. But it is reasonable to expect that a settlement on these lines would be broadly satisfactory to Arab opinion.

21. The principal objection to this proposal is that the Palestinian Jews would not submit to it without a struggle. The great majority of them have come to believe that the Palfour Declaration contained or implied a promise of a Jewish State; they are better prepared than the Arabs for an armed rising or a civil war; and, whatever the attitude of the Zionist Executive might be, leaders would be found to develop the present terrorist campaign into a major rebellion. This would occur during the period of transition in which ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of order would still rest with His Majesty's Government.

22. The announcement of this policy, and the ensuing clash between armed Jews and British troops in Palestine, would cause a violent outburst of indignation among the Zionists and their supporters in the United States. Much abuse of Britain would appear in the Fress, and the Administration might be compelled to associate itself in some way with this explosion of feeling. It is however doubtful whether American hostility towards us on this account would be either widespread or lasting. It is also to be noted that none of the other proposed solutions would satisfy the Zionists, and that any one of them might therefore have a similar effect, differing no doubt in intensity, on American public opinion.

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26. Any course which did not permit the British Delegation to enter into serious discussion with the Ara s would lead to an early breakdown of the Conference, and this might have disturbing consequences. For the failure of this Conference, followed by the announcement of a policy in Palestine which was unacce table to the Arabs, would be represented in the Arab countries as a defeat for the Arab League and for the present Arab Governments. This would give rise to an immediate anti-British agitation in Iraq, Syria and possibly elsewhere. The present Iraqi and Byrian Governments, even if they were not swept away and replaced by Governments less friendly to curselves, would probably be driven by fear of revolutionary nationalism to adopt a hostile attitude towards us in relation to Palestine and to connive at least in the transit of arms and volunteers to support Arab disorder in Falestine.

27. It is unlikely that our relations with the other Arab countries would be so immediately affected. But any policy which aroused Arab hostility would be challenged in the United Nations by the whole of the Arab bloc. There can be little doubt that in this event the Soviet group would align itself with the Arabs. We should thus have helped to bring about a diplomatic combination which it should be one of the first aims of our policy to prevent, and which if it lasted would weaken our position not only in the Middle Last but also at the meetings of the United Nations.

28. Finally, a policy aiming at the early concession of independence to a unitary Falestinian State constituted on democratic principles would be in accord with the prevailing trend of world opinion on the treatment of dependent areas. It would therefore be more likely than any other policy to command the approval of the United Nations.

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NOTES FOR A DRAFT TELEGRAM TO LORD INVERCHAPEL

We have made many efforts to settle

Palestine, and when the Palestine Conference opens we
shall be confronted with Jews and Arabs with great

bitterness to whatever we propose, and it is very

doubtful whether we shall get agreement. But what

I am not clear about yet is what is the American policy?

have made with the Anglo Russian (?) Committee, the ten points of which we would have adopted and carried through, the turning down of 9 of the 10 points, or at least the postponement of nine of the ten points by the United States, and then the British-American experts' report which also was turned down by the United States Government very rapidly and almost without reason, and now we have to meet in conference and work up a solution. What solution does the United States favour: what solution would they be inclined to back?)

I think discreet enquiries should be made to find out exactly where they stand. I would not do this in the ordinary way, but while we are the mandatory power the United States have always claimed the right to intervene and we have not been free to carry out our mandate according to our own lease.

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in Palestine, and we shall scon be taking into account the results of the Conference with the Arabs and of informal discussions It is becoming increasingly with the Jews. important for us to know more about te American policy in this matter of the United States who have for a long time acted as if they had a right of intervention in Paleston of Palestons of fairs. 2. Recent history gives us some grounds (Owing to the inter vention afthe United States for anxiety on this score. A The United intervention in Palestinian affairs and we have not been free to administer our mandate according to our own ideas. Ever since the present British Government came into office we have tried to co-operate as closely as possible with the United States. the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry presented its report, we were ready to enter into consultation with the United States Government on its ten recommendations. But these consultations were prevented by President Truman's impetuous endorsement of one of the ten points and his postponement of consideration for the other nine. The next stage was the meeting of British and American officials in London. Their report, which we were ready to adopt as a

basis for negotiation with Arabs and Jews,

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- to understand the position of the United

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 States, in this matter because of their great
 influence in the General Assembly of the United
 Nations. Whatever statement we decide to put
 forward, we shall probably have to refer it
 to the General Assembly, and the Assembly's
 decision will depend to a considerable extent on
 the attitude of the United States delegation.
- discreet enquiries in order to find out exactly as may be possible.

 where they stand. I would like to know not only what solution they themselves would prefer, but also how their delegate in the United Nations

 Assembly would be likely to cast his vote, if

 H.M.G. brought forward any other of the proposals which have recently been under discussion.

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 528.

D. 9.10. p.m. 17th Jenuary 1947.

17th January 1947.

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IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

We are now considering our future policy in Palestine, and we shall soon be taking into account the results of the Conference with the Arabs and of informal discussions with the Jews. It is becoming increasingly important for us to know more about the policy in this matter of the United States who have for a long time acted as if they had a right of intervention in Palestine affairs.

2. Recent history gives us some grounds for anxiety on this score. Owing to the intervention of the United States we have not been free to administer our mandate according to our own ideas. Ever since the present British Government came into office we have tried to cooperate as closely as possible with the United States. When the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry presented its report, we were ready to enter into consultation with the United States Government on its ten recommendations. But these consultations were prevented by President

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President Truman's impetuous endorsement of one of the ten points and his postponement of consideration for the other nine. The next stage was the meeting of British and American officials in London. Their report, which we were ready to adopt as a basis for negotiation with Arabs and Jews, was turned down by the United States Government very rapidly and almost without reason. Since then, President Truman has indicated that he views with favour the Zionist plan for partition, but we do not know how strongly the United States would be prepared to other possible proposals.

- 3. It is particularly important to us to understand the position of the United States Government in this matter because of their great influence in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Whatever settlement we decide to put forward, we shall probably have to refer it to the General Assembly, and the Assembly's decision will depend to a considerable extent on the attitude of the United States delegation.
- enquiries in order to find out as clearly as may be possible where they stand. I would like to know not only what solution they themselves would prefer, but also how their delegate in the United Nations Assembly would be likely to cast his vote, if His Majesty's Government brought forward any other of the proposals which have recently been under discussion.

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